264. Memorandum of a Conversation, Waldorf Towers Hotel, New York, September 26, 1960, 4:30 p.m.1
PARTICIPANTS
- US
- The President
- The Secretary
- Mr. G. Lewis Jones
- Gen. Goodpaster
- UAR
- President Gamel Abdul Nasser
- Mr. Mahmoud Fawzi, Minister for Foreign Affairs
- Mr. Zakcaria Muhyeddin, Minister of Interior
- Mr. Ali Sabri, Minister for Presidential Affairs
- Ambassador Mustafa Kamel
- Mr. Thabet al-Aris, Minister of Culture and National Guidance
- Mr. Mahmoud Riad, Counselor to the Presidency
SUBJECT
- Conversation with President Nasser
After the picture-taking session and the seating of the group, the President opened by saying that we were in the midst of an “interesting and turbulent meeting”. He said all the world is looking forward to a constructive session. He had tried to make his speech conciliatory.2 Personally, he felt that only through the UN could the world make progress. When a nation, even a great nation, attempts to give aid bilaterally, it lays itself open to the charge of imperialism. The U.S. he felt was generally absolved, but sometimes it is still charged with “economic imperialism”. Thus it is better to deal with and through the UN. The President said Khrushchev’s attack on the UN and its efforts in Africa were “wholly unwarranted”. The U.S. wanted the African nations to settle their own problems—the Africans should be the operating agency. The U.S. would support African efforts to form an African confederation which would strengthen the position of the African States. Apparently, the President said, his conciliatory speech had not been wholly understood by Mr. Khrushchev.
The President said he would welcome any ideas from President Nasser which the UN can support. “Frankly, I am at my wit’s end”.
Nasser, speaking in a clear voice marked by self-confidence, said that he must begin by thanking the U.S. for its great help during the 1956 aggression against his country. He wholly agreed that the UN must be maintained. Egypt had had a personal experience with the UN and the UN had not only ended aggression, but had forced the aggressors to withdraw.
UAR had, however, been surprised by the UN having occupied the airfield and the broadcasting station at Leopoldville. These seemed to the UAR to be actions taken against Lumumba. Egypt objected to this because it felt that such actions jeopardized the prestige of the UN. The UN went to the Congo to throw out the Belgian troops. The UAR had great faith in the UN as an instrument of security. The UAR felt it would be terrible if bad actions by the UN forces were to compromise the UN’s utility in the eyes of the African people.
[Page 602]Nasser went on to confess that, arising out of the events of 1948, he had initially been suspicious regarding the UN. He had spent months in the Negev because the Egyptian Government had honestly believed in the UN only to have its belief disappointed. However, he had had the better 1956 experience with the UN. He felt that the UN in the Congo should not be allowed to take any action which would hinder the legal government there.
“Moreover,” said Nasser, “we can never forget the UN has not lived up to the UN resolutions regarding Israel.” He said, “you asked for my point of view—I have given it to you.”
The President said that regarding Palestine in 1948 the UN did not then possess sufficient power to enforce the resolutions. He agreed that resolutions not carried out bred disrespect for the UN. He could understand the UAR feeling some bitterness towards the UN. However, the U.S. is constantly trying to improve and strengthen the UN.
So far as the Congo is concerned, the President said, this is an affair “growing out of all proportion”. As the President saw it, the UN’s first job was to insure law and order. Even now the situation in the Congo is confusing—it is difficult to tell from day to day who is on top—Kasavubu or Lumumba. The President said that the Secretary General, in closing the airfield, probably wanted to keep out of the Congo unilateral intervention by outside powers. In conditions of chaos, once the UN had gone in, it must keep the peace. There could have been errors in operations or tactics, but the 70–0 vote showed that world opinion thought that the UN was doing all it could.
The President went on to say that the UN is just as important to the big nations as to the small nations: as an instrument of the big nations in giving aid, the UN is most important.
Recalling the Suez affair in 1956, the President told how, in spite of the presidential election and in spite of the “Jewish vote”, he had given all-out support to the UN in causing the withdrawal of the U.K., French and Israeli forces. He said this was not an easy thing to do, but he was backing the principle. He thought the principle had to be backed in the Congo also, even if there were flaws in operations from time to time.
Nasser said that there was no need to debate whether there should or should not be a UN—the UN is clearly needed. Moreover, he recalled clearly the courage of the U.S. in standing up against the wishes of its closest allies. However, in 1948 the U.S. had backed the creation of Israel. This was the first barrier which had even arisen between the U.S. and the Arab people who up to that time had been deeply moved by Mr. Wilson’s principles of self-determination and the ideals of the Atlantic Charter. He said the UAR wants to develop its country, but this is a normal part of a country’s national aspirations.
