Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Arab-Israeli Dispute; United Arab Republic; North Africa, Volume XIII

252. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State¹

Cairo, December 17, 1959—6 p.m.

1872. In farewell call on Nasser yesterday I found him in relaxed and reminiscent mood with result much of conversation devoted to recalling ups and downs in United States–UAR relations, concluding with expression satisfaction that situation now more normal and hope present trend would be continued and consolidated.

I did however take occasion run over various items which Department suggested in Deptel 2410² and other telegram on specific subjects with following results:

1. Magnitude of assistance in terms dollar value as mentioned and Nasser indicated interest without however making any specific comment.

2. Re DLF Nasser said understood why consideration Jordan projects lagging but emphasized great importance which he attaches to doing something in Syria both in industrial and agricultural fields. By way of substantiation he stressed (A) economic dislocation created by two years of bad harvests and foreseeable catastrophic consequences of third such year, (B) emphasis being placed on economic development in Iraq (he mentioned four-year plan amounting to 400 million pounds) in obvious effort seduce Syrians, and (C) fact that Syrians are economic minded people who can be most readily approached through economic medium. In this connection Nasser said also interested in possible IBRD assistance and said target is double national income in next ten years.

3. Re television project Nasser seemed already informed of 4.5 million pound project and to understand its utility but he did not elaborate.

4. UNWRA and PCC that agreement reached on former [sic] but was dubious re prospective efficacy of reactivating PCC under terms of reference stipulated in UNGA resolution³ which he noted were at wide variance from what he had suggested since former one covers question of repatriation and compensation of refugees whereas his idea had been that PCC should work on all UN resolutions on Palestine.

5. On question Jordan waters Nasser reviewed matter in almost identical terms reported Embtel 1723,⁴ clearly indicating that he still was none too happy to have to become involved in a problem which, prior to union with Syria, Egypt had been able to regard more or less as a spectator. In circumstances he said matter under study and nothing specifically decided but that engineers are looking into possibility of using all of Syrian water, although would not wish this result in depriving Jordan of Yarmuk waters since, if this done, Jordan would be completely cut off from water if Israelis should pre-empt Jordan River waters. Nasser also referred, as he had done previously, to military implications, especially in light previous Syrian reactions and strong feelings. It was obvious that this point particularly perturbed him.

I took occasion point out that, by Nasser’s own analysis, matter which had previously been more or less ignored is now inexorably becoming immediate and serious issue. Situation is one where previous appraisal re necessity some form unified development arrangement is obvious and Johnston plan⁵ would seem be best available starting point. Why let matter reach point of explosion when there still time seek some form solution?

Nasser looked thoughtful but refrained from specific reply other than recall his previous suggestion that all these problems would fall into different perspective if sizeable Arab repatriation could be effected in such way that Israel would become another sort of Lebanon.

6. Regarding Africa, Nasser’s comments were along same lines as those of Anwar Sadat as reported Embtel 1862⁶ with especial emphasis on perspective future importance of Africa and consequent necessity for its constructive development.

7. Re Iraq Nasser said agreed with our thesis of non-intervention from outside but he nevertheless felt that Communist threat in Iraq was too serious to be ignored by UAR whose immediate objective is to isolate Communists from people. Following Kirkuk incidents⁷ Communist influence had declined but it is now on upsurge. As for Kassem, he initially used Communists in order to strengthen his position but now situation reversed since Communists endeavoring use Kassem in order regain power. In this connection Nasser said often perplexed by attitude of west which often seemed not only indifferent to this problem but at times actually to follow line which helpful to Communists and he referred certain broadcasts against UAR which he maintained could only have effect of bolstering position of Iraqi Communists.

8. Matter special assistance as covered by Deptel 2427⁸ did not come up.

9. Question relations United States–UAR missions as treated G–59⁹ mentioned in general terms and Nasser agreed situation should be corrected as required. He specifically asked re any cases in point and I cited Libya and Uruguay. Mention of latter seemed amuse Nasser greatly, i.e., as being insignificant.

10. I also briefly reviewed preliminary findings of ICA iron and steel and western desert water development consultants, especially emphasizing recommendations in both cases that efficient development should not be hampered or imperiled by impatient demands for quick results. Nasser listened attentively and said in agreement but I would surmise that his interpretation of recommendation of consultants would probably be at rather wide variance from theirs.

11. I also mentioned orders recently placed with nine Egyptian textile mills by a broker representing several large American mills for Egyptian cotton textiles (mostly unfinished) which might amount to as much as $20 million and for plans by same agent to supply Egyptian private interests with modern United States textile finishing plant at estimated cost of $1,200,000. I emphasized that USG and Embassy had nothing whatsoever to do with this transaction, which however did serve illustrate both indirect benefits of improved relations and also important role can be played by private enterprise. This was apparently first Nasser had heard of matter and it was obvious he was keenly interested.

Hare

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.86B/12–1759. Secret; Limit Distribution.
2. Telegram 2410, December 12, transmitted a list of eight points which Hare, at his discretion, was authorized to make to Nasser in his farewell call. (Ibid., 684A.85322/12–359)
3. For text of Resolution 1456 (XIV), December 9, see U.N. Doc. A/4354, p. 8.
4. Telegram 1723, December 3, described a conversation with Nasser on the previous day in which he stated that discussion on the Jordan waters question was inconclusive. (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85322/12–359)
5. See footnote 3, Document 15.
6. Telegram 1862, December 16, summarized Hare’s farewell call on Sadat in which Sadat stated that U.S. and UAR positions on Africa were not too different. (Department of State, Central Files, 670.86B/12–1659)
7. Reference is to the massacre of Turcomans in Kirkuk July 14–18 by Communist-led local army units.
8. Telegram 2427, December 14, reported the UAR request for Special Assistance funds for tallow and newsprint was undergoing review which would be completed early in 1960. (Department of State, Central Files, 868B.392/12–1459)
9. G–59, December 5, reported that the UAR Embassies in Uruguay and Libya were unaware of the normalization in relations with with the United States and were in fact working against their U.S. counterparts. (Ibid., 611.86B/12–559)