Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Arab-Israeli Dispute; United Arab Republic; North Africa, Volume XIII

312. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Wilcox) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Merchant)¹

Washington, September 7, 1960.

SUBJECT

• Algerian Item—Your Memorandum of August 19²

Your memorandum on Algeria raises several points on which I should like to comment.

1. I agree with your view that discussion of the Algerian problem in the General Assembly this fall is likely to be unhelpful, and we will wish to make this position clear at the appropriate time.

2. It would clearly be contrary to our interest if the outcome of the General Assembly debate should make a solution of the Algerian problem more difficult. I believe, therefore, that the most useful role the United States can play is to try to keep the potential damage to a minimum. For example, a resolution which condemned France would, in my view, harden the position of both sides and diminish any chances for progress toward a solution of the problem; certainly we would want to do what we could to avoid this.

3. From the standpoint of UN procedures, there are serious disadvantages to our taking an advance position on a resolution before we know what its provisions are. It is quite conceivable, for example, that a resolution may emerge from the debate which would prove highly awkward for us to oppose. Moreover, even if it should be decided in advance of the debate that we will vote in a certain way on any resolution which might emerge, it undoubtedly would not be to our advantage to make this decision known. To do so could greatly restrict our influence on the outcome of the debate. In the past, the uncertainty as to how the United States would vote has had a definitely moderating influence, since the sponsors have been prepared to water down their resolution in the course of the session to avoid a negative U.S. vote. Thus, our ability to minimize the damaging effects would be seriously hampered if we were to make known our position in advance.

Beyond this, any indication that the U.S. was standing aside on an item because it was difficult and unpleasant, would set a bad example for many other states whose support we consistently try to obtain on matters where they would basically prefer to stand aside.

4. The course of action suggested in your memorandum would be interpreted by the Asian and African members as contrary to their deeply-held views and interests. With the African states rapidly becoming the largest single geographic group in the UN, their support on many items of interest to us will become increasingly crucial. Furthermore, in all of our contingency planning on the Congo, we come to the conclusion that the key to the success or failure of the UN operation rests largely with the other African states. While the Congo operation is clearly in the African interest and theoretically there should be no carryover from our attitude on Algeria to the UN role in the Congo, there is such a potential risk if we alienate the African states by our stand, once more giving the Soviets an opportunity to pose as the real champion of anti-colonialism.

5. It occurs to me that we could improve our posture considerably if we approached both General DeGaulle and the Algerian leaders urging the resumption of negotiations before the General Assembly considers the Algerian item. I realize there are difficulties involved in trying to accomplish this, but the effort appears worthwhile.

6. In view of the serious implications which our attitude on the Algerian item will have for the outcome of the General Assembly, and for our foreign policy generally, I should like to suggest that a meeting of the interested bureaus be convened at your early convenience to consider the problem.³

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/9–760. Secret. Drafted by Buffum, sent to Merchant through S/S, and initialed by Cargo and Wilcox. Also sent to Kohler, Satterthwaite, and Hare.
2. This memorandum suggested the United States announce that although it would not oppose inscription of an item on Algeria on the U.N. General Assembly agenda, it would not participate in debate on the item and would vote against any resolution arising from it. (Ibid., 751S.00/8–1960) Kohler initially agreed with this approach, but later suggested postponing any final decision on the U.S. position. (Memoranda to Merchant, August 24 and 29; ibid., 751S.00/8–2460) Satterthwaite felt Merchant’s suggestion would adversely affect U.S.-African relations. (Memorandum to Merchant, August 24; ibid.)
3. Merchant apparently met with Satterthwaite, Kohler, and presumably Wilcox, on September 13. A September 13 memorandum from Witman to Satterthwaite outlines arguments against Merchant’s proposal for use in the meeting. Copies were sent to Kohler and Wilcox. (Ibid., 751S.00/9–1360) Witman also referred to a memorandum which Satterthwaite might wish to hand the Under Secretary during the meeting. Satterthwaite presumably did so, as a September 13 memorandum from him to Merchant on U.N. discussion of Algeria bears Merchant’s initials. (Ibid.) Nunley prepared a memorandum outlining arguments in favor of Merchant’s proposals for Kohler. Also dated September 13, the memorandum bears Kohler’s handwritten notation “Thanks. I tried. FDK 9/13”. (Ibid.) No further record of the meeting has been found.