Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Arab-Israeli Dispute; United Arab Republic; North Africa, Volume XIII

88. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State¹

Beirut, August 27, 1959—4 p.m.

693. We believe we are now able to give reasonably accurate assessment of line Arab States will take on Palestine question at UNGA. It is increasingly apparent predictions made to Embassy by Arab League propagandist Fayez Sayegh prior experts conference so far (Embtel 416)² were correct. This is attributable to fact Sayegh did much of preparatory drafting and has been working closely with various delegates, particularly Lebanese. As Department will remember, Sayegh got into act immediately after publication of Hammarskjold report (Embdes 37)³ with demand for concrete Arab counter-proposal.

Thereafter Sayegh appears to have succeeded in persuading Lebanese Foreign Ministry and President Chehab himself that time was ripe for Arab initiative on Palestine question. Since Lebanon has more to fear from integration than have other Arab States and was severely shaken by SYG report, it was highly receptive to Sayegh concept of counter-proposals. Lebanese mood has become one not only of rejecting integration but of finding means of divesting themselves of Palestinian refugees. In last few days Minister Pierre Gemayel has given open expression to this point of view during exchange with Jordanian Prime Minister Majali conducted through the press.

Lebanese, with Sayegh in wings, have in turn succeeded in infecting rest of Arab League with idea of most intensified campaign in UNGA in recent years. Implication all this, at least as far as Lebanon concerned, is hopeful US support.

Sayegh’s motives are not completely clear to us. He may honestly consider himself prophet of new Palestine, but he may equally well be trying to make himself indispensable to Arab League, which he believes has treated him shabbily. Fact remains information he has been giving us has thus far been straight.

Only as in further conversations with Sayegh and various officials Lebanese Ministry Foreign Affairs as well as of local press reports following general points can be made.

(1) Hammarskjold report has provoked Arabs into unwanted display of energy and solidarity and determination to move from defensive to offensive.

(2) While normal tendency Arab States to fall out can not be entirely discounted, it now seems likely Casablanca conference⁴ will endorse AL experts findings and that Arabs will go to UNGA with certain concrete proposals.

(3) Most important elements in proposals are, apart from rejection of Hammarskjold report, to get start in direction of implementing UN resolutions which have not been heeded by Israel and to press for placing UNRWA on regular budget of UN. First element will take form of demand for UN custodial team to safeguard Arab property in Israel and for revival and strengthening ME conciliation commission. Should this prove unsuccessful Arabs will then declare they have borne Israel’s flouting of UN resolutions long enough and now consider themselves free to act as they see fit. We are not clear what implications this maneuver are, nor are we sure Arabs themselves are clear. One obvious implication is preparation for war, but we have no indication this in fact being discussed. Second will if necessary be backed by area threat to take over UNRWA and support it through “refugee tax”. This would take form of levy on ships transiting Suez Canal or tax of one-half cent per barrel on all oil produced in Arab world. Continuation of mandate if UNRWA under present financing for “reasonable” time (Edwart Rizk of Lebanese Foreign Ministry mentioned five years) would also be acceptable to Arabs, although they would insist UNRWA be divorced from all integration implications—i.e., that Hammarskjold report be disavowed by UNGA or withdrawn by SYG. Arabs fully aware placing UNRWA on regular UN budget would reduce US contribution from 70 percent to 30 percent (Rizk thought this would be attractive to US). Reasoning is that this would relieve them of uncertainty and of being “at mercy” contributing states. They also seem believe they could save some millions of dollars by drastically reducing international staff.

While most of results of experts conference have leaked to local press, foregoing key points have only been hinted at. However, neither Sayegh nor Rizk has hesitated to discuss them with us. As matter of fact, Sayegh, with or without blessing of league, is embarked on publicity campaign in which these concepts are alluded to but without stating that they are already part of experts report. As noted in Embassy telegram 659,⁵ he is probably behind articles in Beirut press insinuating US and UK trying to force six month budget for UNRWA on agency and UN. Purpose of Sayegh’s campaign is to prevent loss of interest before UNGA convenes.

Sayegh states so far program accepted with enthusiasm by Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Lebanon. Others, including UAR, less enthusiastic but all endorsed report. Rizk has told us speculation that Jordan and UAR were taking softer line on Hammarskjold report misleading. They were, he said, 100 percent with others in rejecting report.

Apart from fundamental approach noted above, there is obviously still disagreement among Arab states on some very important issues. Controversy over concept creating provisional Palestinian Government is one such. Embassy has been approached by Palestine refugee group soliciting US support for plan involving creation of state prepared to live at peace with Israel if Israel will accept UN partition lines. This being reported separate telegram.⁶

Before and during Sofar Conference Lebanon has been consistently taking initiative. It is to be anticipated this will be repeated at Casablanca and at UNGA. Rizk has asked us to display understanding should Lebanon take extreme position in UNGA. [4½ lines of source text not declassified] He also stated that President Chehab himself is strongly behind new Arab initiative in pressing for solution Palestinian problem.

There can be little question but that Lebanon would welcome anything which would solve her own particular problem. Rizk has admitted to us, however, that there is no possibility of taking separate line from Arab League now.

Just what Lebanon—or any Arab state—hopes to achieve through program outlined above is difficult to say. There appears to be genuine hope on part of Lebanon and possibly of other states that Israel may be ready to make some concessions (Embtel 605)⁷ and that Arab initiative now could possibly lead to eventual solution of Palestinian problem. Failing this, idea seems to be to safeguard self-esteem and make play for public opinion by coming back with something which could be called victory. Noisy rejection of Hammarskjold report is one such measure. Denunciation of UN resolutions on grounds Arabs have waited patiently for ten years for Israel to honor her commitments is another. Getting UNRWA on regular UN budget or taking it over from UN entirely would be still another.

In any event, we are convinced we should be prepared for most active assault on Palestinian problem in recent years. Cairo’s 543⁸ to Department would seem bear this out. While Lebanese impetus may still be checked at Casablanca, they and Sayegh have already gone far in preparing and selling the case they wish to make.

McClintock

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/8–2759. Secret. Repeated to Amman, Baghdad, Benghazi, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, Khartoum, Rabat, Tunis, London, Paris, Tel Aviv, and USUN.
2. Telegram 416, August 5, reported that the conference of Arab League experts would probably recommend making the UNRWA budget part of the U.N. general budget or perhaps institute a refugee tax as alternatives to Hammarskjöld’s report. (Ibid., 320.511/8–559)
3. Dated July 23. (Ibid., 320.511/7–2359)
4. Reference is to the Arab League Conference scheduled to begin September 1.
5. Dated August 25. (Department of State, Central Files, 320.511/8–2559)
6. Telegram 692 from Beirut, August 27. (Ibid., 320.511/8–2759)
7. Telegram 605, August 20, reported that the Director of the Political Section of the Lebanese Foreign Ministry had given the impression that the Arabs were searching for a modus vivendi with Israel. (Ibid., 320.511/8–2059)
8. Telegram 543, August 22, reported the Egyptian view of the experts’ conference and speculated that the Arabs had “something up their sleeve” with respect to UNRWA for the forthcoming U.N. General Assembly session. (Ibid., 884,411/8–2259)