216. Editorial Note
At the 459th meeting of the National Security Council on September 15, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles discussed developments in the Congo during his briefing on significant world developments. The relevant portion of the memorandum of discussion by Deputy NSC Executive Secretary Marion W. Boggs, dated September 15, reads as follows:
“Mr. Dulles said it would not be easy to brief the Council on the situation in the Congo. The President, interrupting, said he understood a third force had appeared in the Congo. Mr. Dulles said a third, perhaps even a fourth, force had developed there. [Congolese Army Chief of Staff Colonel Joseph] Mobutu had attempted to dismiss both Kasavubu and Lumumba. Mobutu had proposed that the Congo should be governed until December 31, 1960 by a “collectivity” of students and technicians. He had announced a policy of cooperation with the UN, had asked that Soviet and Czech technicians leave the country within forty-eight hours, and had demanded that the embassies of the Communist countries be placed under guard. Mr. Dulles reported that Communist technicians had not left the Congo nor had the Communist embassies been placed under guard. Mr. Dulles added that the Kasavubu–Mobutu team had moved with the speed of a snail according to reports of U.S. representatives in the Congo. The situation [Page 490] could only be characterized as fantastic, a situation in which no one seems able to take any action with the exception of Lumumba and his actions indicate that he is insane. Mr. Dulles believed that Mobutu probably leaned a little more toward Kasavubu than toward Lumumba since he (Mobutu) had been appointed by Ileo. Mr. Dulles said he would not go into detail on events transpiring in the UN. He would say, however, that the brutal Soviet attack on Secretary General Hammarskjold deeply engaged the future of the latter as well as the prestige of the UN. Mr. Dulles then noted [4 lines of source text not declassified]. It is possible that a third Soviet ship is also en route to the Congo. Moreover, the Sudan recently received a request to permit the “Soviet-Congo Air Services” to overfly the Sudan. However, the Soviet planes, which had landed in the UAR en route to the Congo, had now returned to the USSR. Mr. Dulles said the latest news from the Congo was that Mobutu had been arrested and then released, which seemed to be standard practice, and that Ileo would hold a cabinet meeting today with Mobutu present. He asked whether Secretary Dillon wished to add anything on the Congo.
“Secretary Dillon said the Western Powers were taking the offensive at the UN by tabling a resolution supported by the Secretary General and by Tunisia. A Soviet veto of this resolution was anticipated, however. If the Soviets did exercise the veto in this case, they will show themselves to be anti-UN. In the event of a Soviet veto, the Congo case will probably be referred to the General Assembly.” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)
Mobutu had announced in a radio address the previous evening that the Army had decided to “neutralize” the chief of state, the two rival governments, and the legislature until December 31, during which time the politicians could try to reach an accord. He declared that this was not a military coup but a “peaceful revolution” and that the Army would call on Congolese and foreign technicians to save the country from chaos. At a press conference later that evening, Mobutu declared his intention to close the Soviet and Czech Embassies within 48 hours. For text of his radio address, see Congo 1960, volume II, page 869. Dulles’ report of Mobutu’s arrest was incorrect. Telegram 726 from Léopoldville, September 15, reported: “During morning everyone who is anyone around here has been reported arrested several times with principal emphasis on Lumumba and Mobutu each of whom would seem to have arrested the other.” (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/9–1560)
At the first of two U.N. Security Council meetings on September 15, Ambassador Wadsworth introduced a draft resolution which reaffirmed the Council’s request to all states to refrain from any action that might tend to impede the restoration of law and order and in particular to refrain from sending military personnel, supplies, or equipment into the Congo other than through the United Nations and reaffirmed that the U.N. force should “continue to act to restore and maintain law and order as necessary for the maintenance of international peace and [Page 491] security.” (U.N. doc. S/4516) For text of the draft resolution and Wadsworth’s statement introducing it, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960, pages 582–587; for the records of the two sessions, see U.N. docs. S/PV.902–903.