Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Africa, Volume XIV

160. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Belgium⁰

August 2, 1960, 7:14 p.m.

317. Ref: Embtel 346,¹Polto 210,² and Deptel 313.³ Following U.S. position has been developed for Ambassador’s use with Belgian Government on his return. (For USRO: Position may be used in your discussions only after Ambassador Burden reports results his presentation to Belgian Government.)

1. U.S. views on Belgian position. Regret Belgium believes U.S. has not supported Belgium in UN to any reasonable degree. In SC discussion on first resolution U.S. clearly made statement against accusation that Belgium “aggressor” in Congo. Affirmative U.S. vote on first SC resolution made because of U.S. conviction UN role vital to solution Congo problem. Moreover, Belgians should be reminded that we made important statement, largely on their behalf, in interpreting paragraph on withdrawal of forces in first SC resolution to mean phased withdrawal of Belgian forces as UN forces assured [assumed?] effective control and brought about public order. In discussion second SC resolution, U.S. played key role in defeating Soviet resolution specifying three-day deadline for total Belgian withdrawal.⁴ Moreover, pursuant to specific Belgian request, we made very strong statement in SC telling Soviets keep out of Congo. U.S. continues in firm belief Belgium not aggressor and that Belgium will continue to sincerely cooperate with UN in implementation both SC resolutions. U.S. has put out public statement this sense.⁵ U.S. fully supports UN role as best hope for solution extremely complex Congo problem, and feels its confidence justified by success UN effort so far.

2. Troop withdrawal. U.S. convinced Congolese will continue insist on complete Belgian troop withdrawal from Congo, including from bases and from Katanga, and that therefore Belgium must be prepared accept such withdrawal as fact of life. Moreover, U.S. believes Belgium must demonstrate concretely that it withdrawing troops rapidly to Congo bases and, as soon as possible, to Belgium. Recent Belgian statement regarding withdrawal to Belgium of 1500 troops invaluable in this connection. Nevertheless, pressure clearly building upon Hammarskjold to show more rapid implementation of SC resolution. Possibility can not be discounted that Soviets, Congolese or Afro-Asians will call another SC meeting and table another resolution condemning Belgium for not implementing SC resolutions and calling for withdrawal of forces within short time limit of two or three days. Such eventuality could only be seriously detrimental to Western position. Consequently, U.S. sincerely believes Belgium must give most urgent consideration to further, measurable evidence its compliance with SC resolutions.

U.S. assumes Belgian long-term interest in Congo is to restore and maintain Belgian economic presence there and deny it to Communists. If this correct, believes troop and base issues must be subordinated economic issue. Lumumba has frequently asserted his recognition of Congo’s need to maintain Belgian economic presence and U.S. would hope Belgians could exert influence on technicians to remain or return Congo with UN forces maintaining internal security. At same time, U.S. willing approach Hammarskjold, providing GOB agreeable, in order point out desirability of maintaining and returning as many Belgian technicians in Congo as possible. U.S. would point out complexity Congo situation, stating that only long Belgian experience in Congo can hope restore economic and technical situation in short term. U.S. would urge Hammarskjold to use his influence with Congolese to give early public assurances re security technicians both in terms Congolese attitudes and intentions and in terms UN force presence.

3. Katanga. U.S. notes with satisfaction Belgian reply to Hammarskjold that Belgium interprets SC resolutions as covering withdrawal from Katanga and that Hammarskjold might use this confidential information in negotiations with Congolese. U.S. hopes Belgium will find it possible make public statement this effect in near future.⁶

4. Bases. As stated above, U.S. convinced Belgium must be prepared give up bases in view Congolese firm position. If Belgium wishes to approach Hammarskjold, offering bases to UN for length UN stay in Congo so that abandonment of bases will not give them over to Force Publique or, in worst eventuality, to Soviets, U.S. would support this solution. Such step would seem desirable in view fact neither U.S. nor NATO military considers Belgian retention these bases of strategic value. Moreover, step would provide further concrete evidence Belgian intentions in Congo.

5. Lumumba. Belgium has already received U.S. explanation reception Lumumba. U.S. believes West must deal with Lumumba as Prime Minister Congolese Government, although his reliability open to serious question. Lumumba’s intentions and sympathies unclear, and evidence exists that he will not prove satisfactory. U.S. will therefore continue search for more trustworthy elements in Congo who might be susceptible to support as part of program of reinsurance against Lumumba.

6. African States. As Embassy is aware, forceful UN action in using troops from African states has so far effectively blocked dangerous Soviet meddling in Congo. Department considers it most important African states continue take lead and Department must keep their sensitivities in mind to certain extent, particularly in public statements.⁷

Herter

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/8–260. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Robert H. Miller of the Office of Western European Affairs; cleared by White, Penfield, Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs Woodruff Wallner, and Executive Secretariat Director John A. Calhoun; and approved by Herter. Repeated to Léopoldville, Paris, USUN, and London.
1. Telegram 346 from Brussels, July 28, reported that Wigny had telephoned Burden on July 27 to complain of lack of U.S. support for Belgium in the Security Council and slowness in U.S. public opposition to unilateral Soviet intervention in the Congo. (Ibid., 770G.00/7–2860)
2. Polto 210 from Paris, July 27, reported that at a meeting of NATO representatives, the Belgians had expressed extreme dismay with U.S. policy concerning the Congo and had warned that this might compel a future Belgian Government to adopt a neutralist policy. (Ibid.)
3. Telegram 313 to Brussels, August 2, informed the Embassy of a message which the Belgian Government intended to send to Hammarskjöld; see the first sentence of numbered paragraph 3 of this telegram. (Ibid.) Hammarskjöld had appealed to Brussels for a public declaration of its intention to withdraw all Belgian troops from the Congo, including Katanga.
4. The Soviet draft resolution, submitted on July 20, was not put to a vote; for text, see U.N. doc. S/4402.
5. Reference is to a statement issued by the Department of State on July 30; for text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960, pp. 540–541.
6. Hammarskjöld appealed to the United States on August 2 to urge the Belgian Government to support his request for a Belgian public statement (see footnote 3 above). Memoranda of several telephone conversations that day between Herter and Burden (in New York), Houghton (in Paris), and Ambassador to the United Kingdom John Hay Whitney (in London) are in the Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Telephone Conversations. Telegram 319 to Brussels, August 2, informed the Embassy of a meeting that evening on the subject between Herter and the British and French Chargés. It stated that a Belgian public statement would be very desirable but gave Burden discretion on this point in view of a Belgian statement issued that day. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/8–260) For text of the Belgian statement, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960, p. 543.
7. Telegrams 394 and 395 from Brussels, August 4, reported Burden’s conversation with Wigny that morning. Telegram 394 reported Wigny’s comments; it stated that he took no issue with any of the points made. Telegram 395 transmitted the talking paper which Burden used for the conversation. (Both in Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/8–460)