Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Arab-Israeli Dispute; United Arab Republic; North Africa, Volume XIII

233. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State¹

Cairo, February 11, 1959—8 p.m.

2357. Haikal came in today to say he had “bad news”. He had been commissioned by Nasser, he said, to tell me decision had been reached call off campaign against Communists. Reason was that Nasser did not feel he could continue fight Communists while he was at same time being attacked by West in form broadcasts by clandestine Voice of Reform and Voice of Free Egypt stations as well as by BBC and Radio Paris. It was not that such broadcasts were doing any actual harm, because their effect was negligible, but what was important was that they served as clear indication of ill-intent of British and French Governments toward UAR. Further evidence of this seen in anti-UAR campaigns in French and British press, in attacks against UAR by British-controlled Sawt El-Libnan (?)² newspaper in Beirut and in obstacles which British placing in way of conclusion financial agreement. Furthermore, British seem think they playing smart game by following same line as Communists in Iraq. If that is their view, then let them go ahead and see what happens. As far as Nasser concerned, they can have clear field from now on but he felt difficult understand why he was being subjected to pressure which, if pursued, would have logical consequence of forcing him seek understanding with Soviets. It just did not make sense.

I let Haikal blow off steam and then observed that, since he calling at behest Nasser, wished make sure nature of message entirely clear so as not confuse conversational amplifications with substance of what Nasser had desired communicate.

In first place, was I to understand that Nasser was changing his policy re Communists in general or just in Iraq. Only in Iraq, Haikal hastened reply. Situation in Egypt had always been under control and same now true in Syria as result recent action. Moreover not exactly correct say opposition to Iraqi Communists being dropped. Basic UAR hostility to them remains same. It is just that attitude of West makes it impossible continue struggle and it therefore necessary desist temporarily for tactical reasons.³ And even here disengagement process will have to be phased since difficult call off campaign too abruptly after having been so deeply involved.

Second question put to Haikal was what he meant by referring to “attitude of West” as deciding factor in Nasser’s policy change. Did reference pertain to USG? If so I could only express great surprise since we had given assurance that we had no desire “stab Nasser in back” and had also endeavored refrain from taking public position which would be embarrassing to UAR by indicating that we were behind its crack-down on Communists. Did or did not Nasser feel that we had kept our word?

Haikal’s reply was unusually direct. He said position we had assumed was unprecedented in its wisdom and demonstrated understanding of psychology of situation. Object of Nasser’s criticism was not USG but French and British, except for fact that Nasser still feels that USG, even if not directly responsible for Voice of Reform, could exert influence on Turks to desist from attacks on UAR which coincide with those of Communists, not to mention Israeli Radio. Also would only be frank to say that, although our assurances re back-stabbing are welcome and have increased feeling of confidence, it nevertheless takes time to do away entirely with suspicion. Net situation, however, is that US position greatly appreciated; it is British and French who are causing the difficulty.

I then said that, having made clear that we are not object of criticism, I was at loss to understand exactly what British and French were supposed to have done which had caused such strong reaction. Difficult believe British would deliberately consort with Commies and I had neither seen nor heard anything re British and French radio and press campaign beyond clandestine radios to which reference had been made on several occasions. Haikal said UAR has “masses” of such anti-UAR publicity and he would have samples sent to me.

Finally I cautioned Haikal re danger of indulging in inadequately considered generalization regarding supposed intention of individual governments or groups of governments based on what might be isolated or exceptional considerations which, if taken as basis for evaluation, could obfuscate rather than clarify real situation. Would be unfortunate if UAR, in making important policy decisions, rushed to insufficiently founded conclusions.

I asked Haikal to communicate this clarifying part of our conversation to Nasser so as make sure there no misunderstanding, especially re American position. Haikal took notes and said he would do so. In so doing he said wished make clear purpose his mission was to give advance explanation in order not only avoid surprise but assure that UAR position understood by US. He also wished re-emphasize that UAR had never sought support from West in attacking Commies in Iraq; all it had wanted was that opportunity should be given for this regional problem to be settled without Western interference. USG had played game; British and French had not; there was trouble.

Comment: In circumstance where complexity and uncertainty of situation in Iraq is outstanding factor and where Nasser as well as others, including ourselves, may be hard put to plot course, it is difficult determine exactly what Nasser may have had in mind in advising us of his intention to lay off attacks on Iraqi Commies. It may be that he does in fact have certain misgivings re intentions of French and British and his dictum re avoiding fight on two fronts is, of course, old story as well as classic excuse for following questionable policy lines. It is also true that recently developed dispute re British financial agreement has given rise widespread feeling here that British resorting to perfidious devices for ulterior motives. Furthermore, it is understood that prospect of access to unblocked sterling funds was being counted on by Nasser as ace in hole in case worse came to worst with Soviets. But I would hazard guess that these are more contributing than main causes and that real problem facing Nasser is that his policy of attempting influence Iraq in direction of UAR and of using Communist issue as field on which to fight battle despite admonition to contrary by some of his associates, e.g., Marshal Amer, had failed produce intended results and he is therefore considering taking time out to think things over and revise his plans. This would not exclude possibility that present disengagement would be more apparent than real in event coup expected in Iraq which might be in UAR interest but with which it would prefer not seem be openly associated. In this sense, Haikal probably right in stating present move essentially tactical.⁴

Hare

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 786B.001/2–1159. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Baghdad and London.
2. As on the source text.
3. Above this sentence on the source text is the handwritten notation: “Sounds very phony to me!”
4. At the end of the source text is the following handwritten notation: “I wonder also whether this tactical move may not also be designed to press us to show more interest in picking up check if Sovs move out. Sovs are probably threatening.”