Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Africa, Volume XIV

128. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

July 15, 1960.

SUBJECT

• Congo

PARTICIPANTS

• The Secretary
• Ambassador Louis Scheyven, Embassy of Belgium
• Mr. J. C. Satterthwaite, AF
• Mr. Robert H. McBride, WE

After thanking the Secretary for his telephone message to the Belgian Foreign Minister, Ambassador Scheyven reported that the three western Ambassadors had met with Wigny in Brussels this morning¹ and would meet again tomorrow.² He said the principal point he had been instructed to make was that it was now clear that Lumumba was operating under Soviet guidance. The Secretary said we had remarked at the change in his attitude prior to his recent trip when he was refused landing facilities in Elizabethville and his attitude thereafter. Ambassador Scheyven said that these changes of attitude had occurred before and noted his very disagreeable speech in front of the King of Belgium at the time of independence and his very friendly statement a few hours thereafter.³ He said that since their return to Leopoldville Kasavubu and Lumumba had avoided Belgian representatives there. He said that, furthermore, they were not consulting with the Foreign Minister who was taking quite a different line.

Ambassador Scheyven continued saying that the Soviet hand in Lumumba’s activities was becoming clearer and clearer. He noted the threatening statement of Khrushchev to the effect that the Soviets would take further steps if the Belgians did not cease their present activities in the Congo. He said that this could even lead to armed Soviet intervention. He then handed the Secretary the text of a telegram from Lumumba to Khrushchev. He said the Foreign Minister had asked him to give this text to the Secretary. He said that now that we had one statement from the Soviets on this subject they would probably continue their menaces and might indeed take further actions. In the light of this situation, the Belgian Government thought that perhaps the time had now come for the United States to make a statement with regard to the Soviet menace in the Congo, along the lines that they would have to face the U.S. should they intervene in the Congo. He said the Foreign Minister felt personally that there should be such a statement at the present time. Ambassador Scheyven continued saying that the situation in the Congo could even lead to World War III. He noted that the first U.N. groups have begun to arrive today and that this might ameliorate the situation. However, he continued that if the Soviet statement on their intentions with regard to the Congo were not counteracted by any U.S. reply, this would mark a net gain for the Soviets throughout Africa. He said the Belgian Government was extremely worried by this development.

The Secretary concurred that this was a serious situation. He wondered how physically the Soviets would move if they were to accept a possible invitation for intervention from the Congolese. He noted it would be a difficult and lengthy move by air and that if the Soviets were to move by sea, the U.S. carrier would be off the Congo coast before the Soviets could be there. Ambassador Scheyven noted that the Soviets seem to feel that they were the protectors of the Congo. The Secretary recommended strongly that the message which Wigny had directed be given to him should also be given urgently to Hammarskjold. He said that the U.N. Secretary-General had taken hold of the situation quite firmly and he thought it would make him extremely angry that one country, i.e., the Soviets were intervening in this situation. The Secretary noted that the Secretary-General interpreted the UNSC resolution in the same fashion that we do, i.e., that there should be no Belgian withdrawal from the Congo until the U.N. force was firmly in control.

The Secretary then inquired how Soviet technicians would be introduced into the Congo. Ambassador Scheyven said doubtless by air and noted that there were many airfields in the Congo, though the two bases of Kamina and Kitona were fortunately firmly in Belgian hands. He continued, saying that the task of the U.N. force would be enormous and that he hoped that they would initially concentrate on areas where there was widespread lawlessness and not on those regions which the Belgian troops controlled and where they had reestablished order. If the U.N. units attempted to force the Belgians to withdraw from areas where they were in control the effect would be very bad. He said that if law and order were not re-established promptly in the Congo the entire structure of the country, both Belgian and Congolese, would collapse.

Ambassador Scheyven then discussed the situation in Katanga. He said that obviously the Katanga government had not taken all of the necessary juridical steps to make its position clear. Ambassador Scheyven said that it was not the present intention of the Belgian Government to recognize the Tshombe regime, but that the Belgians feared that this might soon be the only part of the Congo which was connected with the Free World. Therefore, the Belgians hoped we would not press hard against the present Katanga regime. He said that Tshombe was planning to present his case to the United Nations one way or another and he believed that this Katanga movement should not be suppressed at too early a stage as it might be the last stronghold we have. Furthermore, it was economically, of course, the most important part of the Congo. Finally, if the rest of the country fell under Moscow domination, we might wish to reconsider our present attitude.

The Secretary inquired if the relationship between Kasavubu and Lumumba was still close. Ambassador Scheyven thought that they distrusted each other and therefore were sticking close together to watch each other. He reverted to his suggestion that the United States Government should make a statement with regard to the Congo along the lines outlined above, i.e., in the nature of a warning to the Soviets regarding moving into the area. The Secretary said we would give consideration to the matter, but that was all he could say now.⁴ He reiterated his view that the Belgians should discuss this problem with Mr. Hammarskjold and wondered whether this was the moment for a U.S.-Soviet conflict over the Congo. He concluded, noting that the first responsibility in the affair rested with the U.N. If the U.N. failed to meet this responsibility, then perhaps we should reconsider.

Ambassador Scheyven concluded noting the menacing nature of the present Soviet attitude.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/7–1560. Secret. Drafted by McBride.
1. Telegram 200 from Brussels, July 15, reported that Wigny called Lumumba “a source of trouble and an instrument for a Soviet take-over” and argued that it was necessary to act rapidly to “undermine Lumumba’s position and pave way for other, better people to take his place.” (Ibid.)
2. Reported in telegram 206 from Brussels, July 15. (Ibid., 655.70G/7–1660)
3. Both on June 30; for texts, see Congo 1960, vol. I, pp. 323–326.
4. Telegram 148 to Brussels, July 16, stated that the Department had issued a statement which termed the Soviet message “intemperate, misleading, irresponsible.” (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/7–1660)