Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Africa, Volume XIV

297. Telegram From the Embassy in Ghana to the Department of State ⁰

Accra, July 3, 1960, 2 p.m.

4. Deputy Under Secretary Hare departed July 2 after four days here attending ceremonies incident to Ghana’s becoming a republic July 1.¹ Before inauguration he talked briefly with Nkrumah who was still Prime Minister. On departure day he was received by President Nkrumah for private conversation lasting thirty minutes which was notable for its frankness and cordiality.

At outset this last conversation Hare presented gift globe of world and made some fitting remarks about roles our respective countries in world today. This pleased Nkrumah and created friendly atmosphere for talk.

Hare then opened main conversation with general exposé of USG’s inescapable role in current world affairs. He said USG faced two basic challenges which he characterized as (1) destructive and (2) constructive. The destructive challenge was direct result of Soviet imperialistic Communism. USG accepted principle of “peaceful coexistence” if it truly meant a policy of live and let live and USG had proved this by its relations with Communist Yugoslavia. But USSR did not hide fact it seeks Communist supremacy throughout the world.

Nkrumah who had been nodding assent vigorously interrupted at this point to say with obvious relish: “Yes, they want to do all the “existing” and have others do all the ‘co-ing’.”

Hare went on to say USG desires disarmament but this complicated by vital control problem arising from closed nature of Soviet world which was quite different from open nature of Western, especially US, world. He stressed current difficulties this subject stem from our prudence in negotiating with a society that is reluctant to reciprocate the open attitude we have demonstrated.

Nkrumah indicated a sympathetic understanding of the problem.

Turning to the “constructive challenge” confronting USG, Hare said it concerned countries sometimes referred to as “underdeveloped” but which he preferred to call “emerging” or “re-emerging” countries. He stressed USG has neither political nor economic imperialistic designs; that only thing American people and their government want is to see that development of strong political and economic systems which will permit the full cultural expression of the people within these countries as regards their political development, USG considered this the affair of each individual country but hoped they would develop into strong nations with external policies permitting them to maintain their political integrity.

During this phase of conversation Nkrumah frequently demonstrated his agreement with what Hare was saying.

Turning to subject of economic and cultural development of African countries, Hare said USG wants to be as helpful as possible but is confronted by a number of practical problems in attempting to provide assistance. He remarked that in Department today no subject is of greater interest than Africa, noting there were committees to study specific African problems and mentioning the recent chiefs of mission meeting in Tangier.² He emphasized that, although USG has a clear general policy regarding Africa, there was considerable difficulty in determining what specifically should be done. Unlike Ghana, many of the emerging countries were “formless” in that they were not aware of their own needs or possible ways of meeting them such a situation placed USG in awkward position. USG policy was one of responding to requests of others, not of imposing our own views therefore programs of action are difficult to set out when the various countries are not clear about what they themselves want. Hare concluded that he would like to have any suggestions Nkrumah might make.

Nhrumah appeared genuinely pleased by this opportunity to express his views and started out by recognizing that the problem was indeed difficult. He made three major points:

(1) That USG should choose “certain countries” in Africa to assist USG in carrying out its policies and programs in Africa;

(2) That aid to Africa should be administered on a multilateral basis; and

(3) That an “American” approach to Africa (as distinguished from a “European” approach) should be developed.

In elaborating the first point Nkrumah stressed that direct assistance from outside Africa would be suspect to many African countries but that such outside assistance could be funneled successfully through some truly independent African state. He left little doubt as to the one African country he had in mind which could be used. Within this context he cited both directly and by inference, Ghana’s actions in relation to Guinea and Congo.

In relation to Guinea, Nkrumah said he had talked at length with Sekou Toure since Toure’s arrival in Ghana June 28 for inaugural celebrations. He had questioned Toure directly on reports of Communist penetration in Guinea and after two hours discussion with Toure he thought the reports had been exaggerated to some extent. He recalled that Ghana had tried to help Guinea initially and indicated that after further conversation with Toure he (Nkrumah) probably would advance more of the ten million pounds credit once offered by Ghana of which Guinea has already drawn four million. Nkrumah added that because of Ghana’s limited resources he had not been able to help Guinea as much as he would liked; that if Ghana had been backed by help of “other countries,” he could have done more to keep Guinea from becoming so heavily involved with Soviet Bloc.

In relation to Congo, Nkrumah said Belgians had sought his help as result he had sent some of his people to Leopoldville and they had been able to convince Lumumba and Kasavubu to work together. Nkrumah expressed hope he himself could visit Congo near future.

In presenting second point which concerned multilateral aid Nkrumah told Hare about his conversations with me on possibility of a “Colombo Plan” for Africa. Nkrumah then enlarged on his apprehensions for the former French territories in Africa alleging that neocolonialism is keeping these countries under thumb of France. He referred to Mali and Conseil de l’Entente countries as travesties of sovereignty and eligibility for UN membership.

Hare replied that Nkrumah’s conversations with me had indeed been reported to Department. He hoped Nkrumah was aware that Department had taken careful note of Nkrumah’s hopes regarding multilateral aid. This was a demonstration of US interest in Nkrumah’s ideas and showed that our request for Nkrumah’s views was not idle chatter. As an aside, which Nkrumah appreciated fully, Hare said that Nkrumah was thus playing a positive role in helping formulation of US African policy.

In his third point Nkrumah said that vacuums are being created throughout Africa which somebody will fill. He declared Metropolitan powers still want to maintain their positions but are unacceptable to the Africans and are thus unable to fill these vacuums. He said other countries “with bad views” will try to fill the void. Therefore it was urgent that USG move to fill the void, formulating its own policy without worrying what the Metropolitan powers may think.

Hare responded that USG is indeed developing its own African policy, taking into account the views of the African nations and peoples. It was however inevitable that USG should also take into account the views of the Metropolitan powers. The policy that will emerge will be our own but it can only be elaborated after consideration of all points of view.

Nkrumah said he realized this to be both logical and inevitable.

Embassy comment: I was present during this conversation which was first of its kind held by Nkrumah as President. I felt Nkrumah was pleased as well as impressed by Hare’s forthrightness in describing our posture towards world generally and Africa particularly and his convincing assertions of our desire to help Africa within the bounds of our global responsibilities. At a public reception that night, after Hare had left, President told me it had been an “excellent talk” and expressed confidence that good would flow from it.

Flake

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.13-HA/7-360. Confidential.
1. For text of President Eisenhower’s congratulatory message of July 1 to President Nkrumah, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960–61, p. 551.
2. Held May 30–June 2; see Document 30.