Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Arab-Israeli Dispute; United Arab Republic; North Africa, Volume XIII

325. Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Bohlen) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, December 19, 1960.

SUBJECT

• Algeria

Discussion:

The Afro-Asian resolution (Tab A),² adopted by the Political Committee of the General Assembly by a vote of 47–20–28, is expected to be considered by the Assembly on Tuesday morning, December 20. As things now stand, we expect that two amendments to operative paragraph 4 will be submitted. The first, an amendment by Senegal (Tab B), would remove specific reference to a United Nations referendum, and provide for an international commission selected by the interested parties to facilitate negotiations. The second, an amendment to be offered by Cyprus with the approval of the FLN (Tab C), recommends a referendum “under the auspices of the United Nations”, thus retaining the essence of present paragraph 4 in a form which may be acceptable to a greater number of delegations.

While we had hoped (Tosec 25, Tab D) that the French would see advantage of working out a moderate resolution along the lines of the initiative taken by the French Community States in Brazzaville, thus putting us in a position to work for and support such a resolution, it seems evident that the French are not prepared to do this. We therefore will have to determine our voting position on the texts, including the amendments, which will be before the Assembly.

It is clear that we should vote against the Afro-Asian resolution in its present form. It is also clear that we should vote against the Cyprus amendment, which does not improve the text significantly, and also against the resolution as a whole if the Cyprus amendment should be adopted.

The problem is in determining our voting position in relation to the Senegalese amendment. The French find the Senegalese amendment objectionable and obviously would not like to see it adopted. On the other hand, it is difficult for us to take a totally negative attitude toward a sincere effort by the French Community States to be helpful—one of their first major initiatives in the United Nations.

A further complication arises from the fact, even with the adoption of the Senegalese amendment, that reference to “two parties” would be retained in preambular paragraph 9.³ Our position in Committee One was, as you will recall, that we would vote against the resolution if the phrase “two parties” was retained in the preamble. However, a plausible case can be made that the adoption of the Senegalese amendment, which refers throughout to “interested parties”, puts the reference to “two parties” in the preamble in a different context. The French Community States take the view that the preambular reference to “two parties” means France and the people of Algeria. Possibilities for dealing with the reference to “two parties” in the preamble therefore include (a) amendment to modify this phrase, which might be initiated for example by a Franch Community State or by a Latin American, or (b) a statement of interpretation of this phrase at the time of the vote.

A further complicating element is that the Senegalese amendment may be voted upon in two parts, as explained by the General Assembly Delegation (USUN 1811, Tab E). The first part, inviting the interested parties to undertake negotiations, should be tolerable to the French, whereas the second part, which calls for the setting up of an international commission, involves the concept of good offices, which the French do not like at all. USUN has recommended that our delegation be given authority to vote for a resolution incorporating the first part of the Senegalese amendment and to be given latitude to vote for or abstain on a resolution containing the second part of the amendment as well, the decision to be based on the attitude of the French Delegation and other friends of France.

Recommendations:

1. We should continue our position of voting against the Afro-Asian resolution in its present form.

2. We should instruct the Delegation to vote against the Cyprus amendment and the resolution as a whole, if the amendment is adopted.

3. If the Senegalese amendment is voted on as a whole, we should abstain. If it is voted on in parts, we should vote in favor of the first part and abstain on the second part.

4. If both parts of the Senegalese amendment are adopted, we should abstain on the resolution as a whole.

5. If only the first part of the Senegalese amendment is adopted, the Delegation should be authorized to vote for the resolution as a whole, or to abstain, depending on the positions taken by the United Kingdom and other friends of France and the attitude of the French Delegation.

6. In relation to the Senegalese amendment, the Delegation should deal with the problem posed by the reference to “two parties” in the 9th paragraph of the preamble either by an appropriate statement in explanation of the vote or by arranging for an appropriate amendment of this paragraph.⁴

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/12–1960. Secret. Drafted by Cargo on December 19, initialed by Bohlen, and sent to Herter through S/S. The source text bears the following handwritten notations by Bohlen: “Secretary confirmed his decision to abstain on both Senegalese amendment and resolution as a whole if Senegalese adopted. He did not agree that we could vote for Senegalese amendment CEB,” and “He subsequently authorized US del to vote for 1st paragraph Senegalese amendment & abstain on 2nd CEB.”
2. None of the tabs is printed. Regarding Tab A, see footnote 3, supra. Tabs B and C are U.N. Docs. A/L.334 and A/L.333, respectively. Copies of Tabs D and E are in Department of State, Central Files, 770.00/12–1660 and 751S.00/12–1860, respectively.
3. See footnote 3, supra.
4. Bohlen telephoned Herter, who was on the plane returning to Washington, at 1:45 p.m., December 19, to inform him that the debate on Algeria had been rescheduled for that afternoon. Herter authorized the United States to abstain on the resolution as a whole if the Senegalese amendment were adopted. (Memorandum of telephone conversation; Department of State, Bohlen Files: Lot 74 D 379, Chron File—C.E.B., 1959–1960) Herter reaffirmed this decision later that day when Bohlen discussed the substance of this memorandum with him in the car returning from the airport. (Memorandum to Kohler, Jones, Satterthwaite, and Parsons; ibid.)