[Page 603]Nasser said the people of the Middle East place great responsibility on U.S. shoulders. This was inevitable given the U.S. position in the world. In the Congo, the U.S. cannot escape responsibility because simple people see the U.S. and the UN as virtually the same thing.
Nasser said that Africa is now moving quickly. The UAR very definitely did not want to see the cold war brought to Africa. He said the UAR is against Soviet influence in the Congo just as much as it is against Soviet influence in the UAR.
The President reiterated that the U.S. would support the UN when action is called for. He said the U.S. would never try to do an “end run” and intervene unilaterally. He was glad when the Secretary General decided to bring Dr. Bunche back and send an Indian to replace him because Dr. Bunche gave too great a U.S. connotation in the Congo. The President said that the U.S. wants to support in the Congo, and in Africa generally, a UN economic program because he believes we must help conquer poverty, illiteracy and disease.
The President said that the United States does not want any part of anybody’s territory and does not want to dominate anybody. However, the U.S. does not like to be made the target of accusations in the contrary sense from “certain quarters”. The U.S. wants to see all the peoples of the world develop. Several times, the President said, he had offered Puerto Rico its independence, but the Puerto Ricans wouldn’t take independence.
Nasser said that from the moment of his assuming power in 1952, he had looked forward to good relations with the United States. He had tried hard; but the main barrier always remained—Israel. He had wanted to buy arms, but he could not get any arms from the West. Meanwhile, Israel did receive arms from the West—airplanes from France, tanks from the U.K., and 105 mm. recoilless rifles from the U.S.
The President said that we had never sent any offensive weapons to Israel—”Just some radar equipment and defensive things”.
Nasser said he had heard a radio report from Tel Aviv giving an account of the American 105 mm. recoilless rifles appearing in an Israeli parade. The Israeli commentator had said that these rifles were for use against the UAR.
The Secretary told the President there had been one small sale of this kind.
Nasser said the fact remains that the UAR cannot get arms from the West and Israel does get arms from the West. The UAR is thus liable to be subjected to aggression by Israel.
Nasser said, “I must protect my country and my people. Israel is the barrier to good U.S.-Arab relations”. He said there had been a sharp reaction in Egypt to the statements by Nixon and Kennedy who “have unfairly said open the Suez Canal to Israeli shipping”. But, he [Page 604] asked, what about the other UN resolutions? In the Arab world free speech as practiced in the United States will not be fully understood, but on the TV he had seen Senators and Congressmen discussing Egypt’s Suez Canal quite freely. Nasser said, “We are grateful when you send us wheat but we do not like it when this occasions debates and arguments as to whether we should be given wheat and on what terms.” This, he said, was contrary to Egyptian dignity.
Nasser continued, “If the U.S. wishes to say that the Suez Canal must be opened to Israel shipping, the U.S. must try just as hard to get the UN to get Israel to implement the resolutions to which Israel stands in default.”
The President said that the U.S. was “getting tired” of putting up 23 million dollars each year to keep a million Arab refugees alive with no progress towards settlement. The President said, “I think that right today we would like to see this thing worked out”.
Nasser said that constantly he had followed the line of demanding only that the UN resolutions be implemented—all of them. Except on one occasion when he was responding to an attack by Dayan, he had not threatened to “throw the Jews into the sea”. All he wanted was the implementation of the UN resolutions.
The President said he thought we should take a good hard look at what can be done now via the UN with regard to the Arab-Israeli problem.
With regard to arms, the President said war has taken on a new dimension after Hiroshima. When he took office, he told Mr. Dulles that he did not want to see an arms race start in the Middle East. He said he respected the UAR position as the neutral—indeed, there could be no objection to the UAR taking Soviet arms—but the U.S. “would not like to see” the UAR dominated by the USSR.
The President said the U.S. was spending 46 to 47 billion dollars a year on arms. This was too much. He hoped a balance regarding armament might be established in the Middle East, although he realized the depth of the antagonism existing between the Arabs and the Jews.
Nasser, agreeing regarding the high cost of armaments, said that he did not believe that a limited war between two small countries is possible these days. The 1956 affair had shown that. Nasser said that he strongly favored peace not war.
The President said he would like to see friendly and fruitful discussions between the U.S. and the UAR regarding what can be done with regard to the Arab refugees. He said this was not only because of the suffering of the refugees, but because the refugees lie heavily on the conscience of the world.
Nasser said that only two weeks ago Ben Gurion said that Israel would not take back any refugees.
