254. Telegram From the Consulate at Damascus to the Department of State1
676. Reference: Cairo telegram 2004 to Department.2 Wish emphasize point made Embassy Cairo that, should U.S. wish make palpable contribution to longevity UAR, ideal time is now. Current Syrian economic difficulties are obvious. On political side Nasser has harried Syrian Commies underground and broken with Syrian ASRP, at risk of: 1) paring his forces in Syria to statistical minority; 2) awarding Sarraj more responsibility than he can be trusted with.
To hold Syria against these two dangers, Nasser must: 1) demonstrate sufficient economic advancement to prevent Syrian populace from turning back to ASRP or Commie Party; 2) win personal allegiance enough Syrian officers First Army to minimize danger Sarrajled secession. Believe U.S. participation Syrian econ development would contribute to these two objectives—in addition, of course, to enhancing U.S. prestige in UAR.
Major factor which we cannot accurately evaluate now is that Sarraj so far has been uncooperative re U.S. efforts in region in case trade mission we informed explicitly by commerce and industry representatives that they will do nothing unless Sarraj endorses program, “regardless of any instructions from Cairo.” He has not yet replied to our note of December 233 soliciting assistance.
Contels 674 and 6754 confirm our difficulty dealing “even with friendly Syrians.” Industrial bank and fertilizer plant have for several months been regarded as good possibilities of DLF assistance. However, in requesting final data it develops that immediate need is the entry on scene of U.S. technicians who can provide recommendations upon which Syrian decisions can be made as to final proposals for these projects.
Data promised for January 5 by Ministry, will add to prospects of immediate capabilities for U.S. give financial assistance. Projects said to require foreign exchange amounting to LS 15 million for equipment for existing railways, LS 24 million for earth moving ballast-handling and related construction equipment for Latakia–Aleppo new railway [Page 577] and LS 30 million for highway construction equipment. Ability of region to carry out properly all three projects simultaneously seems open to doubt from our non-technical viewpoint. However, Ministry putting all three up at once as of concurrent top priority.
In respect of Export Import Bank and DLF funds for private enterprise, despite fairly large number of conversations which have resulted local businessmen suggesting about eleven projects, not one applicant has pursued his presentation.
Even talks with officials re availability soon of local currency fund for lending as result of PL 480 sales have elicited no prospective use.
Agricultural attaché here now to explore requirements additional PL 480 wheat. To date despite frequent contact with economic and agricultural officials, some of whom know that U.S. had told Qaysuni it would consider providing more upon justification, there has been no request for additional wheat.
In sum, doing something of major importance on part U.S. in Syrian region will require considerably more technical and administrative coordination within UAR than now exists. Our recommendation is that we meet terms which appear compatible to both regions and enter on scene with technicians for study and appraisal of both industrial bank and fertilizer plant, with a view to ultimate loans in these fields.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 786B.5–MSP/1–560. Secret. Repeated to Cairo and Aleppo.↩
- Telegram 2004 from Cairo, January 2, reported that the current crisis between Nasser and the Baath Party of Syria necessitated the United States giving urgent attention to its economic assistance to the Syrian part of the UAR. (Ibid., 786B.5–MSP/1–260)↩
- Not found.↩
- Both dated January 5, these telegrams discussed various aspects of DLF loans for a fertilizer plant and requested details on specific loan projects from the Syrian Industrial Bank. (Department of State, Central Files, 786B.5–MSP/1–560)↩