351. Memorandum of Discussion at the 378th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, August 27, 19581
[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and items 1–4.]
5. U.S. Bases in Morocco [here follows a list of references]
Mr. Gray presented this subject to the Council. (A copy of Mr. Gray’s briefing note is filed in the minutes of the meeting, and another is attached to this memorandum.)2 Mr. Gray’s briefing ended with the suggestion that the Council might discuss the problem of U.S. bases in Morocco, possibly with a view to giving the U.S. negotiators guidance on the matter of accepting the principle of evacuation in order to buy time for continued use of the bases.
The President said the Department of State must arrive at a political decision on the principle of evacuation. He thought that if the United States attempted to maintain its occupation of the Moroccan bases by force, we would find that we had embarked on a losing venture.
Mr. Gray said the issue was whether we could concede something so that the King and the Prime Minister of Morocco would be able to point out that they had obtained recognition of the principle of evacuation and that we were occupying the bases temporarily. Mr. Gray understood that the military services felt the bases would be needed for another five years. General Twining said the United States would need the bases for at least five years longer.
Secretary Herter pointed out that the prospect of U.S. economic aid to Morocco had been completely unsuccessful as a quid pro quo to induce the Moroccans to agree to the maintenance of U.S. bases. In negotiations with the Moroccan Government we faced three main problems:
- (1)
- The principle of evacuation, with the Moroccans insisting that we state clearly our willingness and intention to evacuate the bases.
- (2)
- The period of time during which we can continue to occupy the bases before final evacuation. Secretary Herter thought we should try to obtain Moroccan agreement to a five-year occupation, but believed the Moroccans might well insist upon a maximum of three years. The President, interrupting, said if we wished to use the bases for five more years, we had better start negotiations by asking for seven more years, so that we could come down to five years.
- (3)
- Continuing, Secretary Herter said the final problem was the question of criminal jurisdiction over U.S. forces in Morocco. He pointed out that under existing policy we are required to obtain criminal jurisdiction arrangements with all countries in which U.S. forces are stationed, at least as favorable as those in the NATO Status of Forces Agreement, unless the Secretaries of State and Defense recommend the waiver of such a requirement in the case of a particular country. So far, the United States had been able to operate in Morocco without a NATO-type status of forces agreement. Secretary Herter felt that if the existing criminal jurisdiction situation in Morocco were not disturbed, we would be in a better bargaining position with respect to the continued occupation of the bases.
General Twining asked why we should not negotiate directly with the Moroccans on these matters rather than through the French. Secretary Herter said we were dealing directly with the Moroccan Government.
[4 paragraphs (11 lines of source text) not declassified]
Secretary Herter said the United States had been pressing the Moroccans on the base question, and had now come up against a stone wall in the negotiations. If we put sufficient pressure on the Moroccan Government to force it to sign a base agreement, it would fall.
Secretary Herter said the French were pressing us to act in concert with them in Morocco. Secretary McElroy said we had status of forces agreements on the NATO model all around the world. The President said most of our status of forces agreements had been concluded with nations that had been sovereign for a long time. New nations, which had just achieved sovereignty, were more difficult to deal with and were more sensitive about their sovereignty. The Moroccans were a sensitive, proud, emotional people. Even if we concluded a NATO-type status of forces agreement with the present Moroccan Government, we might be dealing with a new government the next day. Secretary McElroy observed that he would prefer no status of forces agreement with Morocco (i.e., a continuation of the present situation) to a sub-standard status of forces agreement.
Secretary Herter said we had experienced no status-of-forces difficulties in Morocco.
The President said we must agree to the principle of evacuation and offer this and other quid pro quos for continued occupation of the bases. Certainly we could not use force and get ourselves into a guerrilla war, which would be an interminable operation. We ought to conclude with Morocco the type of agreement which would stand up in the future, and we should start out by asking for seven more years of U.S. occupation.
The President said we could not use force to maintain the bases and thus get ourselves into the predicament of the French in Algeria.
