Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Africa, Volume XIV

134. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

July 19, 1960.

SUBJECT

• Congo Crisis

PARTICIPANTS

• The Secretary
• M. Camille Gutt, Minister of State of Belgium
• Ambassador Louis Scheyven, Belgian Ambassador
• Mr. James K. Penfield, AF
• Mr. Joseph J. Sisco, UNP
• Mr. Robert H. McBride, WE

M. Gutt thanked the Secretary for receiving him and said that he was here originally in connection with private business matters. However, he knew the Congo question would be raised with him so he had seen Foreign Minister Wigny before leaving Brussels. He said that M. Wigny had asked him to explain to the Secretary and to Mr. Hammarskjold the position of the Belgian Government on the Congo crisis. He said M. Wigny had also asked him to discuss this at length with the Belgian Ambassadors in New York and here. He said he could sum up M. Wigny’s views on repercussions of the Congo situation in Belgium under three headings: first, the sentimental reaction in Belgium; second, the political reaction; and third, the military reaction.

In connection with the first factor M. Gutt said that everyone in Belgium from the King down was indignant regarding the shocking atrocities which had been committed by the Congolese. He said the reaction in Belgium was one of astonishment that the whole world did not share Belgium’s indignation. He said the Belgian attitude on the entire question could be explained by the profound reaction against the events which had taken place.

Passing to the political repercussions M. Gutt said that whether or not the Soviets in fact prepared the disturbances in the Congo, they have exploited them extremely cleverly since they broke out. Soviet policy here was the same as everywhere, an effort to divide the West. Following the recent mutiny the Congolese Force Publique apparently was being Sovietized. The Soviet policy, which was being carried out by the Force Publique, was to create an atmosphere of fear and violence which would empty the Congo of its needed technicians and create a vacuum for the Soviets to move into. M. Gutt said that the present crisis far transcends a dispute between Belgium and the Congo. This was in fact a crucial test between the Soviets and the West like the Korean crisis had been in its day. He said that Belgium was very much concerned and realized what was at stake. Central Africa had become an East-West battleground and the Belgian Government and people trusted that the United States would react as firmly as in the case of Korea.

M. Gutt touched briefly on the military aspects of the Congo crisis and then said that Foreign Minister Wigny hoped that there would be a U.S. declaration which would serve as a deterrent to the Soviets and would be in effect a hands off declaration covering Central Africa. M. Gutt said he did not know precisely how M. Wigny envisaged such a statement being made or how we would implement it but he thought that it was essential that the Soviets be made aware of the firm U.S. position on this subject.

Passing to the situation in New York, M. Gutt said that he hoped when the Congo question came up again in the Security Council, the United States would support the Belgian position. He described the Belgian military presence in the Congo as clearly to protect Belgian civilians. Belgian forces intervened only after the first horrors had been committed. They would clearly stay as long as necessary to restore order. When the UN has in fact restored law and order, the Belgian forces would withdraw but until that time it was impossible for them to do so. M. Gutt said he had conveyed the foregoing to Mr. Hammarskjold and Mr. Hammarskjold said that the UN troops could clearly not act in collaboration with the Belgian forces since the former received their orders from the United Nations. However, in fact, he said, satisfactory liaison existed. He repeated that the Belgian intervention was only to protect white residents of the Congo.

M. Gutt then said that the Belgian position also was to the effect that UN troops were there to restore order and therefore they should intervene only where there were disorders and not where peace and quiet already existed as in Katanga. There was a widespread need for UN forces throughout much of the Congo and therefore it would be unfortunate if they were to intervene in areas where Belgian forces were already assuring tranquillity.

The Secretary said that he would like to have M. Gutt’s views on the UN presence in Katanga consisting of one or two UN representatives. M. Gutt said he had discussed this matter with Mr. Hammarskjold and believed that the Secretary-General did not wish to have UN troops in Katanga at the present time. He said Hammarskjold had mentioned to him confidentially this idea of having one or two UN civilians to constitute a presence in Katanga. He thought that this would be agreeable to the Belgian government.

M. Gutt continued saying he realized that what the Belgians wished us to do was not easy. However, he thought we should give serious consideration to their viewpoint because the external concerns of Belgium and the United States with regard to the Congo were identical and this had now become a focal point in the cold war. The Secretary then discussed UN procedures. He said he thought it would be most helpful if the Belgian Government could give further statements of amplification regarding troop withdrawals as order was restored in various parts of the Congo. He thought it would be particularly useful if this could occur in advance of the further UN discussion of this matter. M. Gutt said that he was sure the Belgian Government would reaffirm its willingness to withdraw forces as UN troops began to come into the Congo. The Secretary referred to an agreement between Mr. Bunche and the Belgian Commanding General in the Congo on this subject.¹ M. Gutt stressed that the Belgian Government’s relations with Mr. Bunche have been excellent from the beginning. Ambassador Scheyven noted that certain Belgian units had already been removed from Leopoldville. M. Gutt thought that full implementation of the withdrawal policy could not be achieved at the moment since UN forces were too limited thus far.

The Secretary referred to the action of the Congolese parliament in rejecting the suggestion of Lumumba that there should be an appeal for Soviet assistance. M. Gutt said that Lumumba was pinning his actions vis-à-vis the Soviets on alleged failure of the UN effort. M. Gutt said that the Belgians hoped that the African Chiefs of State would call the attention of Lumumba to the fact that they had sent their own forces there and that these forces and not the Soviets should restore order in the Congo. He then said that in the Belgian view there was virtually no Congolese Government at the present time and merely two men running around, out of touch with the situation.

The Secretary said that he hoped the UN debate tomorrow would proceed satisfactorily. He noted that the Congolese were sending a representative over who was supposed to be a moderate. M. Gutt said that he was one of the few rather good men and was probably in disagreement with Lumumba. He said the Congolese Government had never been more than a conglomeration of disparate individuals and that these men were not capable of restoring order.

The Secretary then inquired as to approximately how many Belgians had left the Congo since the outbreak of disturbances there. The Belgian Ambassador and M. Gutt agreed that there had originally been some 85,000 in the Congo and that probably there were now about 30 or 35,000 left. The Secretary assured M. Gutt that Ambassador Lodge would be prepared to make a strong statement regarding Soviet activities in the Congo. He thought we would be in a relatively good position if the Belgians would indicate their intentions with regard to phased withdrawals of their forces as the UN took over. The Secretary also said that we would stress that there should not be introduced into the Congo any troops other than those requested by the United Nations. M. Gutt stressed that the Belgians believe that UN troops should proceed primarily to areas where there are disorders. The Secretary said that the purpose of sending them indeed was precisely to restore order.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/7–1960. Confidential. Drafted by McBride.
1. Bunche reported this in a message of July 19 to Hammarskjöld; for text, see U.N. doc. S/4389/Add. 1, printed in Andrew W. Cordier and Wilder Foote, eds., Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations, vol. V: Dag Hammarskjöld, 1960–1961 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975; hereafter cited as Public Papers of the Secretaries-General, vol. V), pp. 38–39.