[Page 605]The President inquired “How many refugees do you think would go back?” Nasser replied quickly, “All of them”. He said that if all the refugees go back, Israel would then be a country made up of 1 million Arabs and 2 million Jews and it would be a different kind of country, not the all-Jewish State it is now.
The President said, “Isn’t that quite a lot of Arabs to return to such a small country?”
Nasser said that Ben Gurion expects to get 3 million Jews into Israel from Russia. If these come, Israel will be a very crowded place indeed.
The President asked the Secretary whether “world Jewry” was opposed to the return of the Arab refugees.
The Secretary replied, “Effectively, yes”.
Nasser said that Israel had received since the State was founded, 2 billion dollars in foreign aid of one kind and another. There was some discussion regarding just how much aid Israel has received; Ambassador Kamel, asserting “approximately 1 million dollars a day from the U.S.”
The President said that he wanted to assure Nasser that the U.S. wants to be friends with all the countries in the Middle East. He agreed that Israel constitutes a terrible problem. However, Israel is. The question is how can this problem be solved without starting a war. He thought some Arab refugees would prefer compensation instead of return to Israel.
Nasser demurred at the President’s thought that “Israel is”. He said that to accept Israel as a fact would be to permit a thief to keep what he has stolen.
The President told Nasser that if he could think of any way to solve the refugee problem, he should communicate it to the U.S. Government confidentially. This would have to be done confidentially because if word got out, some interested parties would go to some Senator who would make a speech and nothing could be accomplished.
The President said that the U.S. looks forward to better relations with the UAR. The U.S. is, however, always suspicious “when the Soviets touch a country”.
Nasser asserted firmly that the UAR would accept no price for its liberty or independence. At times its relations had been bad with both the East and the West, but he would never yield where UAR liberty or independence was concerned. “We want to keep our dignity”, he said. It was an affront to Egypt’s dignity when the word came suddenly from Washington that the U.S. had withdrawn its offer to build the high dam. This was a great shock because the Egyptians are “a very sensitive people”.
[Page 606]The President said that the offer was only withdrawn after word had been received that the UAR was negotiating with the Soviet Union for the High Dam.
At this point, Nasser made a move to depart, but the President stopped him by saying he had one other question, “What is going to happen in Jordan”?
Nasser said that since 1957 the Jordanians have continually claimed that the UAR has been plotting with the USSR against Jordan. The UAR has always been on the defensive. He said, “I have no agents in Lebanon, Syria or Iraq.” (sic)—”There are in those countries people who share our ideas. I do not know who they are, but they believe in me, and they believe in Arab unity. Some months ago King Hussein made a provocative speech against the UAR, but the Communist tide was on the rise in Baghdad and I refrained from replying since I did not wish to give them any encouragement.” However, later when King Hussein was in Morocco, he made a speech against Nasser, and the Communist tide in Iraq having receded, Nasser broke his silence which had lasted for 4 or 5 months and started to “attack back”.
Nasser said that within 24 hours of the assassination of Majali, Jordan was attributing responsibility to the UAR. “How could they know so soon?”
Nasser asked rhetorically, “Who assassinated the King’s grandfather? It would not have been me because I was serving in the wilds of the Negev”. The situation was that “many people like our ideas”. At the present time he said Jordan has 5 brigades along the Syrian border; only two days ago there were Jordanian incursions into Syria where demolition charges were placed. The UAR had instituted patrols along the frontier.
The President said that what he could not understand was why the “weakest and poorest” of all the Arab States should attack the UAR. It did not make sense.
Nasser replied, “It is all psychological. The people like Arab unity. Some of them put up my picture and some of them cry ‘Long live Nasser’.” He wants them to cry “Long live Hussein”. It is all personal, said Nasser.
After Nasser and party had taken their leave, Mr. Hagerty suggested that it might be possible to add something to the attached very simple statement.3 The President considered the question and said that it was a talk with the Head of State which was always privileged and he did not want anything more said. The President told Mr. Hagerty [Page 607] that if he was asked about the Suez Canal or any other specifics, he should simply refuse to comment.4
- Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Jones and approved by S on October 5 and by the White House on October 12. A similar record of the conversation by Goodpaster is ibid. A summary of the conversation was transmitted to Cairo in telegram 998, October 3. (Department of State, Central Files, 786B.11/10–360)↩
- For text of Eisenhower’s address before the U.N. General Assembly, September 22, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960, pp. 60–70.↩
- Not printed.↩
- On September 30, Hare held a similar conversation with Nasser at the UAR Delegation headquarters in New York. A memorandum of that conversation is in Department of State, Central Files, 110.15–HA/9–3060.↩