Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Africa, Volume XIV

170. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State ⁰

New York, August 10, 1960, 10 p.m.

377. Re: Congo. We met with Wieschhoff and subsequently with Hammarskjold at our request this evening. Following is account of developments since SC meeting:

1. SYG sent cable to Tshombe transmitting text of SC res¹ and indicating need for Tshombe to comply with SC decision. Before receiving any answer to this cable, Hammarskjold sent second and lengthy cable which eventually will become UN document.² In it he proposed plan of action for Katanga. Making clear there was no question of SYG accepting conditions or coming to any agreements, SYG said he personally would come to Elisabethville for pourparlers and exchange of views with regard to deployment of UN forces in Katanga. He would arrive Friday, August 12, accompanied by Deputy Commander in Chief UNOC, General Kittani (Morocco), SYG’s military adviser, Brigadier Rikhye, some civilian advisers, and two Swedish companies of about 125 men each, uniformed and armed “only for self-defense”. This evening Tshombe replied, welcoming meeting for exchange of views with SYG. In response to comment in SYG’s second cable, Tshombe said he and his group could arrive in safety and would be received “with highest courtesy.” There were no conditions stated in Tshombe’s brief telegram which will also become SC document. (Note that despite many press stories, this was only cable from Tshombe since SC res 8 [9] August.)

2. At same time SYG also sent cable (similar to first one to Tshombe) to Lumumba. He advised Lumumba re SC res, pointing out obligation under Art 49³ to comply with SC decisions. Bunche told Hammarskjold Lumumba had “rushed around” to hand him reply accepting situation as explained by SYG. This exchange will also be made public in SC document⁴ as added help in keeping Lumumba “tied down”.

3. Yesterday SYG called in Belgians. He gave Fon Min Wigny letter in which he proposed, if there were any difficulties or gap before he could introduce UN troops into Katanga, to incorporate Belgian troops Katanga into UN force as temporary measure to maintain law and order pending arrival other UN forces. Wigny said he could not give Hammarskjold answer without referring whole question to cabinet for decision. Wieschhoff described Wigny’s mood as “very mellow”. (Dutch Del today confirmed this assessment Belgian temperament, saying they understood, without knowing any details, that Belgians were extremely satisfied with way situation developed since SC meeting.)

4. This morning Hammarskjold called in Congolese Del and told them of his intention, as set out in his second cable to Tshombe, to go on to Katanga. He did not give them details. He did make it very clear that he regarded Katanga as special problem which was so recognized by SC and that he would brook no interference in this regard. He intended deal with Tshombe directly and would not take rep of central government with him on Friday when he goes in. Congolese Vice Premier Gizenga, according to Hammarskjold, “swallowed hard” but took this without protest.

5. Hammarskjold thus has completed, with Congolese and Belgians, preparations for next step. He realizes that his next problem will be Lumumba. Wieschhoff expressed personal view that in long run it would not be harmful if Lumumba were to try to interfere with SYG’s plan for Katanga, thus precipitating test of strength with those who oppose him. (Wieschhoff mentioned Ileo, Bolikango, Kalonji,⁵ Kasavubu and by implication SYG.) Wieschhoff believes Lumumba would now lose such struggle and it would have result of weakening or destroying his role in govt.

6. In order to keep Nkrumah (Ghana) in line, Hammarskjold has sent him cable indicating his (SYG’s) trip to Leopoldville includes 15 minute refueling stop Accra. He has asked Nkrumah if it would be possible to come to airport for brief “exchange of views” on current situation while plane being refueled. In fact, plane will be spending much longer time in Accra according to present schedule, but if Nkrumah knew this he would try to have Hammarskjold come into city for meeting at Presidential Palace. Hammarskjold feels psychology would be all wrong if that were to take place, hence his subterfuge on time available. (Wieschhoff said SYG originally dictated telegram to Nkrumah suggesting meeting “to discuss our differences”. Wieschhoff said he felt this too strong and proposed phrase “exchange of views” on situation. SYG accepted this suggestion.)

