Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Africa, Volume XIV

285. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Paris, December 15, 1960, 10:30 p.m.¹

US/MC/20

PARTICIPANTS

• United States
  • Secretary Herter
  • Ambassador Houghton
  • Mr. Merchant
  • Mr. Kohler
  • Mr. Penfield
  • Mr. Parsons
  • Mr. McBride
  • Mr. Hillenbrand
  • Mr. Kidder
  • Mr. Long
• United Kingdom
  • Lord Home
  • Sir Frederick Hoyer Millar
  • Sir Pierson Dixon
  • Sir Anthony Rumbold
  • The Honorable Peter Ramsbotham
  • Mr. Boothby
  • Mr. Gerald Warner
• France
  • M. Couve de Murville
  • M. Garbonnel
  • M. Charles Lucet
  • M. Hervé Alphand
  • M. Chauvel
  • M. Roux
  • M. Sauvagnargues
  • M. de Beaumarchais
  • M. Laloy
  • M. Froment-Meurice

SUBJECT

• Tripartite Dinner Meeting—Congo

M. Lucet presented to the Ministers a paraphrase of the following paper which had been agreed to by the tripartite African experts:²

“In the face of the latest developments in the situation in the Congo, the Western countries should have as their objective:

(a) to reenforce the position of Mr. Kasavubu.

(b) to avoid the installation in Orientale Province of a Lumumba bastion which could at a later date be furnished with arms by Egypt or the Soviet Union.

Insofar as concerns (a), it is desirable to persuade Mr. Hammarskjold to improve cooperation between the local organs of the United Nations and the Leopoldville authorities.

Even though the College of Commissioners was invested by the Chief of State, the representatives of the Secretary General in Leopoldville have persistently protested its legality and frequently blocked its actions.

The démarche mentioned below would be facilitated if, as appears to have been envisaged recently, Mr. Kasavubu should decide, in accord with Mr. Mobutu, to clarify the juridical and constitutional situation by setting up a Government composed of ministers without, however, convoking the Parliament. This last point could be made not collectively, but individually, by the three Ambassadors in their talks with their Congolese interlocutors, taking the precautions which are indicated by our desire not to intervene in internal Congolese affairs.

In order to affirm without question his authority, Mr. Kasavubu should doubtless give evidence of his capacity to reestablish the necessary cooperation between the provinces with a view to assuring to the Congo the economic unity without which it cannot be viable. The calling of a round table of Congolese leaders would permit putting off until a relatively distant date convocation of the Parliament. The key to the problem is in the hands of Mr. Tshombe, whose intransigence unfortunately appears greater than ever. We should, therefore, examine what means we dispose of to influence the problem through actions by the Belgian Government; actions by the moderate African states and particularly the Community states.

For Mr. Kasavubu the accusation of collusion with the Belgians might be a source of weakness. It is important that Belgian technical assistance to the Congo, indispensable for obvious reasons, should be less apparent than is actually the case. A solution to this problem would be facilitated by an examination of the Belgian proposal to establish an efficient liaison with the United Nations. These points can be pursued further in Brussels.

Insofar as concerns (b), it would be desirable to encourage efforts tending to reestablish ties between all the provinces of the Congo. The United Nations command should maintain a very strict control over all of the contingents placed under his orders as well as over the air fields of Orientale Province through which Lumumba supporters might be furnished arms.

Troops of the countries who have withdrawn their contingents from ONUC should evacuate the Congo with their equipment as promptly as possible.

The situation in Stanleyville might become serious if Sudan and Ethiopia change their attitude with regard to the supporters of Lumumba. Sudan commands the approaches to Orientale Province. The ONUC detachment in Stanleyville is Ethiopian. In this connection the indications of a change in the Sudanese position as well as the coup d’état in Addis Ababa³ appeared disturbing.”

During the course of his presentation he referred to Dayal, the UN official in Congo, “as not especially wonderful for his job.”

He also mentioned Mr. Merchant’s concern expressed earlier about the withdrawal on January 1st of the Belgian technicians from the air bases at Kamina and Kitona.

Since the Soviets had vetoed in the Security Council the Western resolution on the Congo it appeared that the Congo item would be reintroduced into the General Assembly.

The Secretary wondered what would happen to the Ethiopian troops stationed in Stanleyville in view of yesterday’s coup in Addis Ababa.

Lord Home said he had no idea what would happen in Stanleyville. It was necessary for the UN to keep control of the airport there in order to deny it to the Egyptians and/or Soviets.

Sir Frederick referred to a recent good talk between the British Ambassador at Khartoum and Sudanese Prime Minister. The Sudanese claimed still to be on the side of the West but were dickering with the Soviets on a military arms program.

