318. Memorandum of Discussion at the 466th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, November 7, 19601
[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and items 1 and 2.]
[Page 706]3. Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security
4. U.S. Policy Toward Algeria (NSC 5910/1)2
[Here follows discussion of Sino-Soviet relations.]
Turning next to the situation in France and Algeria, General Cabell summarized De Gaulle’s speech of November 4.3 The reaction in France had been as expected with the leftist Faure describing the speech as “pure illusion” and Bidault characterizing it as “unacceptable”. In Algeria the hostility of the Europeans had been reinforced by the speech. The Moslems were reluctant to comment, but their reaction was generally favorable. General Cabell observed that De Gaulle’s stock in France was still high and that he could probably get wide support for broad negotiations. However, he was deterred from undertaking such negotiations by his obsession with the need for national unity.
Soustelle was organizing opposition to De Gaulle behind a wide economic program. The trial of Pierre Lagaillarde, and the other top Algerian rebel leaders4 now going on in France provided a dangerous focus for Rightist sentiment. Within the army there was an increasing number who took the view that independence for Algeria was inevitable.
The Algerian Nationalists believe that the situation is moving in their favor. They had been outspoken in their rejection of De Gaulle’s speech although official reaction awaited a meeting of the FLN today. Khrushchev’s de facto recognition of the rebel regime and the possibility of Soviet and Chinese assistance would result in pressure on France’s allies. NATO could become involved if De Gaulle invoked the Treaty. He was not likely to do so unless the USSR or Communist China sent large quantities of aid to the rebels. Bourguiba had reportedly urged the rebels to accept the mediation effort which was being made by the states of the French Community. General Cabell concluded this portion of his briefing by stating that the initiative now lay with the rebels.
[Here follows discussion of Laos and El Salvador.]
At the conclusion of the briefing, Mr. Gray turned to Secretary Merchant and suggested that we might possibly face in Algeria a problem of Soviet intervention involving movement of Soviet troops or arms into the country. He wondered whether we needed plans to deal with such possibilities. The President asked whether such intervention would not mean war. Secretary Merchant pointed out that the [Page 707] Soviets had promised matériel assistance and that this assistance might be accompanied by volunteer technicians. However, there was no present fear that the Soviets would introduce organized military units into Algeria. Such action would obviously be an invasion of NATO territory. Mr. Gray asked if this meant that, in such an eventuality, we would take action under the NATO Treaty. Secretary Merchant said that yes, we would if the Soviet action constituted an organized attack. General Cabell pointed out in this connection that the northern departments of Algeria were covered by the North Atlantic Treaty but that the southern departments were not. Secretary Merchant noted that the French had moved the boundary of the northern departments south about a year ago so that the northern area now included most of the population of Algeria.
[Here follows further discussion of El Salvador.]
The National Security Council:5
- 3.
- Noted and discussed an oral briefing by the Acting Director of Central Intelligence on the subject, with specific reference to Sino-Soviet relations; the situation with respect to Algeria; and the situations in Laos and El Salvador.
- 4.
-
Noted that in the event of intervention in Northern Algeria by organized, identifiable units of the armed forces of the USSR, the provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty would be applicable.
[Here follows item 5.]
- Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Johnson on November 8.↩
- See Document 302.↩
- Regarding De Gaulle’s November 4 address, see footnote 4, supra.↩
- Of the January 1960 insurrection in Algeria. [Footnote in the source text. Regarding the January 24 uprising, see Document 307.]↩
- Paragraphs 1 and 2 of this NSC Action were recorded in the portion of the memorandum not printed here.↩