86. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State1
239. During visit with Prime Minister Majali morning 15th, I said that although it was not matter involving US, and I was raising question on my own without instructions, if he would forgive me I wished express concern re situation I had heard was developing on Mount Scopus. I had heard that in retaliation for failure Israelis to cease patrolling Solomon’s Garden and failure remove night blockade of track leading to Issawiya village, GOJ intended refuse permit next fortnightly convoy to Mount Scopus to return with books.
I told Prime Minister I personally could not avoid considerable sympathy with GOJ on whole Mount Scopus question and easy to understand desire to retaliate against Israeli violations of agreements. But, I asked, would retaliation be wise? I pointed out that in month whole question of UNRWA would come up in UNGA and was it wise for GOJ to open Arab world to storm of attack to which it will be subjected by Israel and latter’s supporters if GOJ does not live up to provision Urrutia agreement under which books removed from Scopus by each fortnightly convoy. I said I did not believe Arab countries had facilities open to present their side of story as forcefully to public as Israelis and net results would be residual belief in countries whose friendly interest Arab countries still wish and need in next UNGA that Arabs, and they alone, are difficult and refuse to live up to agreements.
Majali asked me what he could do since Israelis breaking agreements all the time; he appealed to UN presence and was told was matter for UNTSO, and complaints to General Von Horn did not seem give any results. I replied I thought when Von Horn could not require [Page 190] compliance, then matter passed to office UNSYG and I thought proper course was for GOJ permanent UN representative to bring pressure on office, that is, on Hammarskjold, Bunche, or Cordier. Majali said he had instructed Rifai in New York press for action but latter reported he had had no success. What should he do in such a case? I suggested that if oral representations were ineffective then written ones might be called for, prepared by best lawyers in Foreign Office, since it is difficult for any agency to ignore a communication in writing.
Majali said he had not heard of decision by Defense Minister to deny authorization to bring books out in next convoy until this morning and he was meeting with GOJ officials to review that decision 15th. He asked if I thought that would be wise and fair for GOJ permit situation continue as in past for another month, at which time GOJ would take some retaliatory action if GOI had not ceased violations and provocations.
I did not express clear-cut opinion but stated I hoped such postponement could be made to give UNSYG time to try to bring about Israeli compliance with agreements.2
Jerusalem advise Von Horn.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85/8–1559. Confidential. Repeated to Jerusalem, London, Tel Aviv, and USUN.↩
- On August 16, Ambassador Reid, acting on instructions from Washington, also approached Israel on the Mt. Scopus problem. (Telegram 165 from Tel Aviv, August 18; ibid., 684A.85/8–1859)↩