Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Africa, Volume XIV

287. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State⁰

New York, December 18, 1960, 8 p.m.

1806. Subject: Congo.

1. During late afternoon 18 December we learned from various French African dels they receiving instruction from Chiefs of State at Brazzaville¹ to vote against US–UK draft res (sent separate tel) as well as any other res which could conceivably be interpreted as interference in domestic affairs of Congo (L). As we understand this view, these states oppose any new action in Congo by UN and wish leave entire problem for solution by themselves operating in purely African context.

2. Three-way conversation between Cameroun rep, Madagascar rep, and USUN liaison officer revealed however difference in interpretation of instructions from Chiefs of State. Madagascar rep insisted instructions meant only vote against Ghana res, since US res would ask UN assist Chief of State of Republic of Congo to accomplish various things. Madagascar could therefore at least abstain our res. Cameroun rep said all others in French African group agreed wording instructions “vote systematically against res providing for interference in internal affairs Congo” meant vote against both Ghana and US res. He had urged US withdraw our res but was shaken by liaison officer’s insistence that only existence our res made possible drawing off votes from Ghana res and prevention two-thirds majority that res. He then gave as further argument that states in his group could not afford be marked as in Western camp by voting against Ghana res and for US–UK res.

3. FYI only, in vote which scheduled for late morning 19 December we cannot expect necessary two-thirds majority without French African support. End FYI.

4. Believe every effort should be made with Chiefs of State in Brazzaville and through Kasavubu to have French African dels instructed support US–UK res. Following are arguments we suggest be employed:

a. Our res was prepared and introduced both (1) to counter res submitted by Ghana, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Morocco, UAR, Yugoslavia and Ceylon which would constitute interference in Congo affairs and is favorable to Lumumba, as well as (2) to insure continued mandate for UN operation in Congo. Regardless of difficulties which may have developed between UN force and Kasavubu, fact is UN can be of extremely important help to Kasavubu and moderate elements in Congo as well as to nation’s economic well being. Without UN there is serious risk of intervention or aggression by outside powers, including Soviets, who may seize upon situation in Stanleyville to operate in Congo for their own interests. Our res is designed insure UN works with, not against, Kasavubu to develop increased cooperation and to prevent outside intervention which would itself be harmful to French African interests.

b. Para by para analysis of operative paras our res shows it does not amount to authorization to UN force to interfere in domestic affairs. First para reiterates previous mandate and specifically requests SYG assist Republic. Second, third and ninth are targeted against any outside military interference. Fourth asks SYG assist Kasavubu carry out his wish re Parliament. (On 16 Nov Kasavubu circulated official UN document² which included statement “The President of the Republic is in favor of the reopening of Parliament as soon as the necessary conditions of security and freedom of action for members of Parliament are once again established.”) Fifth and sixth are designed primarily meet situation in Stanleyville where Minister Songolo and others are still detained and are so worded as to minimize pressure for release of Lumumba. Seventh³ opens way for constructive assistance by Chiefs of State assembled in Brazzaville and is based on our understanding Kasavubu does not object to three members of Conciliation Comte who are now on way to Leo. Eighth para⁴ should be read in light of UN mandate to assist Republic of Congo.

5. Because of importance this question and because of possibility French African opposition may be based on misunderstanding we believe Department should authorize above approaches immediately in hope favorable instructions can be received by dels here early 19 Dec.

Wadsworth

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/12–1860. Confidential; Niact. Repeated to Brazzaville and Léopoldville.
1. The heads of state of 12 French-speaking African countries met at Brazzaville, December 15–19. A declaration, which they issued on December 19, called for a round-table conference representing all the Congolese parties. The text is in Documents on International Affairs, 1960, edited by Richard Gott, John Major, and Geoffrey Warner (issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London: Oxford University Press, 1964), pp. 341–344.
2. U.N. doc. A/4577.
3. It expressed the hope that the forthcoming round-table conference (which Kasavubu had indicated he would convene) and the forthcoming visit to the Congo by the Conciliation Commission would help to resolve internal conflicts by peaceful means and to preserve the Congo’s unity and integrity.
4. It requested all Congolese to lend practical cooperation to the United Nations.