143. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions0

129. Eyes only Principal Officer. Department aware that declaration independence Katanga, Tshombe refusal admit UN troops and presence Belgian troops Katanga pose complex policy problem. Adverse reaction African states including present Congo Government, to Belgian presence in Katanga inevitable and will become stronger if Belgian troops remain for some time. It also likely that Congo, divested of principal source income, could ultimately represent for USG, UN and others much greater funding and development problem after present unrest has been settled. Against this must be balanced advantage of maintaining pro-Western orientation of at least part of Congo and protection of its industries. At very least, denial of Katanga assets to Soviet influence through Communist-oriented central government extremely important. Much depends on eventual political outcome of UN intervention, and character of Congo leadership which might emerge during intervention and after withdrawal of Belgian and UN troops. Department sees as distinct possibility emergence of several [Page 345] regional centers of political strength, each dominated by local leaders with tribal backing and perhaps linked in loose federal structure with few important powers left for central government. The relationship of Katanga to such possible federation and role of Belgian influence in it is obscure at moment. In any case Dept continues opposed any fragmentation of Congo and continues to hope that with UN military and technical assistance, degree of economic recovery can be initiated and government stabilized thus precluding definitive independence Katanga.

Department hopes that visible Belgian political and military presence in Katanga can be minimized. However, US should avoid giving impression it fostering extinction Belgian interests there or attempting supplant those interests. Such position on part US would undoubtedly seriously offend Belgians as well as other metropolitan powers, which probably would support Belgium’s desire salvage what it can in Katanga. This could cause serious split among NATO powers. Recognize also that question independent Katanga closely linked in Belgian minds with future status enormous Belgian mining interests and Kamina base, which Belgians will strive hard to retain.

Dept hopes that, if Katanga is to continue as independent, reliable local security force with African officers can be trained and African administrators worked into posts with real responsibility. UN technical assistance in these fields would ensure such training would in fact be carried out and would remove some of stigma Katanga independence from viewpoint African states. In any case Tshombe’s blatant opposition to UN not helpful anyone now. It may be possible present these points to GOB officials, Katanga Government and SYGUN at later date.

Meantime Department suggests that public statements on Katanga question be limited to position that (1) at present time we do not recognize Katanga, (2) issue quite complex and receiving close study by USG, and (3) US recognizes Congo Government and hopes stable, unified Congo Government can be developed once present crisis over.

To assist Department, views of addressee posts are solicited on all aspects this problem.1 In addition Brussels and Congo posts are asked to report as information available on character of Tshombe, whether he apt show any independence of Belgian advisors, likelihood African opposition to secession, nature of possible role for Jason Sendwe as opposition leader, plans for disposition of Belgian troops in Katanga and pressures from Belgian industrial interests.

Herter
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/7–2160. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Woodruff; cleared by Sisco, McBride, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Ivan B. White; and approved by Merchant. Sent to 15 embassies and 7 consulates in Africa and to Brussels, Paris, and USUN.
  2. See Documents 146 and 150. Additional responses to this telegram are in Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00 and 655.70G/7–2360.