Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Arab-Israeli Dispute; United Arab Republic; North Africa, Volume XIII

218. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, September 4, 1958¹

Washington, September 4, 1958

SUBJECT

• US–UAR Relations

PARTICIPANTS

• H.E. Dr. Mustafa Kamel, UAR Ambassador
• NEA—William M. Rountree
• NE—William D. Brewer

1. US Economic Assistance

Ambassador Kamel called by request on September 4. Mr. Rountree began by referring to the constructive Arab attitude at the recent emergency UNGA and said that the Secretary considered that his private talks with Foreign Minister Fawzi had been most helpful.² The Department had taken seriously the content and spirit of those conversations and was actively working to normalize and improve US–UAR relations. Specific actions being taken to this end included: (a) resumption of the CARE school feeding program about which he had informed the Ambassador the previous evening; (b) US decisions in principle to approve the EARIS program, amounting to $5,000,000, and to release local currency (equivalent to $4,700,000) under P.L. 402 for the Delta Road Project—on both of which final technical details were now being worked out by ICA; and (c) the likelihood that, despite pressure for its use on domestic projects, approval would be granted within a day or two for the U.S. Army dredge Essayons to be made available to the UAR in response to Dr. Fawzi’s recent request through the Ambassador.³

2. UAR China Policy

Mr. Rountree continued that, in the midst of such efforts, the Department could only exceedingly regret the criticism of US China policy contained in President Nasser’s speech of September 3, notably his accusation of US “aggression” against the Chinese Communists. Egypt itself had maintained normal relations with the Republic of China until 1956. Egyptian policy towards the China problem had during that period been characterized by the same adherence to principle as had our own. Subsequent Egyptian recognition of Red China had apparently been accomplished as a result of the negative Cairo reaction to the US withdrawal of its offer to assist in financing construction of the Aswan Dam, and perhaps also to assure a channel for continuing to receive arms shipments in the event that all UN members had agreed to an arms ban.

3. Reported US Arms Aid to Israel

Turning to recent publicity regarding US arms aid to Israel, Mr. Rountree emphasized that the US had taken a firm stand in support of Egypt at the time of the Suez crisis and we knew of President Nasser’s deep appreciation of the actions we had taken. The political courage shown by US leaders in stating, immediately before the 1956 election, that we would impose economic sanctions on Israel if her troops were not withdrawn, had been noteworthy. However, since that period, the UAR had received substantial military assistance from the Soviet bloc. The USG had nevertheless resisted Israeli pressure to become a major supplier of arms to Israel. Israel had only received from US sources a small fraction of the amounts received by the UAR, and included in US sources a small fraction of the amounts received by the UAR, and included in US totals, because of our licensing procedures, were such innocuous items as spare parts for civilian aircraft. Our policy had been dictated by the considered opinion that an area arms race should be avoided. It was significant that the US Government had in fact supplied far more arms to the Arab states than to Israel.

In view of these facts, Mr. Rountree emphasized that the sudden publication of baseless allegations in Al Ahram to the effect that the US was giving $40–50 million, and the UK $80–90 million, in arms aid to Israel had been most disturbing. Ambassador Kamel interposed that he had not read Nasser’s full speech and asked whether specific amounts had been mentioned. Mr. Rountree replied that this was his recollection.

Expressing appreciation for Mr. Rountree’s remarks, Ambassador Kamel replied that he had found only good will, cooperation, understanding and patience in his preliminary contacts here. He was working in the same spirit, as were President Nasser and Dr. Fawzi. However, all questions could not be liquidated in one day and he had been prepared for set-backs. There had been rumors in the Arabic press of great quantities of arms being sent to Israel from France and the UK. It had even been reported that French troops, originally bound for Lebanon at the time of the US landings, had been diverted to Israel. The fact that Israel is receiving British, French, and apparently also some American arms, at a time when the first two powers are carrying on financial negotiations with the UAR and the US is talking of improving relations, naturally had caused Cairo concern. After the emergency UNGA, the UAR had looked forward to beginning a new page in relations with the West. If the US had given only one gun to Israel that would demonstrate that these hopes had been ill-advised. President Nasser would not understand the description of US arms aid to Israel as consisting of “small quantities” of “defensive weapons” as these were fluid terms. The Ambassador did not know whether the UAR was now receiving arms shipments from the USSR but opined that his government would no doubt cease any such transactions should the US Government be prepared to furnish UAR needs.

