80. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State1
1062. Re: UNEF—re ourtel 947.2 Following is report of conversations had by Mission officers with Bunche (UN) and Vaughan (UN), who have just returned from Gaza.
In initial conversation, Bunche stated was sent by Hammarskjold to Gaza with view assessing feasibility of reducing size UNEF in 1960. Upon return, Bunche reported to Hammarskjold view that any reduction in size UNEF is not feasible, and that reduction would destroy usefulness. He believes (though not certain) SYG has accepted this view and intends so to report to GA.
Bunche pointed out that present disposition UNEF forces practically assures absence incidents on UAR-Israeli border. Outposts are in view each other and can prevent or at least immediately note border crossings and apprehend persons responsible. This important in Bunche’s view, since demarcation line very difficult for inhabitants of area to observe in many places, with result that number of border crossings are made inadvertently.
In Bunche’s opinion, present scope UNEF operations could not be maintained if force reduced, and he said this is view of Burns and other senior UNEF officers. He believes Burns would resign if any sizeable cut made in UNEF on ground he could not guarantee success of operation. In his opinion, appreciable reduction UNEF forces would result in increase border violations and retaliation within month, which would shortly bring UAR-Israeli issue back to GA and/or SC.
Bunche has since reported subsequent conversations with Hammarskjold, in which latter expressed view there must be “showdown” on UNEF at next GA. (Bunche said Nielsen (Norway) and Ritchie (Canada) concurred in this view.) By “showdown”, Bunche understood Hammarskjold to mean he would have put all facts (including financial) on table so that govts could decide what course follow. Bunche said Hammarskjold generally aware threat posed to financial position entire UN organization by UNEF deficits and that he expects sit down shortly with Turner (UN controller) to go over entire situation. Hammarskjold has scheduled mtg UNEF Advisory Comte for June 2 and, if he able have full discussion with Bunche and Turner prior that time, will probably discuss UNEF future with comte.
[Page 177][2½ lines of source text not declassified] While disclaiming role of expert, he indicated belief might be possible give up many fixed observation posts along Gaza border if simple barbed wire fence installed in demarcation ditch and this patrolled. He believed this would avoid unintentional border crossings and most of those made for non-military purposes. Reduction in number outposts would enable consequent reduction in number supporting forces. Vaughan stated belief that, if forces were cut, Burns would recommend setting up unified headquarters at Rafah rather than maintaining separate headquarters at Gaza and Rafah as is now case. However, he pointed out life at Rafah headquarters would not be pleasant.
A major point emerging from discussions with Bunche is following: while drastic reduction in size UNEF, perhaps to 2,000–2,500 men, inevitably would result in increase border incidents and retaliations and probably result in issues being presented GA and/or SC, such cut in size probably would not reduce effectiveness UNEF as deterrent major aggressive action by either UAR or Israel. Bunche stated his recent conversations in ME indicate both UAR and Israel wish UNEF remain and that UNEF furnishes both govts with political excuse not to engage in major aggressive action. In his opinion, this would very likely still be case if UNEF greatly reduced in size.
Our reaction to foregoing is that, while it obviously in our interest maintain UNEF at present level and avoid all border incidents (and consequent report to GA and/or SC where Soviets will pose as Arab defenders) if we can solve financial problems, we cannot, as indicated USUN 947, see how UN can continue finance UNEF at present level for any appreciable period, given this situation, continue believe most desirable course action is to cut size UNEF—perhaps in half—in order maintain it indefinitely as effective barrier to major aggressive action by either UAR or Israel. If we can live with limited UN operations on other frontiers, such as Syrian-Israeli border, we can probably get along, even if not comfortably, with greatly reduced UNEF in Gaza. Our hope is that, by acting early enough, we may be able maintain such smaller UNEF on semi-permanent basis with substantial assessed financing.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320.5700/5–2759. Confidential.↩
- Telegram 947, April 29, reported that UNEF financial difficulties required a careful re-examination of the basis and size of UNEF’s operation in order to assure its continued presence as long as possible. (Ibid., 320.5700/4–2959)↩