213. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State0
1305. Fifth message from Harriman. Personal for the Secretary and Dillon. Please give substance confidentially to Senator Kennedy.
Lumumba will continue to cause difficulties in the Congo whether he is in control of the government, in jail or released. He is a rabblerousing speaker, a shrewd maneuverer with clever left-wing advisers, aided and encouraged by Soviet and Czech Ambassadors. He is obsessed with his mission to unify the Congo, believes he is the only man who speaks for 80 percent of the Congolese people. If the UN does not do his bidding, he considers it a new form of colonialism. He thinks if he can get his troops into Katanga and the Belgians removed that the people will give him their support. He is confident he can be successful in a civil war if UN keeps hands off. He is of course counting on full support from Soviets.
[Page 487]I feel our best hope is strongest support by Security Council for continued backing of Hammarskjold and Dayal, and insistence Russians and Belgians or others desist from giving aid outside UN. It is of utmost importance that African opinion be exerted. Although Nkrumah is at the moment being difficult, British pressure may bring him into line again. Nigeria when independent will loyally support every effort to prevent Russian influence in Congo. Except for Sekou Toure and perhaps Sudanese, former French African leaders can be counted on to oppose Communist designs in Congo. Bourguiba influence is considerable among West Africans.
In Leopoldville members in Parliament will be afraid to vote against Lumumba unless UN can get control of Force Publique. Lumumba knows how to use even a few squads of soldiers to terrorize those who oppose him.
If Russians fail to agree to channel their aid through UN, other means must be adopted to stop it. In this, support of other new African states would be important.
It is conceivable that if Lumumba is confronted with no aid from Soviets and firm stand by other West African leaders, he might temporarily change his position.
Kanza told me some deputies were urging on Lumumba that he request UN to call a round table conference of Congolese leaders including Tshombe [and] Kalonji to work out solution.
Situation today has been aggravated by early weakness in United Nations action. Best hope today is in firmness, particularly against Soviet intervention. I doubt that Khrushchev will want to face strong UN opposition to his actions in Congo when he addresses the Assembly.1