Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Arab-Israeli Dispute; United Arab Republic; North Africa, Volume XIII

160. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations¹

Washington, July 22, 1960—5:51 p.m.

113. At present Arab-Israel border situation appears relatively tranquil. However, there been number of recent developments which are disturbing. These include:

1. Anti-Israel pronouncements by UAR leaders and press have become more inflammatory. Danger is leaders might find themselves captive to Arab emotionalism which they are arousing. Some contentious statements have also been made by Israel spokemen.

2. Both UAR and Israel governments have stepped up efforts to obtain important armaments.

3. Military maneuvers are being conducted in both Israel and UAR which might be misconstrued as mobilization. Tel Aviv’s telegram 59 to Department, repeated USUN 8,² reports Israelis now engaged in large-scale defensive maneuvers against simulated “Soviet-type blitzkrieg attack”. We have unconfirmed report that UAR has recently been moving some troops back into Sinai.

4. Incidents and resulting tensions have increased in Demilitarized Zones, particularly in explosive Tawafiq area.

5. Israel Deputy Defense Minister Peres’ public remarks re alleged UAR military build-up have ominous overtones. (Tel Aviv’s 60 to Department, repeated USUN 9.)³

While recognizing SYG is preoccupied at present with other more urgent matters, USUN may wish when suitable opportunity arises bring foregoing to SYG’s attention. Hope might be expressed that despite necessity for transfer some UNTSO and UNEF personnel to temporary duty in Congo, every effort will be made by UN to maintain adequate vigilance Arab-Israel situation.⁴

Herter

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86B/7–2260. Confidential. Drafted by Hamilton, Meyer, and Palmer and approved and signed for Herter by Sisco. Repeated to Jerusalem, Damascus, Tel Aviv, and Cairo.
2. Dated July 18. (Ibid., 784A.54/7–1860)
3. Dated July 18. (Ibid., 784A.5/7–1860)
4. On July 29, Barco discussed the problem with Cordier who indicated that Hammarskjöld had instructed him to keep a close watch on the situation. (Telegram 256 from USUN, July 29; ibid., 684A.86B/7–2960)