364. Memorandum From the Secretary of State
to the President
1
Washington
,
March 24,
1960.
SUBJECT
- Proposed Letter to King of Morocco
To capitalize on the good will produced in Morocco by your agreement with
King Mohamed at Casablanca last December to
withdraw U.S. forces by the end of 1963, and to pursue certain important
matters resulting from your conversation with him,2
I recommend that you send him a personal letter and enclose a suggested
text. The Department of Defense and our Ambassador at Rabat concur.
The letter will be an entirely natural sequel to your visit and will
avoid certain difficulties entailed in using the normal diplomatic
channels. It will not go into the details of any arrangements but will
play a vital part in setting the stage for further action on matters of
urgent interest to us—specifically, separate arrangements on
communications facilities (as mentioned by you to the King); denial of
hostile third party use of our bases when we withdraw; and a
satisfactory status of forces understanding for the period remaining
until their withdrawal.
The letter will also recall your undertaking to give sympathetic
consideration to the King’s request for U.S. training assistance to help
the Moroccans take over the bases and ask for any suggestions Morocco
might now have. The Department of Defense believes the letter will be of
the utmost value in pursuing current Joint Chiefs of Staff
objectives.
[Page 803]
If you approve the letter, I recommend that the Department send it by
telegram to our Embassy at Rabat for delivery.
Enclosure 1
BACKGROUND PAPER4
The Moroccan Government and public are pleased with the agreement you
reached with the King in Casablanca about the withdrawal of United
States forces by the end of 1963. However, certain aspects of these
talks, not mentioned in the communiqué, evidently warrant further
attention:
- 1.
-
The special status of United States
communications centers. At the time of your visit
the King agreed to discuss separate arrangements for these
facilities. It seems desirable to ascertain how far he is
prepared now to enter into this matter. The present state of
Moroccan public opinion may not permit the Government to
announce, or even to conclude, detailed arrangements
providing for U.S. tenure at the communication centers
beyond 1963, since this might be taken to interfere with
Moroccan plans to seek the evacuation of French and Spanish
forces. It might also be taken by anti-Palace opinion in
Morocco and by Arab opinion abroad as indicating that a
secret arrangement, vitiating the United States withdrawal
agreement, had been accepted by the King. (Remarks to the
King’s party on its recent trip to the Middle East confirmed
the existence of such suspicion.) It is considered highly
useful, however, to refer to the understanding that
exceptional arrangements are to be reached in this case, to
indicate our readiness to negotiate detailed arrangements at
any time, and to elicit the King’s views as to what time
would be suitable.
- 2.
-
The King’s appeal to you for United
States assistance in training Moroccan personnel to
utilize bases released by the United States. It
is desirable to meet this request, so as to have a
better chance of eventually obtaining Moroccan approval
of United States access to these bases after 1963 in the
event of wartime necessity. Further, our willingness to
train Moroccan personnel in the operation and
maintenance of these bases justifies our seeking
assurance that Morocco will not allow hostile third
powers to use these installations, considering their
evident implications for United States security.
The foregoing steps would serve certain general military
objectives in Morocco recently recommended by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. These are: (a) retention of certain
communications facilities for an [Page 804] indefinite period beyond 1963; (b)
non-utilization of released air bases by third powers
unfriendly to the United States; and (c) re-entry upon
released air bases if this should be required by future
developments. It appears possible now to approach the
first two points directly. We doubt that the King or any
other responsible political figure in Morocco could
safely commit himself now on the last point (re-entry
rights), which appears to depend largely on our ability
to develop the appropriate political atmosphere in
Morocco.
I believe that our present objectives can best be
attained by a letter from you to the King, along the
lines of the attached proposal. Prime Minister Ibrahim and his cabinet
have an uncertain future, he was not present at your
talks with the King, and we are not confident that he
would be as receptive as His Majesty on these points.
Accordingly, diplomatic channels, which do not normally
provide access to the King, are not likely to be
effective. Moreover, an exchange of letters at the chief
of state level would reduce the risk of awkward
counterproposals from the Moroccan side, such as for a
timetable of United States evacuation or early Moroccan
assumption of supervisory functions at United States
bases.
- 3.
-
Prime Minister Ibrahim’s Letter to
Me.5
On February 14 Prime
Minister Ibrahim
wrote a short letter to me in which he expressed his
“complete personal satisfaction and that of the Moroccan
people” over the base evacuation agreement. He went on to
say that the solution of this problem and the way in which
it has been achieved “are a striking example of the sincere
cooperation existing between our two peoples.” It is to this
letter with its expression of satisfaction over the
agreement that reference is made in the second sentence of
the first paragraph on the second page of the enclosed
suggested message.
Enclosure 2
SUGGESTED LETTER6
Your Majesty: Events of great consequence
have occurred since my memorable meeting with Your Majesty in
Casablanca last December. Our hearts are heavy at the thought of the
terrible ordeal which Morocco has undergone in the disaster at
Agadir.7 The rapidity with which the Moroccan
authorities, under the direction of Your Majesty [Page 805] and the Crown Prince, have organized
relief efforts has mercifully spared further suffering and brought
consolation to the unfortunate victims.
On a happier note, I trust that your historic tour of the Arab world,
with its high promise of greater international understanding, has
fully met your expectations. In this regard, my own visit to South
America,8 I am glad to say, was very gratifying. I believe that
the opportunity to meet friendly chiefs of state personally, and to
discuss problems frankly with them, contributes significantly to the
pursuit of peace and mutually advantageous relations between
states.
Certainly our meeting in Casablanca, of which I retain very pleasant
memories indeed, was an unusually important event in this respect.
Secretary Herter has informed
me of the letter he received from your Prime Minister expressing
particular satisfaction with our agreement about the bases operated
by the United States in Morocco, as an example of the sincere
cooperation which exists between our two countries. I assure you
that the United States shares this feeling. It is in this spirit
that I now feel it desirable to write to Your Majesty about certain
matters left in suspense by our conversation.
I recall Your Majesty’s request that the United States assist in
training Moroccan personnel to utilize the bases from which United
States forces are to be withdrawn by the end of 1963, and my own
assurances that the United States would give this matter sympathetic
consideration. In connection with the recent withdrawal from Ben
Slimane, I wish to confirm that the United States would be happy to
provide such training assistance as may be agreed upon by our two
Governments and would be pleased to receive suggestions from your
Government in this regard.
I am, of course, confident I can count on Your Majesty’s assurance
that bases constructed by the United States will not be made
accessible to any third power whose policies contain a threat to the
security of my country. I feel free to anticipate Your Majesty’s
confirmation of this point because it seems an inevitable corollary
of Moroccan-American friendship and entirely consistent with the
principles of Moroccan policy which Your Majesty has expressed to
me.
As for our reference to separate arrangements for certain
communications facilities, I have asked the appropriate United
States authorities to be prepared to discuss our needs for the
period following 1963, and would be glad to learn Your Majesty’s
wishes concerning the negotiations we envisaged.
[Page 806]
Finally, I trust that any necessary clarifications of the status of
United States military forces during the remaining period of their
presence in Morocco can be worked out to our mutual satisfaction by
our respective representatives directly concerned.
With my warmest personal good wishes, and with the highest
respects,9
Sincerely,