M. Couve said there was only one problem in the Congo. A real government must be formed. The next two steps would be for the UN to recognize that government and then work with it.

The Secretary said that as long as Lumumba was in jail, he thought it should be relatively easy for Parliament to convene in some safe place and ratify a new government. Parenthetically, he said the Belgians earlier this week had told him they had given Tshombe a bad time during his stay in Brussels.⁴ They presented him with a stiff note⁵ insisting that he work toward a federated government in the Congo and telling him the Belgians did not want an independent Katanga.

M. Couve said the UN people don’t want a government in the Congo.

Mr. Merchant referred to his statement made to the other deputies concerning the fact that the problem of UN troops in the Congo would become academic if the UN member countries did not contribute to the cost of that operation. The US had pledged upwards of 40 million dollars (some of this conditionally the Secretary interjected). With the Soviet bloc refusing to make any contribution there was now the real question of whether the UN operation would continue. There is general agreement that the situation in the Congo would become appreciably worse if the UN troops were withdrawn.

The Secretary said he was extremely worried about this problem. What would happen if the UN troops stayed on without leadership, unpaid, and without transportation to their home countries.

Lord Home said facetiously, “They’ll be eaten.”

M. Couve said you can’t ask France to pay for the UN forces in the Congo when France doesn’t know for what purpose they were really sent. The UN shouldn’t pay for Congo budgetary support. The Congo is not a rich country but it has some resources and it could pay its way.

Lord Home said that bad as the UN operation is the alternative is worse.

M. Couve said the UN forces can’t be held in the Congo indefinitely acting as they do. There is only one sensible thing to do, that is for the Congo to have a real government with a small army of its own. And this is something no one from the UN wants to do.

Lord Home said “but until then you have to have UN forces in the Congo.”

M. Couve said it shouldn’t take long to form a government.

The Secretary asked whether the French position on non-payment was conditional or positive.

M. Couve said that from the beginning the French said the UN operation had started in a bad way. The UN intervened against Europe, and the French didn’t think that was sensible. The UN operation has contributed to the anarchy in the Congo. There is a Swedish general, an Indian High Commissioner, and everybody is doing what he wants.

Lord Home said he didn’t think he could accept this analysis.

M. Couve said the UN went into the Congo thinking 100 troops with UN armbands could solve the problem. They couldn’t have.

The Secretary said he didn’t agree with “couldn’t have.”

Lord Home said the thing to do was exactly what we were trying to do now.

M. Couve said, “And do it despite the UN.”

The Secretary said that three weeks ago it might have been necessary to work for this kind of solution despite the UN but not now.

Mr. Boothby said that three weeks ago there would have been civil war. M. Couve said there is a problem in Katanga only because there is no central government in Leopoldville.

The Secretary admitted that the UN had gotten off on a bad footing in Katanga. Von Horn and Dayal have been flops. If we get rid of them, perhaps the situation will improve.

Kasavubu really hasn’t done anything since his position was strengthened through the seating of his delegation by the UN. Someone has to give Kasavubu benzedrine day by day.

M. Couve said Kasavubu was exactly like the King of Laos.

Mr. Merchant observed that our nickname for the King of Laos was Sitting Bull.

0. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, NATO Ministerial Meeting—Memcons. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Merchant’s special assistant, Edward T. Long, and approved in S on December 23.
1. Secretary Herter and Lord Home were in Paris for the NATO Ministerial meeting, December 16–18. This conversation was held at the Quai d’Orsay and lasted until 1:10 a.m.
2. Prepared by a tripartite working group on the Congo (apparently Sauvagnargues, Penfield, and Boothby), at the request of Merchant, Hoyer Millar, and Lucet. The paper purported to express the sense of a discussion between those three on December 14 and was approved by them at a meeting on December 15. The text of the paper, as incorporated in the memorandum of discussion at the December 15 meeting, is virtually identical to the “paraphrase” here quoted. The December 14 and 15 meetings among Merchant, Hoyer Millar, and Lucet are recorded in US/MC/2 and US/MC/7, both in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, NATO Ministerial Meeting—Memcons.
3. Reference is to an attempted coup on December 14.
4. Tshombe made an unofficial visit to Brussels in early December to present a wedding gift to King Baudouin. Documentation concerning U.S. efforts to dissuade him from making the trip and to persuade the Belgians to minimize its impact is in Department of State, Central Files 033.70G55 and 770G.00.
5. On December 8; despatch 531 from Brussels, December 9, transmitted a translation. (Ibid., 770G.00/12–960)