348. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco1
922. Embtel 904, March 12 has been carefully studied in light Embassy belief that certain aspects our policies and negotiating tactics vis-à-vis Moroccans should be revised. Embassy appears in effect to be advocating liberal aid policy toward Morocco for principal purpose of supporting King and moderate government, with implication that we should not as heretofore expect, in immediate future at least, concrete returns in form of base agreements, etc.
If this correct interpretation Embassy views, question arises what Moroccan attitudes we may expect as to our own interests, i.e. bases and VOA. While we have obvious interest using our aid in manner calculated support moderate elements Morocco, it is of equal importance such elements take our interests into account and provide us some satisfactory assurances re continuation our operations which would permit us justify to Congress extension of aid in this magnitude. In this connection does Embassy believe GOM unable or reluctant, because of Algerian, Saharan and economic difficulties, conclude formal agreement re US interests in reasonably near future? Balafrej strongly implied this in conversation reported Embtel 931.3 If so should we adopt passive attitude toward negotiations, remaining ready to proceed when circumstances appear encouraging and would GOM acquiesce, perhaps tacitly, in such US attitude? Also in such case could our base and VOA operations be expected continue satisfactorily especially if present moderates leave government or succumb to anti-Western pressures? In considering these aspects of matter we have in mind not only Balafrej’s comment to you but also continued reiteration by Assembly and Istiqlal Party of theme that evacuation foreign troops must be national aim. While recent Istiqlal resolution4 beclouded troop issue somewhat by not specifying “all” foreign troops, this attitude nevertheless raises basic question whether such important groups include US military personnel in their thinking. We realize government [Page 764] considerably more cautious than Assembly and Party in this respect but participation of Ministers Foreign Affairs, National Economy and other party chiefs in forming Istiqlal resolution cannot be overlooked.
Hope Embassy will provide Dept promptly with estimate of situation as we desire make realistic assessment our prospects at early date.
We note from Embtel 931 you envisage another conversation with Balafrej to discuss defense support amendment. On that occasion you may state that as evidence our desire to meet Moroccan position on US aid, you authorized propose phraseology re amendment being transmitted separate telegram.
Re $30 million aid (second recommendation Embtel 904), we expect to instruct you after we have had opportunity appraise situation in light your replies foregoing questions. In interim you of course should continue negotiations on previously offered $20 millions and PL 480 program.
Before pressing French in sense indicated in your third recommendation we would like additional info as to basis on which French funds now withheld from Morocco. Is this due solely to lack of agreement on establishment convention (Embtel 929)5 or is GOF hesitant because of troop and frontier problems as well? Paris comment would be useful this point.
Re your fourth recommendation Dept believes French are aware our desire their authorities in Algeria endeavor avoid incidents on frontiers, Moroccan or other. We would continue on appropriate occasions stress need avoid incidents such as Sakiet, though existing frictions both in Morocco and Tunisia limit our ability effectively to contribute to control this situation.6
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.71/3–158. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Porter; cleared by Dolgin, Rehm, Jova, Barnes, and in substance with Belcher; and approved and signed for Herter by Palmer. Repeated to Paris, Tunis, and Madrid.↩
- Not printed. (Ibid.)↩
- Telegram 931, March 5, relayed Balafrej’s comment that U.S.-Moroccan negotiations would proceed smoothly were it not for Morocco’s deteriorating relations with France and Spain. (Ibid., 511.714/3–558)↩
- Reference is to a March 2 communiqué issued in Tangier by the Executive Committee of the Istiqlal Party. Telegram 913 from Rabat, March 3, reported its main points. (Ibid., 671.00/3–358)↩
- Telegram 929, March 5, reported that France had decided to continue withholding fiscal year 1957 aid from Morocco. (Ibid., 651.71/3–558)↩
- Telegram 986 from Rabat, March 16, restated the Embassy’s assessment that bargaining with U.S. aid would not make the Moroccan Government grant all U.S. wishes, but would only weaken its moderate members. (Ibid., 611.71/3–1658)↩