Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Africa, Volume XIV

182. Telegram From the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State⁰

Léopoldville, August 18, 1960, 8 p.m.

450. Yesterday I requested appointment to see Prime Minister which was arranged for 10:00 this morning. On arriving Prime Minister front gate I and Carlucci were stopped by armed guard who refused understand or accept laissez-passer or accept our explanation who we were and our business. He would not permit us enter grounds. After considerable argument we persuaded him take us inside where office staff spent confused ten minutes debating what should be done after which I was escorted across street and left standing on curb for 15 minutes. Having thus consumed half an hour, I returned to Embassy. Within minutes I had had two calls from his Chef de Cabinet, Grootaert, offering apologies and saying Prime Minister would see me immediately if I could return.

I did so at 11:00 and was ushered in, with Lavallee, to see Lumumba. Grootaert was the only other person present. Lumumba offered profuse apologies and explained that guards and staff were unfamiliar with simple problems such as visits of this nature. If I had set stage myself, I could not have contrived a better environment for tackling the Prime Minister on a number of problems which I might not have raised had visit gone off smoothly on the first round.

I told him I understood the earlier contretemps and then suggested he make certain in the future his staff took care of arrangements at the gate and in the waiting room so that visitors with appointments to see the Prime Minister would not be arbitrarily stopped and prevented from entering. Lumumba agreed that this must be done.

I went on to say that six members our plane-handling crew at airport had been stopped and surrounded by members Force Publique yesterday at airfield and their identification papers taken away from them temporarily. They were released and permitted to proceed only after members Ghanaian forces had interceded on their behalf. I pointed out how unnecessary and how bad, point of view public relations, such action was.

2. ¹ I stated members of foreign press had been molested by Force Publique yesterday when gathered in front his office for press conference he had called. I told Lumumba I had never known US and Free World press to have carried story such as the one on the Congo so sympathetically, so fully and so much on their front pages. I said this was of primary importance to the Congo and to efforts being made to meet the needs of his government and his people. I told him that he should assist the press in all possible ways. He replied by giving instructions over the telephone to one of his assistants to see that this was done.

At that point one of Lumumba’s aides brought in the passport and other identifying documents of Los Angeles Times correspondent Drake, who had apparently been detained. Lumumba asked me whether he was bona fide and whether he should be permitted to stay in Congo despite fact Drake had arrived without a visa. I said I know him personally and could vouch for him adding that he should be permitted to remain. The aide was dispatched with the documents and I am sure they were returned to Drake at once.

I pointed out he or his services could always check bona fides of any American newsman or businessman with Embassy. Without naming Detwiler, I made broad reference to persons who were interested only in making money fast and by any means, legal or otherwise. I stated such persons were bad for Prime Minister, the Congo and if Americans, for US. I said we are at his disposal to provide him and his government with information regarding Americans who might wish to do business with Congo. Lumumba stated a Van Der Meersch had telephoned 3 times from New York regarding a business proposition but in view of his “Detwiler” experience had refused to talk to him. He was under impression this Van Der Meersch had formerly worked with Dillon Read. I told him I would query Department re any information it could give regarding Van Der Meersch and his present connections. Please advise.

I then gave Prime Minister letter from Tippetts, Abbett, McCarthy, Stratton² and stated this was a well-known, respectable and solid business firm. I also handed him a letter from Coolidge³ regarding the Preservation of Wildlife in the Congo National Parks. Both were sent through me since I had talked with Bryant of Tippetts et al. and Coolidge during last visit Washington.

3. Prime Minister declared everyone could see he was not Communist since he had first called upon an American businessman to help exploit riches of country. He had also asked his various ministers to furnish him with names candidates who could proceed to US on some of 300 scholarships, which we had offered Congo. Lumumba pointed out he wished first students go to US and not Moscow or Prague. Also in this connection, Prime Minister stated he had decided yesterday to send Joseph Mbuyi to Washington as Ambassador. Therefore first GOC Ambassador to be sent anywhere in world would go to US. He declared that in few days Foreign Minister Bomboko would come to Embassy with new Ambassador-designate in order obtain assistance on housing and information on clerical situation in US. I told him we would be very glad offer all assistance possible.

4. I stated there were many persons who were trying to operate in this new country and that Prime Minister should be extremely careful regarding the choice of his advisers and to consider carefully their counsel since some might be taking the Congo down the wrong road. Prime Minister declared that the one overriding thought of his government was to rid the country of Belgian troops. He said he and his colleagues were not anti-Belgian. In fact, they wanted Belgian technicians and experts to stay on in order help this new country. I informed Prime Minister I had pointed that fact out to our President and to National Security Council as well as in Department.

5. Prime Minister declared he appreciated all UN had done here, but severely criticized Hammarskjold for not having complied with resolutions of Security Council, for not having consulted his government prior to his visit to Elisabethville where he “negotiated” with Tshombe. He also expressed anger at SYG for having refused wait for Congolese Delegation which was proceeding to New York and Prime Minister declared that no doubt Hammarskjold wished to talk first to Afro-Asian group and to Security Council before arrival Congolese representatives.

After my talk with Prime Minister I accompanied Grootaert who had been present and who is one of Lumumba’s Chefs de Cabinet, although a Belgian, to his office. Grootaert, formerly judge in Katanga and who apparently has been advising Lumumba regarding interpretation Security Council resolutions, made following points:

1. There is apparently honest difference of opinion between SYG and GOC re interpretation Security Council resolutions. GOC which bases itself on Roman law interprets letter of law while SYG, basing himself on common law, is guided by precedents such as Lebanese and Korean cases.

2. To understand Lumumba one must realize he was “raised” in Belgian-type liberal circles.

3. Reverting to my remarks to Prime Minister that he should be careful re choice of advisers, Grootaert stated he was very much disturbed by type of Communist advisers who now surround Lumumba. He referred particularly to the Guineans and to the Press Attaché, Serge Michel, who according to him was placed at disposal Lumumba by FLN and Ferhat Abbas⁴ while Prime Minister was in Tunis. Grootaert did not believe Prime Minister had fully understood import of my remarks and my caveat concerning his advisers. Grootaert said he would spell out my meaning to Lumumba. I asked him what he thought of a proposal we had in mind to invite Kashamura to visit US. He thought it was excellent, since the Information Minister could very well profit from a first-hand contact with US.

4. Grootaert did not understand why UN troops had refused prevent killings between warring Luluas and Balubas in Luluabourg area. He said it was one of functions of UN forces to restore law and order in country.

5. Chef de Cabinet stated it was desire of Prime Minister to have Moroccan General Kettani together with assistance Ghanaian troops train National Army. In his opinion, army must be thoroughly reformed, regrouped, and members be given new-type uniforms. There must be complete break between new army and old Force Publique. Although on number of occasions, Prime Minister and Grootaert had asked talk with Kettani, Bunche thus far had not sent Moroccan General to them. I said I would talk to Bunche.

6. Grootaert stated that few days ago 40 Belgian soldiers had been found in Leopoldville and that radio equipment had been seized in building formerly occupied by Belgian Embassy.

I was with Prime Minister for one and one quarter hours and with Grootaert for nearly an hour.

Timberlake

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/8–1860. Confidential; Priority. Repeated priority to Brussels.
1. There is no numbered paragraph 1.
2. An engineering consulting firm.
3. Zoologist Harold Jefferson Coolidge.
4. Prime Minister of the Algerian Provisional Government.