Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Africa, Volume XIV

278. Telegram From the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State⁰

Léopoldville, December 7, 1960, 5 p.m.

1351. Deptels 1510,¹ 1534,² 1539,³ 1541,⁴ 1542.⁵ Hope Department is not assuming from a few modest successes that Embassy has Kasavubu, Mobutu or any other Congolese “in pocket”. While we have consistently endeavored through counsel and advice to guide moderate elements along reasonable path, they rarely consult us voluntarily regarding prospective moves. This should be evident in light of reported examples impulsive action by even our closest friends against which Embassy would have advised them had it been forewarned. In fact our most strenuous efforts have been engaged in putting out senseless brush-fires started by ill-considered actions or statements concerning which we had no forewarning. It would be necessary to live 24 hours a day with the principals in this drama to know what role they may decide to play at any given moment. I like to think if we were really directing this show a somewhat more professional performance could be expected. I can add only that Lumumba’s coterie of advisers encountered the same difficulties even though they had him literally hedged in.

We have consistently advised all participants against violence and inhumane treatment and continue to do so. It must however be understood that in the Congo what passes as inhumane to US is customary among them. Thus the abuse of Lumumba shocks civilized countries while Congolese themselves consider he is pampered. Fact is he is much better treated than any other prisoner has been to best our knowledge. Mobutu continues to assert he will be tried in a proper court with legal safeguards. I am certain Kasavubu fully supports this proposal and will endeavor have him so inform SYG.

Dayal’s report could only have been hearsay so far as inhumane conditions of confinement are concerned and he obviously did not have accurate information regarding physical well-being of Lumumba. Mobutu’s statement that he will not permit outside doctor to examine Lumumba before release Songolo and others held at Stanleyville is obvious effort obtain their release.

In case Songolo, Department is fully informed of documented brutality practiced by pro-Lumumba masters of Stanleyville. I still feel this would be useful line in Security Council debate as counter to Soviet bloc charges. Also realize may be attempt to negotiate release Lumumba as quid pro quo release Songolo et al. Aside from fact I do not believe Mobutu or Kasavubu would settle for any such deal, if consummated it would put us back to July and August. I realize Dept and USUN are having and will continue to have very rough time in New York and that a government with more claim to legitimacy would make it easier to deal with Soviet bloc attacks and with African community. In spite of efforts along lines long since mapped out and agreed, we have not made measurable progress in convincing Kasavubu, Mobutu or other moderate leaders of desirability fall back to Ileo Government or establishment of any other Cabinet. We cannot dictate either terms or timing. Furthermore, possibility of obtaining full session Parliament is dimmer today than a month ago owing to hardened position Tshombe and probable refusal Kalonji to permit Kasai Deputies to attend. This would make serious inroads on already questionable parliamentary alignment pro and con Lumumba. If moderate government was approved by truncated Parliament Soviet bloc would protest illegality owing absence members from all parts Congo. If no confidence voted and Parliament approved vote of confidence in Lumumba, Communist bloc would immediately claim its position vindicated and UN would be forced deal with Lumumba.

On other hand, we have reported apparent switch in pro-Lumumba advocates who now appear against reopening Parliament. This can only mean their assessment of pro-Lumumba votes has changed and they fear defeat. It is quite within cards that Lumumba’s support will continue to ebb while he is confined by GOC. This will dishearten all but hardcore Lumumbaists and may already have swung votes away from him. Will endeavor convince Kasavubu and Mobutu of necessity for issuance statement in line lettered paragraph 3 of Deptel 1539. Will also endeavor have Kasavubu transmit appropriate statement for possible translation [transmission] SC on justification for Lumumba’s arrest incorporated Deptel 1542.

FYI. Kasavubu returned late last night from three-day trip through Bas-Congo.

Timberlake

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/12–760. Secret. Repeated to Brussels and USUN.
1. Document 271.
2. Telegram 1534, December 5, stated that since Mobutu had announced that he intended to extend the Commissioners’ term beyond December 31, the Department considered it even more important for Kasavubu and Mobutu to agree on action along the lines of Document 271. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/12–560)
3. Dated December 6, telegram 1539 urged that Kasavubu send a message to Hammarskjöld as soon as possible with a statement of the facts of Lumumba’s arrest and confinement, the report of the doctor who examined him, an invitation to Red Cross representatives to visit him, and assurances as to his future safety and fair trial with due process of law. (Ibid., 770G.00/12–660)
4. Telegram 1541, December 6, stated that the Security Council meeting on the Congo had been moved up to the following morning and urged that Kasavubu cable Hammarskjöld immediately requesting that a Congolese representative be given the opportunity to address the Council. (Ibid.)
5. Dated December 6, telegram 1542 advised that to strengthen the case for Lumumba’s arrest, Kasavubu should transmit a statement to Hammarskjöld supporting the argument that Lumumba had committed treason. (Ibid.)