Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Arab-Israeli Dispute; United Arab Republic; North Africa, Volume XIII

271. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia¹

Washington, March 17, 1958—8:46 p.m.

735. Good Offices. Eyes only Murphy, Houghton and Jones. Tunis 1167.² Following comment bears on numbered paragraphs reftel.

1. Statements first numbered paragraph³ have been carefully weighed and while Department does not discount information to effect gesture needed, indication FLN will publicly cast its lot with Nasser appears ignore Tunisian and Moroccan attitudes. Latter are major factors in FLN thinking and it no doubt clear to FLN that neither Moroccans nor Tunisians would countenance such move toward Nasser, for time being at least. In any case it entirely unlikely such FLN plans would be unknown to Bourghiba and other top Tunisians and consultation envisaged numbered paragraph 5⁴ reftel should suffice in immediate future to keep us closely informed re FLN.

2. Subject any comments Murphy may have, we agree that we should warn FLN in sense recommended paragraph 2(a),⁵ but we do not believe contact should be made with Debbaghine in Cairo if this can be avoided. We must assume FLN leaders under close GOE surveillance and therefore FLN itself would probably prefer contact be made Tunis or Rabat. If Debbaghine deemed ranking political leader at present, and if Murphy believes it desirable convey U.S. comments to him, we believe Embassy [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] can arrange for him come to Tunis.

3. Department in accord your belief closer overall contact with FLN needed and prior to receipt reftel had consulted [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] to that end. Entire matter now under study, especially in regard to contact with FLN military leaders who represent very important and relatively unknown factor.

4. Embassy Tunis was authorized several months ago by Department to establish discreet contact with FLN. In this connection, Dept approves suggestion para 5. of reftel re advisability very discreet high level contact with GOT this subject. We agree Tunis channel may be of increasing importance, and with this in mind we hope events will permit Tunisians induce leaders like Debbaghine to diminish their contact with Cairo. This may not be practical for latter at present because FLN dependence Egyptian support undoubtedly requires presence top level FLN in Cairo, and FLN in any case reluctant bring too many top leaders into proximity with French military forces.

6. Our hesitations with respect to Cairo contacts outlined are mentioned numbered paragraph 2.

7. We believe study mentioned paragraph 3 this tel and authorizations mentioned paragraph 4 will result adequate contacts for our purposes. As to hope we may be able hold out to FLN much would appear depend on development of present situation and consequent willingness governments Tunisia and Morocco exercise restraining influence on FLN and back up possible U.S. efforts that direction.

8. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]

Herter

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 651.72/3–1758. Secret; Eyes Only; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Porter on March 15; cleared by Jandrey, Palmer, and Howe; and approved and signed by Herter. Also sent to Paris.
2. Telegram 1167, March 14, reported the FLN had set a deadline for receiving an indication of Western support, and advocated establishing closer contact with the group. (Ibid., 772.00/3–1458)
3. The first paragraph warned the FLN might ally with Nasser in absence of Western support.
4. Paragraph 5 recommended consultations with Bourguiba and the Moroccan Government.
5. Paragraph 2(a) stated: “warn FLN that US reaction would make it incredibly harder for US Government to play positive role in settlement of Algerian war.”