248. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State1
1533. Although first reports of President’s projected trip through this general area not unexpectedly gave rise to various private expressions of surprise, regret and criticism that Cairo not included, matter was one which felt could be taken in stride in view obvious complications which visit here or to other Arab countries could raise in respect of Israel and inter-Arab rivalries (inclusion Morocco no problem since so much on fringe Arab world). Furthermore, original emphasis placed on inability expand schedule gave matter note of finality which seemed preclude discussion.
Subsequently announced meeting with President Bourguiba, however, puts trip in different light since it will bring President into orbit of one of foremost rivals for Arab Nationalist leadership (others being Nasser, Hussein and Qassem) and consequently will invite speculation on that score. In particular and in view proclivity here for subjective deduction, visit could hardly fail be interpreted in Cairo as invidious endorsement of Bourguiba over Nasser at time when they publicly at loggerheads and even without diplomatic relations. For reason of pride this will probably not be mentioned officially or possibly even publicly but situation nevertheless certain to be one which will not only give rise to negative repercussions here but also tend dissipate goodwill which has been so laboriously built up during past year; which has recently been bearing such satisfactory results in form normalization relations; and which presumably is development of which Soviet have been mindful in their recent fence-mending efforts with UAR.
Having posed problem, question is what, if anything, can be done about it.
[Page 562]As Department aware, I have in various past evaluations of situation here expressed view that Nasser’s psychotic sensitivity and suspicion constitute key problem in our relations with the UAR and that one of most promising opportunities for making major and constructive impact on him would be in form personal meeting with President Eisenhower, who, as soldier turned statesman, could be expected especially command Nasser’s respect and inspire his confidence. However it was recognized that relations between two countries would have to be more normal before such visit would be feasible. In pursuance this thought and in light of improvement in relations mentioned above I have looked [omission in the source text] course but implications of Bourguiba meeting and incidental publicity of other origin would seem to bring matter to point of active consideration sooner than had been expected.
As regards procedure which might be followed most obvious suggestion would be that, with political pattern of President’s trip already altered, arrangement might be made for short stop here provided adjustment in schedule possible. To extent political atmosphere a consideration, it would seem just about as favorable as could be expected now or foreseen later. It would also be in good political perspective.
However, if that not possible, would suggest President consider sending message to Nasser saying would have liked stop here but, being unable do so would like have him visit Washington at later date. Timing problem here could of course be more bothersome but on other hand prospects as good as they are likely ever be in this chronically troubled area. To wait for ideal opportunity would merely mean postponing decision indefinitely.
If this also found unacceptable, suggest transmission personal message from President to Nasser through this office to general effect that President would have liked extend trip to include Cairo but unable do so and expressing trust that steps taken normalize relations may be continued and expanded. Some personal touch would also be effective, including, if consistent with fact, expression hope that Cairo might be included on one of President’s subsequent trips. Additionally, it might be helpful, if he could be given guidance which might put Bourguiba meeting in as favorable a light as possible here. Obviously anything smacking of excuse would be out of question but perhaps there might be something useful which could be said.
In submitting foregoing wish make clear no intention raise Bourguiba visit in critical vein but rather to point out that such plus values as might be expected therefrom could foreseeably have equally or greater negative consequences here unless some form of remedial action taken.
[Page 563]Addendum: Foregoing was in final draft when unfortunate press reaction to Press Secretary Hagerty’s replies to questions in Rome broke in press here this morning (Embtel 1526).2 Still too soon to assess seriousness but of interest to note that rebuttal by official spokesman understood to have been directed personally by Nasser, who seems to have attached especial importance to matter because it featured as headline news on Voice of America yesterday morning. Although this additionally complicates situation, believe that it gives even greater emphasis to desirability of making some appropriate gesture.
- Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 61 D 59, UAR—President’s Trip to Near East. Secret.↩
- Telegram 1526, November 14, reported that the Cairo press was quoting responsible sources in the UAR to the effect that they knew nothing about an Eisenhower visit to Cairo and that he had not been invited. (Department of State, Central Files, 711.11–EI/11–1459)↩