Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Africa, Volume XIV

299. Telegram From the Embassy in Ghana to the Department of State⁰

Accra, August 25, 1960, 6 p.m.

283. Deptel 183.¹ Apparent drift towards Soviets noted in reftel is in my opinion a reflection of GOGhana’s determination to pursue more actively its policy of positive neutralism (like India, it now seeks political support and material benefits from any source so long as it feels this can be done without dangerous involvement). It is not a turning away from the West. It is Ghana’s idea of wide angle vision as it seeks political friends and commercial bargains wherever they may be found. It is what Ghana regards as the final breaking of chains that before independence kept Ghana confined entirely to the West. I do not think this could have been prevented by any USG action and feel we must expect some more manifestations of closer relations with Soviets before position stability. I believe that when this point is reached the West will still be far ahead.

GOGhana has always recognized ChiCom but never took initiative to exchange diplomatic missions. ChiCom Embassy is the 23rd diplomatic mission established in Ghana and GOGhana claims and I believe it accepted ChiCom’s for same normal reason it accepted new Turkish Embassy just established here.

The alleged Soviet interest in Volta project does not attract Nkrumah so long as he has faith in effective support from US as he now has. He has told me this several times recently. At same time he sees no reason to turn down USSR offer to build steel mill if it proves feasible and USG or US companies not interested or not competitive with USSR.

The purchase of 4 Soviet aircraft is part of expansion scheme announced by Minister of Transport “to make Ghana airways the leading airline of Africa”. Ghana simultaneously purchased five new British aircraft and three second-hand American aircraft. Soviet prices and terms were more favorable than others. The four Soviet aircraft now here are being used by GOGhana pending delivery of the new aircraft.

I would not wish minimize dangers inherent in this increasing contact with Soviet Bloc but feel we must be careful not to attribute motives to GOGhana that do not exist. The West has always had a dominant position in Ghana and in my opinion this will continue. I believe we would defeat our own purpose if we tried at every turn to thwart contact with Soviet Bloc.

To match USSR fully in cultivating friendship with Ghana we would have to be more positive in supporting Africa against European NATO powers. We would also have to oppose “neo-Colonialism” in Africa and encourage Ghana’s desire to create (in the words of Nkrumah) “a socialist New Jerusalem” in Ghana.

In my opinion Ghana is not communist and I detect no desire here that it become so. It is trying to develop a type of socialism that has its roots in tribal life determined not to be exploited by East or West. I feel we should endorse Ghana’s policy of positive neutralism and as far as possible show Ghana by our deeds that we are truer friends than USSR. This will not be easy as long as some of our official documents and unofficial papers emphasize we are interested in Africa as a source of raw materials and market for our manufactures while USSR cites brotherhood as its motive.

For background see Embdes 497 March 3 and 590 April 28.²

Flake

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 645J.60/8–2560. Confidential.

1. Telegram 183 to Accra, August 19, reads in part as follows:

   “FYI. Dept concerned re apparent increase Bloc influence Ghana (i.e. ChiCom Embassy, alleged Soviet interest in Volta Project and steel industry, alleged purchase of Soviet aircraft, continued utilization Soviet aircraft by GOG, etc.). Request your appraisal of seriousness this apparent drift toward Soviets and your recommendations as to what action Dept might consider. End FYI.” (Ibid., 745J.11/8–1260)

2. Despatch 497 contains an analysis of Ghana’s politics and policies. (Ibid., 745J.00/3–360) Despatch 590 transmitted a country summary paper prepared for the Conference of Chiefs of Mission held at Tangier, May 30–June 2. (Ibid., 120.1471/4–2860)