274. Telegram From the Consulate General in Algeria to the Department of State 1
318. Rome for Montgomery and McSweeney. During past months, French position on Algeria has gone through significant change. While in past French have maintained that Algeria is internal French problem which they could easily settle themselves without foreign interference, there is now increasing insistence that France is fighting here for West and that she should obtain full and open support of her Allies. Pineau’s announced intention raise Algerian problem at May NATO meeting2 is further expression this policy.
Believe therefore next NATO meeting may offer opportunity for frank exchange of views with French on Algerian problem. France expects Allied support in area which is specifically covered by terms of North Atlantic Treaty. Indeed without support on problem deemed so vital to French opinion, NATO would threaten become meaningless to [Page 634] French. We hear this thesis on all sides. NATO Allies, on other hand, have right to demand formula which will permit solution of problem in terms favorable to West and cannot underwrite policy which may lead to indefinite continuation and further extension of Algerian war.
For reasons discussed in despatch 1873 we believe French promise grant Algeria self-determination within specific but limited period offers better hope for constructive solution than pressure on French to negotiate with FLN. Negotiations, directly or indirectly with FLN on future Algeria would represent such complete reversal of previous French policy on Algeria, which based on premise that FLN is not representative of majority Algerian Moslems, that it is difficult to see how it could be adopted without an equally radical change of political alignments in France including reliance on PCF support. Also, French structure here would probably immediately collapse when negotiations became public and resultant chaotic conditions could jeopardize Algeria’s future and decrease chances pro-Western orientation. Promise of self-determination on other hand appears compatible with previous French policy statements on Algeria particularly Mollet statement on cease-fire, elections, negotiations. Open loi-cadre,4 if honestly applied, would lead eventually to self-determination as territorial assemblies could pass resolutions demanding revision of Algeria’s relationship with France. What appears needed is clear French promise that Algerians will be called upon to express their preference on given date.
To be believed, such promise would have to be accompanied by international guarantees, preferably from NATO countries as this would increase ties between this area and NATO.
Interim between cessation of hostilities and self-determination could be only to undo some of damages of war, apply reforms and make necessary adjustments to permit orderly transition from French to Algerian rule. Loi-cadre, in this framework, can also play useful role through creation of badly needed political institutions. French have already accepted in principle international supervision of elections, and elections perhaps initially for institutions provided for in loi-cadre could be held within reasonable period after end of hostilities. Also possibility cannot be ruled out that French constitutional reforms urging interim may create framework for broad North African solution.
Cooperation of Tunisia and Morocco to bring about the cessation of hostilities on these terms would of course be essential. FLN may be reluctant accept solution which will not result in its immediate access to power. Nevertheless, I believe that risks of continuation present [Page 635] French policy, as well as risks of direct transfer of power to FLN at some future date are so great that alternative of promise of self-determination with international guarantees.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/4–1958. Secret. Repeated to Paris, London, Tunis, Rabat, and Rome.↩
- Reported in telegram 4341 from Paris, March 20. (Ibid., 751S.00/3–2058)↩
- Despatch 187, April 12, outlined alternative courses of action in Algeria. (Ibid., 751S.00/4–1258)↩
- Reference is to a statute adopted by the French legislature on January 31, but never implemented. It reorganized Algeria into eight new departments and aimed at a political solution to Algeria’s relationship with France.↩