49. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, November 26, 1958, 3:30 p.m.1
SUBJECT
- Israel and the Middle East
PARTICIPANTS
- The Secretary
- Mr. Abba Eban, Ambassador, Embassy of Israel
- Mr. Yaacov Herzog, Minister, Embassy of Israel
- Mr. William M. RountreeNEA
- Mr. William L. HamiltonNE
Ambassador Eban handed the Secretary a letter (copy attached)2 from Foreign Minister Meir in response to the Secretary’s letter to her in which he dealt with rumors particularly in the UAR of an impending Israel move against the West Bank. Ambassador Eban underlined Mrs. Meir’s statement that Israel preferred the status quo in Jordan. All [Page 117] other alternatives which suggested themselves, including UAR control of the West Bank and Nasser’s occupation of the Holy City, Israel contemplated with alarm. Prime Minister Ben Gurion’s suggestion of the West Bank’s demilitarization and an international status for it are objectives to be hoped for if Jordan collapses and not a plan he has any hope of realizing.
Ambassador Eban said he interprets United States policy as being one of resisting forceable political change anywhere. Noting that the day of preferential diplomacy is past, the Ambassador said a government can no longer apply a policy to one problem and fail to take the same action in similar circumstances elsewhere. United States acceptance of this logic was demonstrated by Lebanon and Quemoy, and he hoped the policy would be extended to Berlin if necessary. Israel would not be among those who counseled appeasement or retreat if the Soviets create new crises. The Secretary agreed that the policy dictating the actions cited by Ambassador Eban does have general application and is not pursued on a “pick and choose” basis. Israel or anyone else could be a beneficiary under such conditions as the United States had indicated. United States intervention in these places had not extended our policy beyond previously contemplated limits. But when in implementation of a policy a definite course of action is undertaken, the policy tends to become more apparent and predictable.
Ambassador Eban described two trends in the area which he found favorable. The first stems from British and United States intervention in Lebanon and Jordan, and it is manifest in the courageous manner in which new Middle East governments are asserting a policy of separate nationalism and independence, and resisting the doctrine of submission to Nasser. This tendency is important despite the fact that at the same time democratic institutions are being discarded by some of the same governments.
The Secretary remarked that the assistance given Lebanon and Jordan may have marked a turning point. Since then, there seemed to be an increasing emphasis on nationalism as opposed to adherence to the concept of a monolithic pan-Arabism. The picture is not clear in Sudan but there too we are inclined to believe that the new regime has a nationalistic quality. Mr. Rountree remarked that there is reason to believe that the UAR was extremely disappointed with the development, having had in mind a coup of quite a different character which would have produced Sudanese leadership more to the UAR’s liking.
The other trend which Ambassador Eban said he considered favorable was Israel’s strengthening position. He cited excellent relations continuing with the United States and France, and marked improvement of Israel’s relation with Great Britain and the non-Arab states of the Middle East. In the case of Turkey, Israel’s relations were [Page 118] progressively stronger in all fields and at all levels. Israel anticipated restoration in January of normal diplomatic relations which were interrupted by the Sinai Campaign, at which time the Turks had withdrawn their chief of mission and obliged Israel to do the same. [51/2 lines of source text not declassified]
[1 paragraph (4 lines of source text) not declassified]
The Secretary said he had noted with some concern reports of increasing immigration to Israel from Eastern Europe. These reports seem to provide a basis for the fears in the area that population pressures will tempt Israel to expand outward. Ambassador Eban replied that the Israelis are not contemplating external expansion but rather development of their own territory. Outward expansion would only worsen the ratio of population to area. He cited the West Bank as an example. People who think Israel has its eyes on the West Bank should bear in mind that relatively Israel would acquire responsibility for more people than new area for settlement. Israel has less control of immigration than most people imagined. The Soviets were unpredictable in the way they opened or closed the door. Israel feels obliged to take the Eastern European Jew whenever the opportunity presents itself. The opportunity might never arise again if attempts were made to defer it.
The conversation closed with the Secretary remarking he had heard numerous reports about Ambassador Eban’s personal political prospects. The Ambassador replied he would not say the reports were inaccurate, but they were premature.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85/11–2658. Secret. Drafted by Hamilton. See also infra. A briefing memorandum for the meeting with Eban, November 25, in Department of State, Central Files, 680.84A/11–2558. A summary of the conversation was transmitted to Tel Aviv in telegram 405, November 28. (Ibid., 684A.85/11–2858)↩
- See footnote 3, Document 46.↩