[Page 769]Mr. Gray recalled that when he was an official in the Department of Defense, debate on the Moroccan bases had centered about the quid pro quo and base rentals. It now appeared that a quid pro quo was no longer an effective factor in the negotiations.
Secretary Herter said he hoped this discussion would produce additional guidance on the problem.
The President said we must agree to the principle of evacuation in the hope that the time thus bought would enable us to develop a weapons system which would render the Moroccan bases of no great use either to the United States or to the USSR by the time we had to evacuate them.
Secretary McElroy remarked that within five years the USSR may be such an obvious threat to North Africa that the Moroccans will want us to continue in occupation of the bases.
Mr. McCone asked why we could not phase out of one base at a time. Secretary McElroy pointed out that, as stated in the JCS views,3 we were ready to abandon one base now—Boulhaut Air Force Base. He added that the naval communications facility at Port Lyautey, however, is very important, and there should be no thought of singling it out for early abandonment. Secretary Herter agreed.
The President thought we should be very careful in our negotiations about indicating what bases we are willing to give up in advance of other bases.
Mr. Gray asked whether the Record of Action should show that (1) the United States was prepared to accept the principle of evacuation in order to buy maximum time for continued U.S. occupation of the Moroccan bases; (2) the United States should press the French to get out of U.S.-Moroccan negotiating channels; and (3) the United States would not press for a NATO-type status of forces agreement with Morocco.
Mr. Allen said that negotiations with respect to a Voice of America relay base in Morocco were waiting on military base negotiations. In connection with the VOA relay base, we had become tied up with the French, so that the Moroccans made no distinction between the United States and France. He felt we must divorce ourselves from the French in negotiating with Morocco. The President agreed. Mr. Allen added that he hoped we would accept the principle of evacuation of Moroccan bases even if the French did not.
[Page 770]The National Security Council: 4
- a.
- Discussed the subject in the light of the memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the attached views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (transmitted by the reference memorandum of August 19, 1958), and of an oral statement by the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.
- b.
- Agreed that:
- (1)
- The United States should negotiate directly with the Moroccan Government regarding the maintenance of the U.S. bases in Morocco; and should press for the elimination of the intermediary role of the French with respect to base security, procurement and contracts, hire of labor, surplus disposal, etc.
- (2)
- In negotiations with the Moroccan Government, the United States should recognize the principle of eventual evacuation of U.S. bases in Morocco; but should, in return therefor, attempt to secure continued occupation of such bases for the maximum feasible time up to seven years.
- (3)
- The United States, while maintaining a flexible position in its negotiations with the Moroccan Government for an agreement respecting the status of U.S. forces in Morocco, should continue to seek agreement based on the NATO–Netherlands formula; however, in the event that this is unacceptable to the Government of Morocco, the United States should strive for an agreement at least on the substance of the so-called NATO formula. If agreement on the NATO formula is impossible, it is preferable to continue the present arrangements without formalizing them in an agreement.
Note: The action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of State for appropriate implementation in consultation with the Secretary of Defense.5
[Here follow the remaining items.]
- Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Boggs on August 28.↩
- Not printed. The minutes of all National Security Council meetings are in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of National Security Council, Official Meeting Minutes File.↩
- Expressed in an August 15 memorandum from Twining to the Secretary of Defense. (Attachment to a memorandum from Gleason to the National Security Council, August 19; Department of State, Central Files, 771.56311/8–1958)↩
- Paragraphs a and b and the Note that follows constitute NSC Action No. 1982. (Ibid., S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)↩
- Lay’s September 2 memorandum to Dulles is ibid., S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1. Ambassador Yost presented the U.S. position to Balafrej on September 10 and, at the Prime Minister’s request, gave him a letter on September 11 recounting the essential points. (Telegrams 374 and 389 from Rabat; ibid., Central Files, 711.56371/9–1058 and 711.56371/9–1158, respectively)↩