219. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations0

424. Re: Special GA Congo Session. Following are Dept suggestions which you requested use as guidance re emergency GA on Congo:

We consider focus of session should be maximum possible extent be one of highlighting Soviet-UN confrontation in particular obdurate Soviet insistence on pursuing unilateral course in Congo and in undermining UN and SYG action contrary to overwhelming sentiment UN members, including most Afro-Asians. Statement being prepared for Wadsworth will stress this theme.
At same time we recognize US must help give lead and direction to debate to encourage more timid to stand up and be counted, and that you must balance this need against main objective of having session Soviet-UN contest rather than Soviet-US contest.
Strongly preferable, therefore, in our view that SYG or Slim give lead off in GA and you should encourage them to do so. It would be logical for either of them to speak first or one follow other, SYG because of his heavy involvement and importance he attaches to having his mandate supported, and Slim because of his sponsorship of SC resolution. (Ceylon less desirable because of ambivalent position.)
If neither is willing to open debate, nor some other moderate African (such as Ethiopia), you authorized speak first, as sponsor of SC res requesting special session if you believe this desirable in order channel debate into constructive channel.
Re res, we understand consideration being given by Slim to introduction same res Soviet vetoed in SC with appropriate technical modifications. This strikes us as sound course, but you should make clear US unwilling accept any weakening essential ingredients, i.e. confirming and strengthening mandate UN and SYG, and focusing on activities designed undermine UN and SYG efforts.
You should consult urgently with all friendly dels encouraging them to give full presentation their views, expressing hope they will be unequivocal in support UN Congo operation and in opposition Soviet intervention. More and longer speeches from friendly dels better, since there is advantage from our point of view to have special GA on [Page 494] Congo running simultaneously with regular GA session (see Deptel 401).1

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/9–1760. Confidential. Drafted by Buffum and Sisco, cleared in substance with United Nations Adviser in the Bureau of African Affairs Martin Herz, and approved by Wallner.
  2. Dated September 16, telegram 401 to USUN indicated that the Department believed an emergency session would offer an ideal opportunity to put the Soviets on the defensive and that the alternation of special emergency sessions with regular General Assembly sessions should make it possible “to minimize Soviets” efforts exploit Khrushchev presence in GA.” (Ibid., 770G.00/9–1660)