7. Hammarskjold due to arrive Leopldville Thursday night. After breakfast Friday morning he plans to fly on to Elisabethville according schedule set out above. He anticipates “talks” with Tshombe will only last one day. By Sunday Hammarskjold expects to be able to call in first large complement troops for Katanga. (He regards 250 Swedes in first group as “token” only.) These will consist of Irish, Moroccan, and more Swedish troops. Perhaps later he will bring in Ethiopians.

8. Hammarskjold plans return Leopoldville Monday, August 15 to begin negotiation on disposition of bases, pursuant provisions in Friendship Treaty. To do this he intends be party to negotiations between Belgians and Congolese and to initial eventual agreement on disposition. He hopes according to Wieschhoff to be third party to agreement, with outcome being delegation of authority for control of bases from Belgians and Congolese to UN. He proposes that these negotiations be carried out in Leopoldville and that Belgian diplomatic and military representatives come there for that purpose. He has already informed both Belgians and Congolese of intention have negotiations there. SYG anticipates these negotiations will take approximately one week.

Hammarskjold will then fly to Pretoria for his talks with South African Govt beginning August 20. Prime Minister Verwoerd has now agreed to meet with him and has invited him to lunch and/or dinner. Hammarskjold will return to Leopoldville approximately 24 August, and come back to NY just before end of month. While in Leopoldville he may have to do more with bases.

9. Kuznetsov⁶ also called on Hammarskjold today re Congo. During course of conversation Kuznetsov told Hammarskjold Soviet Union would make all its technicians for Congo available through UN. He also agreed that UN would set specifications for these technicians and only those would be supplied which were requested. During conversation Kuznetsov also sought to dispel any doubts SYG might have as to Soviet support for his efforts. They merely wished to reserve right to express difference of opinion publicly, he said. Hammarskjold indicated he prepared to concede them that much.

10. In discussing his civilian assistance establishment in Congo, Hammarskjold said he hopes when he returns to NY at end of month to bring Bunche with him. To replace Bunche as his personal representative he has asked New Delhi for services of former Indian Amb to UN and later to Belgrade, Rajeshwar Dayal ⁷ who also served SYG in 1958 as member 3 man council.

11. It may be useful at this point to add that SYG, during recent days, has been busily pulling various recalcitrants back into UN line. With Guinea this revealed in exchange of cables with Sekou Toure set out in doc S/4417/Add.1/Rev.1.⁸ With Soviets it has taken many turns including his extremely forthright rebuttal statement during SC and his conversation with Kuznetsov reported above. With Ghana it has included cable exchanges with Nkrumah and now SYG’s plan to stop in Accra. Re Lumumba, of course, SYG has taken many steps of which Dept aware from variety of sources.

Barco

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/8–1060. Confidential; Priority.
1. The resolution introduced on August 8 by Tunisia and Ceylon was adopted without change on August 9 by a vote of 9 to 0, with 2 abstentions (France and Italy). For text, see U.N. doc. S/4426; also printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960, pp. 547–548.
2. For text of Hammarskjöld’s August 10 message to Tshombe and the latter’s reply, see U.N. doc. S/4417/Add.4; also printed in Public Papers of the Secretaries-General, vol. V, pp. 83–84.
3. Article 49 stated that “The Members of the United Nations shall join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security Council.”
4. See U.N. doc. S/4417/Add.3.
5. Jean Bolikango, leader of the Parti de l’Unité National (Puna) and Albert Kalonji, leader of the Kalonji branch of the Mouvement National Congolais. On August 9, Kalonji declared an independent state in South Kasai province.
6. Vasili Vasilievich Kuznetsov, Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister, was representing the Soviet Union in the Security Council discussions on the Congo.
7. For Dayal’s perception of events, see his Mission for Hammarskjold: The Congo Crisis (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976).
8. Dated August 6 and 7; also printed in Public Papers of the Secretaries-General, vol. V, pp. 67–68.