Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Arab-Israeli Dispute; United Arab Republic; North Africa, Volume XIII

381. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia¹

Washington, March 1, 1958—6:02 p.m.

648. Good Offices. For Murphy from the Secretary.

I agree with your analysis of situation as set forth 1081 from Tunis and authorize you proceed along lines recommended telegram 1082. With respect to numbered paragraph 15 of 1082,² you may wish to take into account following information covering future US activity this matter.

I think you should know that I have activated a group including Departmental and Defense representatives under Julius Holmes to survey the North African problem in both its short and long term aspects and to recommend courses of action based upon various contingencies. Precise steps to follow your Good Offices Mission of course cannot be determined at this juncture. My action in forming group is in no way intended to prejudge outcome your mission but rather to provide adequate follow-up on overall problem.

If results your present efforts should be substantial improvement in immediate French-Tunisian aspects of problem, timing and method subsequent approach will be materially affected. In any event, however, it appears likely that further high level approach to French will be necessary with respect to basic problem of Algeria. In this event, provisional thinking is approach to French would be made by US official acting as President’s special envoy carrying brief letter to Gaillard indicating bearer will state President’s views to which President hopes French Government will give most earnest consideration. Envoy would then inform French orally that our recent efforts and examination of Tunisian problem and North African situation generally have convinced us we must make supreme effort avoid consideration by Security Council and General Assembly. Envoy would also state that since in our view internationalization of Algerian problem inevitable as result impending UN consideration, we believe France can take initiative to narrow scope of internationalization by announcing she prepared confer with US, UK, Morocco, Tunisia and possibly Libya on North African subjects. Elaboration of our views would probably follow general course cited in Holmes’ memorandum to me of February 20, 1958,³ with which you are familiar. We will be in contact with you shortly on this point. It is essential Good Offices Mission continue to function, including British assumption of initiative, until our position is firm on subject of subsequent approach concerning which we would probably have to inform Tunisians in strict confidence and without detail in order to avoid their having recourse to UNSC should they conclude good offices effort terminated or unproductive.

I hope you will provide me as soon as possible presumably after your next conversation with French with your views as to suggested timing and desirability such approach. Also, I would like your estimate as to whether you believe it would be appropriate for you, as a projection of your Good Offices Mission and in light existing atmosphere, to assume function of the President’s Special Envoy for this purpose. Also require your views with respect to disclosing our intentions to British and endeavoring enlist their support. You will appreciate that course of action outlined herein is suggested only because I am increasingly concerned that very great danger may result from full discussion by the UN of the Algerian and Tunisian problems with highly dangerous implications for our relations with France and with emerging nations of Africa.

FYI. President meeting with Elbrick and me this afternoon approved the general lines of your 1082 and also observed that in his opinion the implications of the North African situation as regards NATO and Western Europe were so serious that he did not see how we could indefinitely delay making this a matter for NATO consideration.⁴

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 651.72/2–2858. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Porter; cleared by Rountree, Jandrey, and S/S; and approved and signed by Dulles. Also sent to Paris and London.
2. Telegram 1081, February 28, transmitted Murphy’s analysis of the Tunisian political and economic situation and the factors affecting France’s relationship with Tunisia. (Ibid.) Telegram 1082, also February 28, recommended that the United States and United Kingdom propose that France withdraw its military personnel from Tunisia, except Bizerte, so that French-Tunisian talks could resume; that neutral U.N. observers be placed at five airports in Tunisia, after which the good offices mission would cease; that the future disposition of Bizerte be left to “friendly negotiations” between France and Tunisia; and that France and Tunisia return their Ambassadors to Tunis and Paris. Paragraph 15 suggested the United States and United Kingdom continue cooperating with France and Tunisia through regular diplomatic channels. (Ibid.)
3. Document 269.

4. Dulles added the last sentence after discussing the telegram with Holmes. (Memorandum of telephone conversation; Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations) A memorandum of Dulles’ and Elbrick’s 3:30 p.m. conversation with Eisenhower is in Department of State, Central Files, 651.72/3–158.

   In telegram 4103 from Paris, March 6, Murphy stated that the British were considering a similar approach to the French Government, but noted it might prevent accomplishment of U.S. goals in North Africa. The French National Assembly would defeat any government responding sympathetically to such an approach. He therefore suggested that the United States begin discussing the idea with the British and consider the question of a special envoy later. (Ibid., 651.72/3–658)