Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Africa, Volume XIV

229. Telegram From the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State⁰

Léopoldville, September 26, 1960, 6 p.m.

824. Reference: Deptels 886,¹ 887² and 894.³ Accompanied by Lavallee, I called on Kasavubu this afternoon in order deliver substance Deptels under reference which I explained in great detail. Ileo was also in attendance. They listened avidly to recommendations of Department and then gave impression they were very anxious to carry them out.

I told them that I would try to talk to Mobutu today in order obtain his support for Kasavubu’s position.

During conversation which lasted approximately one hour I made following other points:

1. My government fully realizes that certain powers such as Guinea, Ghana, UAR, Morocco and Tunis have been and still are bringing pressure to bear on Kasavubu and other Congolese leaders in order to effect a reconciliation between Kasavubu and Lumumba. I stated this question of pressure was being taken up by US with SYG and respective delegations at UN in New York which include several heads of state. I declared in my opinion it would not be profitable to come to an understanding with Lumumba. During the two months he was in power, he created anarchy throughout country, he fought with his collaborators, the UN and SYG, he helped bring cold war to Congo by accepting direct assistance military nature from Soviets, he fanned fires of civil war in country and in summary constituted a centrifugal rather than centripetal force. I added he was an evil influence who would be bad for the Congo. It was for these reasons that I was squarely against him. Added we had worked with Lumumba while he was recognized Prime Minister and we prepared work with legal successor.

I stated my government considered Kasavubu to be legal head of Congo state and that it supported him strongly.

2. Kasavubu and Ileo agreed with above remarks and Kasavubu stated he had no intentions whatsoever of effecting reconciliation with Lumumba, knowing it would not be in interest peaceful settlement.

I stated that no power, whether great or small had right to inject itself in internal affairs of Congo and this is US policy.

Since army mutiny in early July, disorder and subversion have been reigning in Congolese army rank, principally because its cadre of officers has disappeared. I stated that Kasavubu may wish ask UN establish pool of army officers drawn from various countries who could be seconded to Congo to run and train national Congolese army. In order regain control army and to blunt efforts certain politicians to convert parts or all of it into political weapon, it was essential that a cadre of officers, directly responsible to Chief of State, as CINC, be created as quickly as possible. I pointed out that as soon as Congolese officers were formed they could replace the “temporary ones.” Pointed out plenty of precedent in British officers with Ghana troops and with Indian troops after independence. Those, however, were bilateral while this should go through UN although requiring also agreement with countries asked to second officers.

3. I enquired why Lumumba had been permitted remain in official residence of Prime Minister since his dismissal. I stated this constituted psychological advantage for Lumumba and that Ileo in his capacity as Prime Minister should be living there now.

They agreed this was case but seemed to think this could be solved only by arresting him. I suggested they consider, whether or not they willing or able arrest him, telling UNOC they insist Lumumba be removed from official Prime Minister office and residence so that legal Prime Minister Ileo could move in. They may have accepted this idea but went back to problem of arrest.

Kasavubu declared that warrant for Lumumba’s arrest which had been made out be Attorney General on September 8 was still valid, but that Mobutu had shown some hesitancy about arresting former Prime Minister. He stated there was another army officer who was willing to arrest Lumumba. I suggested that before serving warrant Kasavubu should inform Dayal to satisfy him warrant legal and ask for UN army officer to accompany arresting party in order inform UN soldiers guarding Lumumba that party had legal warrant for arrest of Lumumba. I stated that if these procedures were followed, I believed Kasavubu forces should encounter no obstruction from UN in arresting Lumumbu.

4. With reference to ambiguity that exists between legal positions Kasavubu, Ileo and Mobutu’s Council of High Commissioners, I asked them if they approved action of Mobutu. They replied they approved and supported him and prepared reiterate. I pointed out confusion among many nations at UNGA meeting yet to be ironed out.

5. I informed Kasavubu and Ileo that my staff and I were at their entire disposal. I added that I had not come out to see them as frequently as I would have liked, but that I did not wish give impression to their opponents that we were working too closely with them. They fully understand and agree.

6. In thanking me for my visit and advice, Kasavubu and Ileo appeared to be sincerely appreciative of the position we have taken. They also seemed to be eager to follow our recommendations. I believe my visit came at most opportune moment, in that it will show Kasavubu and Ileo, who have been subjected to various pressures, that they are not alone in their anti-Lumumba struggle. They indicated they would call Mobutu immediately to inform him of US views, to encourage him and induce him take necessary action his part.

On return to office I received disturbing reports, not yet fully confirmed, that Mobutu may be yielding to pressure (probably from Kettani whom he likes and trusts) and may already have made overtures to Lumumba assuming latter will soon be back in saddle. We are endeavoring directly stiffen Mobutu’s backbone and hope Kasavubu and Ileo will also be successful today that same enterprise.

Wish to add that USUN telegram 114 to Leopoldville⁴ arrived after I was en route to Kasavubu hence could not make specific point re lunch. However, I left no doubt in minds Kasavubu and Ileo our support for Bomboko and asked them take indicated steps so that US, as member Credentials Committee, could effectively support his seating. With Department’s assurances directly to Bomboko, do not think it necessary explain to Kasavubu.

Department may wish repeat to other African and Asian posts concerned.

Timberlake

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/9–2660. Secret; Niact. Also sent to USUN and London and repeated to Brussels and Paris.
1. Dated September 23, telegram 886 to Léopoldville instructed the Embassy to try to persuade Kasavubu and Mobutu of the desirability of putting the Congo government on a better legal footing. It recommended that Kasavubu announce that he was still Chief of State and, as such, above factional disputes, and that he appoint as government the council of commissioners named by Mobutu. (Ibid., 770G.00/9–2360)
2. Document 227.
3. Also sent to USUN as telegram 497, telegram 894 to Léopoldville, September 24, instructed the USUN to approach the Ghanaian, Guinean, and UAR Delegations to argue against their support of Lumumba and to tell them the United States opposed small power intervention as well as big power intervention in the Congo and considered it essential that the various U.N. contingents remain responsive to U.N. instructions. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/9–2260)
4. Secto 15 from USUN, repeated to Léopoldville as telegram 114, September 24, explained that the Secretary had not invited Bomboko to a luncheon he had given for the chief U.N. delegates of the newly-admitted African states because the Credentials Committee had not yet submitted its report. Timberlake was instructed to make this known to Kasavubu and Mobutu at his discretion. (Ibid., 303/9–2460)