278. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia1

985. While Department doing everything possible with GOF, GOM and GOT to induce them avoid incidents present critical juncture, representations in their direction unlikely affect decisions of FLN. Latter undoubtedly examining present situation with view drawing [Page 639] every possible advantage from it, and question therefore arises as to what if anything can be done to restrain FLN from undertaking actions which would involve Tunisia and Morocco in direct conflict with France.

We note from Tunis 15832 that FLN units falling back from frontier into interior of Tunisia. While this step will help avoid incidents on frontier, it will put FLN in position to provoke French-Tunisian clash inside country itself.

We wonder whether in these circumstances you would deem it useful to get across to FLN idea they would be well advised to undertake no action which would further complicate existing Tunisian and Moroccan problems. As Bourguiba has in past indicated desire to transmit US views to FLN, we would prefer use him in this instance rather than make direct comment to FLN which they might construe as official US démarche.

If you perceive objection or doubt usefulness such expression by us, Department would be pleased to have your comment.3

Dulles
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/5–2258. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Porter, cleared by Torbert, and approved and signed for Dulles by Palmer. Repeated to Paris, Rabat, and London.
  2. Telegram 1583, May 19, reported the substance of a call by Ladgham and Mokaddem on Ambassador Jones. (Ibid., 651.72/5–1958)
  3. Telegram 1630 from Algiers, May 24, questioned the advisability of attempting to transmit to the FLN through Bourguiba U.S. views on questions relating to FLN activities within Tunisia itself, as distinguished from U.S. views on broader subjects. (Ibid., 751S.00/5–2458)