Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Arab-Israeli Dispute; United Arab Republic; North Africa, Volume XIII

158. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State¹

Tel Aviv, July 18, 1960—11 a.m.

58. Eyes only Secretary. At his request I called on Ben-Gurion July 15. For seventy minutes he analyzed security situation and said Israel now entering period “very serious danger”. Specifically, he reviewed in greater detail his discussions with De Gaulle, commented on his Washington talks, and evaluated Nasser’s possible intentions in light his need stay in power and retain his personal position with respect UAR army.²

1. Ben-Gurion-De Gaulle talks.

After informing De Gaulle in some detail about his Washington and London talks, Ben-Gurion told De Gaulle Nasser might attack Israel when MIG–19s acquired. De Gaulle thought that not likely, remarking that it would mean world war, to which Ben-Gurion rejoined he believed Nasser increasingly in position politically where he would be compelled attack and psychologically in frame of mind where he believed he would be successful. Reportedly De Gaulle listened attentively this analysis and finally replied that following summit break up he, President Eisenhower, and Prime Minister Macmillan had agreed meet some future time to consider “strategic” implications Khrushchev’s summit actions. In consequence, Ben-Gurion comments, De Gaulle assertedly stated one of principal points he would raise at meeting would be question “Israel’s security”. De Gaulle reportedly prepared advance following formula: France should continue supply most modern aircraft (e.g., Mirages), Britain should provide Centurions, and US should provide defensive missiles.

2. Israel’s security.

Ben-Gurion “wholly certain” UAR, in accordance “written agreement”, would acquire MIG–19s by October this year. Here, Ben-Gurion noted Khrushchev’s July 8 Vienna remarks³ might mean delivery would be even earlier than October. Israel’s danger period would begin October 1960 and run through 1962. French delivery 40 Mirages scheduled begin about December 1961, with initial delivery being four aircraft followed by two each month.

In above circumstances Nasser would be in position, after reasonable training period, bomb Israel’s three airfields in surprise low level attack, and thus immobilize Israel’s fighter aircraft.

UAR’s some 100 II–28 bombers, each capable of carrying ten-ton loads, would be able to make at least two sorties apiece in bombing runs Tel Aviv and other cities. Not much would be left of these cities, and many people would be killed. This would also effect Israel’s ability to mobilize which essential due to small standing army.

In any attack Jews “would fight to death” and “might win” but such victory would be too costly. Israel could not afford lose its best youth, particularly since flower European Jewry already destroyed by Nazis. Israel’s prime concern, therefore, is to prevent war; only answer was deterrent Nasser would respect.

3. Ben-Gurion talks in Washington.

Ben-Gurion turned to his discussions in Washington particularly his talks with the Secretary. He said he definitely had come away with the belief that Secretary had given him a positive reply re Israel’s acquisition of the Hawk. While the Secretary had used the phrase “fair assumption”, he (Ben-Gurion) had taken this virtually as a promise”.⁴

I remarked that when I called on Ben-Gurion on his return from the US and he (Ben-Gurion) had referred to the Secretary’s response—that I had taken the occasion then to remark that the Secretary had used the phrase “fair assumption” with a caveat and dependent on factors that the Secretary did not then know about being brought to his attention. I added that while I could understand his having reasonably assumed the probability of a positive decision; nonetheless the Secretary had clearly indicated a qualification in his answer, and in light of this, his reply could not have constituted a promise. Ben-Gurion smiled and said he could understand this; that there might be other interpretations of what the Secretary had meant—but he had taken it as a positive reply.

In any event Ben-Gurion said—pointedly counting the months on his fingers—it now four months since discussion and he had called [me?] in as October and period of danger for Israel fast approaching.

Israel could acquire most arms requirements from traditional suppliers but some equipment could come only from US.

I remarked that our offer re electronic equipment should not only be of value but he might be interested to know this equipment most modern and that even some of our NATO allies did not have it.

(I also said, speaking personally, I was sure we would do all possible to expedite six or ten million dollar electronic package which ever Israel preferred. Ben-Gurion said he thought plans called for larger package.)

Ben-Gurion said he most appreciative—as this equipment would alert IDF shortly after takeoff of UAR aircraft—but Hawk only weapon that could meet surprise low level air attack.

Also, it important an Israeli technician receive training now on operation and use of Hawk as only in this way could IDF know how to plan ahead; how much training required, et cetera.

I commented—that as I understood his thinking—he primarily concerned about prevention of war and the need for a deterrent in this connection. He nodded. I asked how a deterrent could be kept secret—remarking that Secretary particularly concerned re security and importance we attached to a minimum number of people being apprised of or involved in these discussions. Ben-Gurion said deterrent would be Mirages—which would be known to Nasser—not Hawk, which would be kept secret.

I queried him as to why he thought Nasser might attack with MIG–19s—which not markedly superior to super-Mysteres—when he wouldn’t with MIG–17s and why did he seriously think Nasser would attack in first place. Ben-Gurion said Nasser presently afraid Israeli fighters but would not be when UAR acquired MIG–19s—which definitely very superior aircraft—and as Nasser’s political support depended on army. As he had repeatedly called for destruction of Israel he might have to attack to stay in power.

Ben-Gurion then referred to report from secret Iraqi and Jordanian sources that 24 UAR officers (including general officers) had just been arrested. Report not confirmed and might be spread by Iraqis for own reasons. It not clear whether these Communists or “rivals”, but report indicative of Nasser’s problems.

In addition Ben-Gurion stressed confirmed intelligence reports—during recent UAR build-up in Sinai to effect front line officers believed this was it and long awaited attack on Israel imminent.

I then asked how he believed Nasser would attack and Ben-Gurion said UAR might (also) block Straits of Tiran and fire on Israeli ships. I said this would immediately engage UNEF in Sharm el Sheik. Ben-Gurion said—citing Amer’s statement July 11 (Embtel 50)⁵—that Nasser might, prior to this, call for the departure of UNEF. I said we would query this most seriously and I was sure UN would also.

Further I said in the event of an attack the UN and the US would take action. Ben-Gurion first said action would be too late and then that it could be stopped by a Soviet veto.

Here I said I was sure prompt UN action could be taken under the uniting for peace resolution.⁶

Ben-Gurion didn’t disagree re possible General Assembly action but he clearly felt this would take too much time and the UN would ultimately find much of Israel destroyed and would only be able to pass a pious resolution after the fact. This would not save Israel’s best youth.

Other means were required and he again urged first that training be made available re Hawk and later the Hawk itself.

I then reiterated points Secretary and Under Secretary made to Mrs. Meir.⁷

Comment: Ben-Gurion clearly hopes we will provide at least one training opportunity re Hawk. On this I gave him no encouragement; twice pointing out training facilities as difficult a problem as availability Hawk itself.

Reid

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86B/7–1860. Top Secret.
2. On July 2, Reid reported that he had an 80-minute talk with Ben Gurion while the latter was on vacation, including a discussion of Japan and President De Gaulle. (Telegrams 8 and 9 from Tel Aviv, July 2; Eisenhower Library, Project “Clean Up”, Israel)
3. The transcript of Khrushchev’s press conference at Vienna, July 8, during a State visit to Austria, is printed in Pravda, July 9, 1960, pp. 1–2.
4. Next to this paragraph on the source text is the handwritten notation: “BG will not find people very anxious to talk with him if he uses the screws like this.”
5. Telegram 50, July 18, reported a statement by Amer on the future of UNEF. (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86B/7–1860)
6. Reference is to U.N. General Assembly Resolution 377(V), November 3, 1950; see American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1950–1955, vol. I, pp. 187–192.
7. See Document 155.