Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Africa, Volume XIV

234. Telegram From the Consulate at Elisabethville to the Department of State⁰

Elisabethville, September 29, 1960, 5 p.m.

145. Re Deptels 103¹ and 106.² In lengthy talk with President Tshombe yesterday, during latter’s informal evening call at my home, I made points raised in reference telegrams.

1. I outlined in detail reasons why Tshombe should publicize his willingness to talk with other moderate leaders of former Belgian Congo concerning future constitutional arrangements and stressed impact which this would undoubtedly have on leaders of independent African states. Tshombe replied that it was his idea to convoke conference of moderate leaders in first place. I suggested he follow through by supporting plans of Kasavubu, Ileo, and Bomboko for holding this conference at Leopoldville in near future, adding strong implication that Department hoped that these persons would benefit from a general rallying of moderate Congolese leaders to their support. Tshombe replied without conviction that although he still favors conference idea, he generally discouraged by inability other moderate leaders to fight for their principles and is therefore unwilling attend meeting in Leopoldville where even his personal safety cannot be assured during present chaotic period. I asked Tshombe to think over my suggestion and proposed we discuss it again this coming weekend. He indicated in reply there was little likelihood that he would change his mind until Leopoldville situation became clarified; although he himself might decide to convoke conference moderate leaders in Elisabethville.

2. Pursuing theme that Tshombe should campaign to win support among independent African States, I broached subject of possible visits by him to African capitals, beginning with those where he most likely to receive encouraging welcome. I indicated such visits might be of greater benefit to Katanga than sending Katangan “Foreign Minister” Evariste Kimba to New York and Washington (reported separately). Tshombe listened carefully but made no comment on this subject.

3. Commenting on important role of independent African states in supporting UN action in Congo, I proposed that Tshombe give maximum publicity to his willingness to share responsibility with UN for maintaining order in central Baluba area. I said that past unfortunate outbursts by Katangan officials against UN actions in Katanga may have had effect of painting Katanga Government as hostile to UN Congo operations which have received overwhelming support of non-Communist world. I equated Katanga’s acceptance of UN assistance and cooperation with improved image Katanga might make in eyes of African states as well as other free world nations. Tshombe offered no comment concerning his present relations with UN (although I understand from UN source these relations are presently much better).

4. Finally I broached subject of minimizing more visible aspects Belgian influence Katanga. I made clear this criticism meant in constructive way and was not attempted to discredit Belgian assistance to Katanga or obliquely to achieve removal Belgian technicians from province. I indicated my willingness to make these observations to Ambassador Rothschild as proof my constructive intentions. I nevertheless stressed that too obvious Belgian presence in support Katanga Government has led to criticism abroad and in Katanga that Tshombe government is neocolonial regime. Tshombe said answer to this was simple: He and his entire family were anti-Belgian. He outlined at length his deep-rooted antagonism toward Belgium, but added that his present choice lay between accepting only western help offered him or depriving Katangan population of badly needed technical services. Tshombe added with thinly disguised bitterness that he would like nothing better than to internationalize corps of technicians upon which his government depends. I repeated that my criticism was directed toward too obvious manifestations of Belgian presence and not towards principle of European advisers who are employed by almost all independent African regimes. I again referred to image of Katanga held by independent African states and voiced my personal conviction that Katangan regime has substance as well as support of African population.

Comment: It is possible that certain ideas discussed in this conversation will take root in Tshombe’s thinking and cause him to react in desired direction. However, particularly on subject joining rally of moderate Congo leaders behind Kasavubu and others in Leopoldville, he showed apparent determination to back away from Leopoldville situation and to move further on separatist limb along which he has progressed rather rapidly in recent weeks.

Most striking aspect of conversation was Tshombe’s unwillingness express interest or concern over non-acceptance by independent African states of Katanga’s claim to being representative African state. This blind spot called to mind my recent conversation with Interior Minister Munongo who, when reminded that African states were watching Katanga closely, called down plague on all their houses. In course conversation, I mentioned possibility of visit to Elisabethville by Ambassador Timberlake. Tshombe said he had no objection to such visit for, “although the US and Katanga do not agree on anything relating to Katanga, we are nevertheless still friends”. This hardly constituted cordial invitation and I believe Ambassador will agree situation here should develop further before date for visit is set.

Toward end of conversation I suggested we discuss these subjects again and indicated my willingness to review points with other leaders in Tshombe’s cabinet. Tshombe indicated meeting might be arranged with Vice President Jean Kibwe, who he said takes moderate view these matters, but he ruled out meeting with Munongo whom he described as very emotional.

In summing up his ideas before his departure, Tshombe said that US failed to appreciate hard facts of African politics. He said Africans appreciate only two things: Force and money. If US really wanted help Kasavubu and Ileo it should give them sufficient money to buy support of few key politicians and legislators in Leopoldville. This is what he himself has tried to do. Tshombe said Soviet bloc recognizes these facts and acts accordingly. However US cannot even recognize its own anti-Communist allies in Africa. This is due, he thought, to fact US makes mistake of playing game honestly and fairly, as result of which US will never succeed in its political bargaining with independent African states.

Canup

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/9–2960. Confidential; Priority. Received at 9:13 a.m., September 30. Also sent to Léopoldville and repeated to Brussels, USUN, Abidjan, and Brazzaville.
1. Telegram 103, September 24, summarized a conversation with Bassompierre, in which Department officers suggested that it would be helpful if Tshombé would emphasize publicly his support for a united Congo and his willingness to discuss the subject with leaders in Léopoldville. They also suggested a visit by Tshombé to some of the independent African countries and Belgian efforts to minimize the more visible aspects of Belgian influence on him. The telegram instructed Elisabethville to broach these suggestions with Tshombé. (Ibid., 770G.00/9–2460)
2. Telegram 106, September 27, informed the consulate that Bassompierre had indicated Belgian agreement with the U.S. suggestions in telegram 103 and suggested that Timberlake visit Katanga to reinforce these positions with Tshombé. (Ibid.,0 770G.00/ 9–2660)