Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Africa, Volume XIV

183. Telegram From the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State⁰

Léopoldville, August 19, 1960, 5 p.m.

455. Reference Deptel 495.¹ Believe your reference to Embtel 434² must be garble as that does not mention Hammarskjold and he never made such statement to anyone here. In fact, I believe Lumumba perfectly capable of demanding withdrawal UN troops and is probably getting just such advice (see Embtel 453).³

Agree 100 percent with Department’s estimate contained paragraphs (a) and (b) reftel.⁴ Paragraph (c)⁵ is more difficult estimate. There is some evidence Lumumba’s recent flouting of UN–arrests, roughing ups, etc.—has enhanced his prestige on group. Congolese impressed when he gets away with such treatment great international organization. On other hand many Congolese disturbed over out-breaks of trouble again and believe majority would support firm line, provided it adequately explained. (Local UN public relations effort to date is totally ineffective.)

Believe first consideration in handling a possible Lumumba request for withdrawal of UN will be solidarity African States participating. As I see it, all would stand firm except Guinea and possibly Ghana. However, if Nkrumah listens at all to General Alexander or his own officers here he must be well aware chaotic conditions.

Secondly, in such an event believe action on this end should be taken to persuade Kasavubu that such a step calls for careful GOC consideration and that Parliament should be called in extraordinary session to consider. I confess I have not yet learned secret of spurring Kasavubu to action.

Any or all delaying tactics contained last four paragraphs reftel have possibilities depending on circumstances at time. For example, Lumumba himself has frequently asked for neutral observers. However, Department should bear in mind UN invited in by handful of cabinet and presumably [could] be logically disinvited same way unless local opposition could be assured as per paragraph immediately above.

Timberlake

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/8–1960. Secret; Priority. Repeated to USUN and Tunis.
1. Telegram 495 to Léopoldville, August 18, set forth the Department’s preliminary views on possible courses of action in the Security Council if Lumumba insisted on the withdrawal of U.N. forces; it requested the Embassy’s comments. (Ibid., 770G.00/ 8–1860)
2. Telegram 495, also sent to USUN as telegram 239, referred to “Hammarskjöld’s belief contained your tel 434 that Lumumba will not demand withdrawal UN forces from Congo.” Telegram 434 from USUN, August 17, reported a conversation with Hammarskjöld that afternoon. (Ibid., 770G.00/8–1760)
3. Dated August 19, telegram 453 reported on Lumumba’s press conference that day. (Ibid., 770G.13/8–1960)
4. They stated (a) that the U.S. objective should be to retain the U.N. force as a stabilizing element in the Congo, even if Lumumba requested its withdrawal, and (b) that the attitude of the African states would be of key importance.

5. Paragraph (c) reads as follows:

   “Solidity of Lumumba’s position in Congo likewise of major importance. If his leadership is challenged in significant way, his request for withdrawal of UN force will be easier deal with. On other hand, if such request by Lumumba should have continued backing of Congo Government and evidence popular support in Congo, practical problems of maintaining UN forces there over any long period of time are obvious.”