Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Africa, Volume XIV

131. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State⁰

New York, July 18, 1960, midnight.

121. Re: Congo. Following are points SYG made to us during conversations Saturday.¹

1. SYG concerned with danger that request for assistance from Lumumba sent out in all directions might result in attempts by Soviet bloc to move in with technicians. He believes most effective means prevent this is for UN move in as quickly as possible to prevent any vacuum developing as Belgians move out. He has therefore requested specialized agencies urgently to begin planning to supply technical assistance as soon as political situation stabilizes enough for them to be used. He observed this is first time UN has had to assist country where it had no government and whole UN program is going ahead without Govt of Congo approval in any clear-cut form. (SYG did not seem daunted by that and in fact appears intrigued by creative role thrust upon UN. He nevertheless carefully protects himself by consultations with other Africans, and, in differing degrees, with big powers.)

2. SYG said his approach in requesting troops had been first to issue general request for battalions to all independent African states (except, of course, South Africa). He said in reality he hoped avoid taking either Mali or Guinea forces at outset. He did not want Guinean troops for obvious reasons and if he took troops from Mali, he felt in politics of Africa he would have to take Guinean troops. SYG therefore relieved when Mali replied they could not supply troops before July 21 because of army reorganization now in progress. This, SYG felt, strengthened his hand in telling Sekou Toure he did not need Guinean troops since he already had as many as he could handle now, but he did need specialists, and therefore would like police company. (While SYG’s reply to Guinea still being processed, he received formal Guinean offer of 2 battalions. However, he ordered his original reply to be sent as if formal offer had not come to his attention in time.)

SYG said he felt it imperative that he make clear to independent African states he considered they had main responsibility for UN’s effort in Congo. In his view, this will stop in advance any argument that UN operation is disguised imperialism. At same time SYG said he is emphasizing to Africans that UN operation must have “universal” character and for that reason in his “second phase” (ourtel 107)² he is seeking recruit troops outside Africa.

3. Katanga. SYG said he hopes avoid problem of Katanga until “middle of week” by which time he believes UN will be in strong position in rest of Congo. He then intends to send emissary (not going through Leopoldville) to Tshombe to make arrangements for UN troops to go into Katanga. His general tactic will be that he will deal directly with Tshombe and by implication recognize his importance and at same time trade that recognition for permission have troops enter Katanga. Once UN forces successfully in Katanga, Tshombe’s efforts secede likely lose their footing and Tshombe probably make overtures to GOC in Leopoldville to salvage some degree of authority for himself by collaborating with GOC. (SYG emphasized he does not wish UN action to have effect of artificially bolstering Lumumba who, SYG implied, not very strong and probably will not last.)

4. UN command. SYG said Moroccans sending General Kettani and Ethiopians also sending General. In order avoid question of command and rivalry among officers, he decided to select Von Horn³ as commander. (He said he may have to ask Swedish Govt for temporary promotion for Von Horn in order assure him sufficient rank in view other Generals present.) He said he thought there many advantages in having neutral European as commanding officer, and he had received no complaint in any way from Africans on this score. (Von Horn’s staff at start will also be “European,” since this will be initial use to which TSO officers arriving with Von Horn to be put.)

5. SYG said Tunisia and Guinea have each offered to send “political advisers” to assist Congo Govt. He said while Tunisians might be all right, Guineans would be impossible, and he said he taking very strong line in saying “no” to all such offers.

6. SYG reported Sobolev (USSR) came to see him about Congo request for technical assistance. SYG said he considered it significant that Sobolev had done this since if Russians intended to respond to request, they would not have discussed question with SYG.

7. SYG reports that at this stage Bunche so over-worked he cannot personally continue with food distribution responsibility. Pate (UNICEF Director) and staff of six left Saturday night for Congo to take over responsibility for this operation on UN’s behalf.

8. In answer our question regarding status plans for his trip to Africa, he said he thinking in terms direct flight to Leopoldville, soon as ONUC fully in place, for purposes personal check. Then 3 days in South Africa pursuant original trip plans. Return to NY via Leopoldville would give him second chance review operation on ground.

Lodge

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/7–1860. Confidential.
1. July 16.
2. Telegram 107 from USUN, July 17, reported Hammarskjöld’s plans for recruiting the U.N. force in the Congo. (Department of State, Central Files, 332.70G/7–1760)
3. Major General Carl C. Von Horn of Sweden had been serving as Chief of Staff of the U.N. Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine. For his account of his service in the Congo, see Soldiering for Peace, pp. 140–252.