Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Africa, Volume XIV

190. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State⁰

New York, August 26, 1960, 7 p.m.

517. Re: Congo.

1. In accordance Deptel 271¹ Lodge saw SYG today and read substance of Leopoldville 496² to him.

2. SYG’s observations on telegram were: (a) he thought comment that “all UN military contingents bear witness to humiliations, etc.,” was slightly exaggerated, (b) he agreed with essential idea behind telegram that situation in Congo would not be straightened out until Lumumba was dealt with, (c) he did not feel he now had authority to disarm Force Publique as Timberlake suggests, and (d) he thought situation in Congo had not yet gotten to “China” stage.

3. SYG thinks issue in Congo must come to crisis shortly and that Lumumba must be “broken”. (He apparently has in mind that new crisis between Lumumba and UN, in which UN victorious, will under-cut Lumumba’s political power in Congo sufficiently that Kasavubu or Ileo will be able to assume effective control.) He believes this crisis will develop after end of current meeting of African leaders in Congo.

4. One way for crisis to develop would be effort by Lumumba to take Leopoldville airport. He showed Lodge draft letter he plans send Lumumba in case Lumumba again demands to take over control of airport. Substance of letter is that control of airport by UN is necessary to facilitate UN responsibilities and that UN will take “all necessary measures” to protect its position there. (SYG believes that one way or another there will have to be some casualties in Congo before situation cleared up. He is prepared to face this and believes this is best way of preserving situation in long run.)

5. Other way crisis might develop, which he seemed this morning to consider more likely in light of Lumumba’s press statement today, would be Lumumba demand for immediate withdrawal UN troops when Belgians were out. SYG said he would treat this as “formal request”, although he had information showing other Congo leaders would not favor it, and he would have SC meeting. After Lumumba presented his demand SYG would say in SC that Force Publique could in no circumstances maintain peace and order in Congo and that withdrawal of UN troops would undoubtedly lead to foreign intervention and therefore to breach of peace. In order to avoid contributing itself to breach of international peace UN must therefore stay in Congo in fulfillment responsibilities under Article 42 of Charter (which provides for air, sea or land force action by SC to maintain or restore international peace and security). He would plan to phrase his remarks in such a way that in absence SC resolution calling for UN withdrawal, retention of UN troops in Congo would have been endorsed. He is confident that only USSR would introduce resolution calling for withdrawal and that it would be defeated with only two favorable votes. He then would hope that other members of SC would refer to Article 42 in explaining their reasons for rejecting Soviet motion.

6. SYG believes that if USSR attempted to take issue to GA it would be defeated by vote of 70 to 12 and that they would therefore not attempt it. He also believes USSR could not intervene militarily in Congo because other Africans states would be opposed to it. He said he thought he was worth “five Lumumbas” to Russians. (He said until recently he thought he had been worth ten Lumumbas to them.) Only way for USSR to interfere with continued UN operation in Congo would therefore be through “flag of convenience”. This would only be Guinea or Ghana. He said Guinean troops had been so placed in Congo that they could not move and could do no damage. He observed Guinea had only one other battalion and that with current difficulties in Mali, Guinea would be unable to take this out of country. Re Ghana, he saw signs it was beginning to sober up and he noted that Nkrumah himself believed Force Publique should be disarmed.

7. SYG said that after SC session of this sort UN would in effect be taking over control of Congo and that he would then be in position to disarm Force Publique by force if necessary. (SYG said disarming of some Force Publique units when UN first arrived had come as result Congolese Government order but that government had itself rearmed Force Publique units in Leopoldville area.)

8. He thought Katanga problem could and must be resolved once Lumumba was out of way and this crisis had been passed. He said there was no Katanga problem between Tshombe and Kasavubu or Ileo but only with Lumumba.

9. He is sending Cordier and General Rikhye (India) to Congo tonight and Galo Plaza³ (Ecuador) tomorrow and bringing Bunche back September 1 so that SYG, Bunche and Dayal (India) can confer here before Dayal goes to Congo. Cordier will cover period between departure Bunche and arrival Dayal. He will be SYG’s personal representative, with Rikhye second ranking of group. He described Rikhye as very much “our” (UN) man and said Dayal would be same. He said Dayal would have same orientation as Bunche and would be even more forceful.

10. Commenting on other aspects of situation he said Bunche was now totally unable to obtain appointment with Lumumba, that Bourguiba (Tunisia) had unsuccessfully tried to see Lumumba for five days and was about to leave, that Tunisian representatives were unable to get into opening session of African leaders’ meeting and that Quaison-Sackey (Ghanaian Ambassador to UN) was incommunicado in Brazzaville.

11. SYG commented he had never worked so hard or enjoyed himself so much since he came here. He is clearly looking forward to forcing issue with Lumumba, but wants latter create the situation. He is confident that he can win with backing of substantially entire UN except Communists.

Lodge

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/8–2660. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Léopoldville.
1. Dated August 25, telegram 271 instructed Lodge to express U.S. concern about the deteriorating public security situation in Léopoldville to Hammarskjöld. (Ibid., 770G.00/ 8–2560)
2. In telegram 496, August 24, Timberlake declared that security conditions in Léopoldville were growing steadily worse and urged that the only way to restore law and order would be disarmament or disbandment of the Force Publique by the U.N. forces. He declared that the pattern noted in telegram 433 (Document 179) was even more evident and that “if Lumumba and his wired-in Communist advisors are not stopped by a policy of strength we think this country is headed toward another China by way of technicians instead of bayonets.” (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/8–2460)
3. Former President of Ecuador Lasso Galo Plaza headed a U.N. committee to study what should be done with the Belgian military bases at Kamina and Kitona.