Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Africa, Volume XIV

202. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State⁰

New York, September 7, 1960, 9 p.m.

605. Re: Congo.

1. From recent conversations with SYG and his assistants pattern of SYG’s political operation has emerged insofar as there can be pattern in as shifting situation as he faces in Congo. In his conversation with Wallner yesterday, SYG admitted at end that what he was trying to do was get rid of Lumumba without compromising UN position and himself through extra-constitutional actions. (He compared his activities to “gamesmanship—how to win without actually cheating.”)¹ Several times during conversation Hammarskjold referred to acts which he had just authorized which he characterized as “extra-constitutional.” He is clearly concerned about this aspect of his operation though he seemed determined to act effectively to utmost extent he considers possible.

2. SYG told Wallner while he would recognize, deal with, and by implication strongly support Kasavubu in his struggle with Lumumba, possibility had to be borne in mind that Lumumba might win the fight. In that eventuality SYG would have be able explain and justify his actions to SC and possibly GA. SYG made it clear if Lumumba should survive and request immediate UN withdrawal, SYG would not accept request but would take matter immediately to SC. At that point he would, of course, have to be able to justify his actions.

3. This attitude on part of SYG helps to explain his impatience with what he considers extreme Belgian shortsightedness in not completing withdrawal their troops as they have said they would do and as they have even on occasion said was already done. He and Wieschhoff have both emphasized importance of taking away Belgian troop issue from Lumumba and Soviets. This has been fundamental point in SYG’s strategy from start. In his conversation with Wallner Hammarskjold referred to problem he presented to us Monday night (ourtel 586),² problem of Belgian troops not only at Kamina but also and even more embarrassingly, at Kitona. Paratroop battalion at Kitona, SYG emphasized, had not previously been reported at all, in contradiction to Belgian declarations of complete withdrawal. Hammarskjold said he believed (he and Wieschhoff have repeated this on many occasions) Belgian Foreign Office is not responsible for “Belgian lies” on withdrawal. He believes this is doing of Belgian Defense Department, local commanders and “local interests.” But, he observed, situation has gotten to point where no one believes anything that is said about troop withdrawal unless UN says it.

4. SYG feels failure of Belgians to complete withdrawal as promised has greatly weakened his position in combatting intervention of Soviets. He noted to Wallner that SC decisions are specifically directed against presence of Belgian troops and he has specific mandate in that regard. However, nothing in resolutions themselves forbids Soviet Union supplying airplanes at request of GOC. (In this connection SYG said his approach to Russians had dealt solely with matter of Russian crews and personnel, not with planes themselves.) He feels he is prevented from taking as strong action as he would like against Russian intervention because of what he considers to be Belgian double dealing in keeping military personnel in Congo.

5. Wallner drew attention of SYG to danger that removing all Belgian military personnel from Katanga might lead to exodus of Belgian civilian technical personnel. SYG’s reply was Belgians using this threat as kind of blackmail as they have all along. He referred to Belgian claim that whites would flee if UN troops came into Katanga; SYG noted 170 women and children out of 20,000 whites had left. SYG said threat of whites leaving had recently been put to one of his aides in Katanga. Reply given was, “in that case, UN would have to operate [garble]”. SYG commented this had been just right reply.

6. Wallner expressed to SYG our desire to be helpful and avoid any action which might complicate SYG’s efforts. At same time we were very concerned at growing Soviet infiltration with both men and airplanes. In response to question from Wallner, SYG expressed view US should not protest directly to Soviets nor by ltr to UN against Soviet actions in Congo beyond that contained in text he gave us (tel’d to IO last night)³ in view his inquiry to Soviets. He commented if he had not sent note, US ltr might be desirable, but not at this stage.

7. Yesterday (reported by telephone to Sisco–UNP), Wieschhoff reported on first UN actions following Kasavubu’s dismissal of Lumumba, i.e. closing of radio station and blocking of airports. Wieschhoff also reported that Cordier was treating Lumumba as a private citizen following his dismissal by Kasavubu and was even refusing to see him. Wieschhoff said 4,000 members of Force Publique at Camp Leopold agreed to have their arms locked up in return for Kasavubu’s promise of food and pay.

8. Comment:SYG not in our opinion correct in saying he has no authority (para 4 above) to oppose introduction Soviet planes as distinguished from personnel. Res of July 21 [22] requested “all states to refrain from any action which might impede the restoration of law and order” and authorized SYG to take “such action as may be necessary …⁴ by this res.” Soviets attempted behind scenes to alter wording this para of res, and it was clearly understood by Tunisia and Ceylon (the sponsors) to apply to Soviet unilateral action. Arguments against military personnel applies just as logically to military equipment.

Cook

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/9–760. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution.
1. Reference is to Theory and Practice of Gamesmanship: Or the Art of Winning Games Without Actually Cheating by Stephen Potter (New York: Holt, 1947).
2. Document 198.
3. Hammarskjöld had provided a draft statement for possible use by President Eisenhower at his September 7 press conference after Herter sought his advice as to what the President could say about the Congo without adding to Hammarskjöld’s difficulties. Hammarskjöld’s text was not used, however; a statement drafted in the Department was sent to the White House instead. (Memoranda of telephone conversations on September 6 and 7 between Herter and Eisenhower’s press secretary James Hagerty and between Herter and Wilcox; Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Telephone Conversations) The text of a statement read by the President at his September 7 press conference, deploring the Soviet Union’s unilateral action in supplying aircraft and other equipment to the Congo for military purposes, is in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960, pp. 568–569.
4. Ellipsis in the source text.