Ambassador Kamel expressed appreciation for the steps the US was taking in the economic field to which Mr. Rountree had earlier referred, but emphasized that political actions, for example the withdrawal of US troops from Lebanon, would be far more important. Dr. Kamel opined that President Nasser’s criticism of US policy with respect to China had been directly linked to US action on the Israel arms question. The UAR Ambassador expressed the view that it was in the interest of no one, including Israel, that Israel receive arms shipments. Efforts to strengthen Israel in this manner only served to bring the Arabs closer together and a continued policy of such assistance could cause catastrophe. The economic steps outlined by Mr. Rountree would, said Dr. Kamel, no doubt help to clarify the situation. Such economic assistance would assist in creating a favorable political atmosphere but would not solve political problems. The UAR would be happy to normalize relations with the US but specific political developments presented obstacles. (See subsequent comments below.)

4. Lebanon and Jordan

Mr. Rountree replied that the USG is aware that political problems exist. The US did not oppose Arab nationalism and our actions in the Suez and Lebanese situations had not been taken to oppose Arab unity but in accordance with the basic US principle that we stand ready to assist smaller countries who request help in preserving their independence and integrity. We believed that our failure to respond to such a request would cause a lack of confidence among our friends in our fundamental determination to assist them in meeting any threats to their integrity. The US had not desired to land troops in Lebanon but had done so at the request of the legitimate government of that country. Our troops would be withdrawn when Lebanon’s integrity was no longer threatened or whenever withdrawal should be requested by the Lebanese Government. We hoped withdrawal could take place soon. Ambassador Kamel commented that the UAR would never seek to threaten Lebanese independence, noted that US withdrawal would have a great and favorable impact on the people of the area and inquired regarding the Jordanian situation. Mr. Rountree replied that the Jordanian problem was far more difficult. As the Secretary had informed Dr. Fawzi, Jordan by itself was not viable.⁴ The formation of the Arab Union had made considerable sense, without regard to political considerations. Without some solution along these lines, Mr. Rountree said, it was difficult to see a long-term solution for the Jordan problem. However, should Jordan now collapse suddenly, the consequences would be most serious. What was required was a period of tranquility in which this problem could quietly be worked out. Dr. Kamel agreed personally that the union of Iraq and Jordan might be the best solution and inquired regarding the Israeli attitude. Mr. Rountree replied that Israel had not opposed the formation of the Arab Union.

3. Reported US Arms Aid to Israel (Continued)

In closing, the UAR Ambassador again pressed for details regarding the value and volume of US arms aid to Israel. Mr. Rountree said that he stood by the Department’s statement, namely that Israel had obtained relatively small quantities of defensive arms. He declined to speculate whether such assistance would continue and said he could not speak for the UK or France regarding possible British or French shipments. Mr. Rountree emphasized that the amount Israel had received had been far less than recent Soviet arms shipments to the UAR and was also less than US arms aid to the Arab states. It appeared questionable whether Israel should be deprived of all sources of arms, even if this were a practical possibility, since Israel might in that eventuality resort to other means to assure its defense. However, we were aware of no massive program of arms shipments to Israel from any source which could give the UAR concern in terms of existing UAR military supplies. Ambassador Kamel observed that, for the purpose of building understanding between the Arabs and the West, it would be desirable that no arms should, for the time being at least, be delivered to Israel and that the question of Israel’s security should be settled by other means. Otherwise, a vicious circle would be created. Mr. Rountree said that an arms race was exactly what the Department wished to avoid and asked whether an area arms embargo might be possible. Ambassador Kamel replied personally that he would favor such an embargo provided it could be made effective. Dr. Kamel asked again whether the value of US arms aid to Israel was in fact $40 million to which Mr. Rountree replied that this figure was, as he had explained, a gross exaggeration and that the Al Ahram article in which it had appeared was completely without substance.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.86B/9–458. Confidential. Drafted by Brewer on September 8 and approved by Rountree. A briefing memorandum for the conversation is ibid., 601.86B11/9–458; a summary of the conversation was transmitted to Cairo in telegram 736, September 5. (Ibid., 886B.49/9–458)
2. See supra.
3. On August 25, the UAR Embassy delivered an aide-mémoire requesting the lease of the dredge Essayons. (Department of State, Central Files, 986B.7301/8–2658) Following discussion in the Department of State, Dulles sent a memorandum to the President on September 3, recommending the lease. (Ibid., 786B.5621/9–458) On September 4, Dulles telephoned Rountree at 4:31 p.m. to say that the President had approved the request. (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Telephone Conversations)
4. During the conversation referred to in footnote 2 above.