Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Arab-Israeli Dispute; United Arab Republic; North Africa, Volume XIII

156. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Jones) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Merchant)¹

Washington, July 7, 1960.

SUBJECT

• Israel’s Request for Missiles

With reference to our recent conversation² concerning the Israeli request for Hawk missiles, I am summarizing below the various considerations which have had a bearing on NEA’s thinking on this subject:

1. Traditional Policy. Our traditional policy has been to avoid becoming a major supplier of arms to the Near East countries. Our supplying Hawk missiles to Israel would represent a measure three times the scope of the electronic equipment offer we recently made to the Israelis, and the electronics equipment offer is ten times as large as any previous military transaction, i.e., our sale of $1,000,000 worth of recoilless rifles at Israeli urging in 1958. Having set a precedent of this magnitude we would have difficulty in refusing future Israeli requests by referring to our “traditional policy”. Similarly, as far as the rest of the Near East is concerned the citing of “our traditional policy” would tend no longer to be useful.

2. Arms Race. Were we to introduce spectacular missile weaponry into the Near East, the United Arab Republic would undoubtedly importune the Soviets for similar weaponry. When the Israelis succeeded in obtaining Super Mystere aircraft from the French, the UAR, whose MIG 17’s are outclassed by Super Mysteres, have found it necessary to give top priority to obtaining MIG 19’s which are comparable to the Super Mystere. The UAR’s preoccupation with this problem is even now evident in Cairo’s apparent swing back toward more friendly relations with the Soviets at our expense. Were we to introduce missiles, there would be no assurance that missiles provided by the Soviets to Israel’s neighbors might not have a surface-to-surface capability. In this latter event, the Hawk system would in effect be obsolete since it can defend against aircraft but not against missiles. In brief, by giving the Israelis missiles we would be setting in motion a new spiral in the Middle East arms race with the likely result that no one would gain except the Soviets who wish to exacerbate tensions in that area.

3. Israel’s Defense. In making their case for Hawks, the Israelis point up their vulnerability to an air attack. Whether one air raid by the United Arab Republic would prostrate Israel is a matter for speculation. Israel has a splendid air force which can for the foreseeable future cope with the UAR air force. The early warning electronics equipment we have proffered will increase the Israel air force’s effectiveness. According to Prime Minister Ben-Gurion, the French have agreed to supply Israel with 40 Mirages (Tab A).³ When these planes become available to the Israelis in late 1961, the Israel air force will have an aircraft which according to our Defense Department is “far and away” superior to the MIG–19. The shortage of airfields is a problem which should not be insurmountable for the Israelis; there are large areas in the Negev which could be utilized for emergency landing strips. On the ground, Israel appears to have the ability to handle the UAR forces quite successfully. Cf. the Sinai campaign in 1956. Were Israel subjected to a flagrant attack of the type pictured by the Israelis in requesting the Hawks, there is little doubt Israel’s friends would be quickly at Israel’s side. Just this past week President De Gaulle is reported to have pledged France to come to Israel’s assistance (Tab B). No doubt our own country would quickly swing the Sixth Fleet and other of our forces into action were Israel to be subjected to an unprovoked attack. I am convinced that President Nasser is aware of this, which awareness is in itself an important factor in dissuading him from undertaking an aggressive adventure against Israel.

4. High Costs. Israel’s request for only six batteries of Hawks is relatively modest. Yet this installation would cost approximately $25,000,000. The 300 “birds” which the Israelis have requested would cost an additional $12,000,000. Annual maintenance costs, as estimated by the Defense Department, are in the neighborhood of $5,000,000. In our view, Israel can ill afford initiating an arms races in the Near East with weaponry involving costs on this scale. No doubt the Israelis would look to us for the needed financing.

5. Partiality. One of our major objectives in the Near East has been to the extent possible to give the appearance of impartiality in the Arab-Israel dispute. It is our conviction that this is important if an eventual Arab-Israel settlement is to be achieved and peace preserved in the Middle East. Supporting Israel with missile weaponry would not be compatible with this objective. It would, moreover, foster a trend which aligns Israel with us while driving the Arab countries into closer dependence on the Soviets. A suggestion has been made that since the Hawks are defensive, we might offer them also to the United Arab Republic. This is not feasible since the Hawk system is in the “Secret” classification and even were the Defense Department to yield by allowing Israel to gain a status of sharing “Secret” information with us, there quite rightly would be no disposition to elevate the United Arab Republic to such a status. Incidentally, until now Israel has been considered by the Defense Department only cleared for “Unclassified” information, but in response to our representations to offer the advanced early warning electronics equipment, the Defense Department has agreed that Israel might share in “Confidential” information in regard to this one category of items only.

6. Procurement Elsewhere. Israel has hitherto been able to obtain most of its needed military equipment from other than American sources. The French continue to exhibit scarcely any restraint in meeting Israel’s military needs as the recent transaction for the supply of 40 Mirages confirms. The Israel request to the U.S. for Hawks originally was paralleled by an approach to the British for Bloodhounds, a missile considerably less capable and sophisticated than the Hawk. According to the British Embassy here, the Israelis have not followed up their initial expression of interest; they apparently have decided to concentrate on the attempt to obtain Hawks from the U.S. Hawks are being produced in Europe under U.S. aegis for certain selected NATO countries, i.e. Belgium, Netherlands, France, Germany and Italy. Greece and Turkey are not included among these recipients. It is not possible to predict whether Hawks could be provided to Israel from this production but in any case it would not be possible before 1964.

7. Privileged Sanctuary. Although Israel’s vulnerability to surprise air attack is present even now, the Israelis have indicated that they are really not concerned about the situation until 1963 or 1964. While there is validity to the contention that by that time the UAR capability may be improved, it is possible that the Israelis themselves may have something in mind for those years. The most obvious possibility is the Jordan Waters issue for it will be in those years that Israel’s construction of facilities for diverting the Jordan River will be completed. It is worth noting that the maximum capacity of the works being constructed will permit the diversion of twice the amount of water allotted to Israel under the Johnston Plan. Protected by Hawks, and assuming the Arabs have not obtained missiles, the Israelis could with relative impunity launch aggressive measures with respect to Jordan Water diversion or for that matter other issues still in contention with the Arabs.

8. Arab Uproar. It is axiomatic that if we provide Israel with missiles, there will when this becomes known occur an emotional uproar against the United States in the Arab world. It is doubtful if Israel’s acquisition of missiles could remain secret. The Israelis themselves have told the British that such weapons can only have the desired deterrent effect if Nasser knows that Israel possesses them. Recently, a number of developments have caused an upswing in Arab sentiment against us: the Ben-Gurion visit, the Hays–Douglas amendment, the Cleopatra picketing, the public display by Israel of American-supplied recoilless rifles, public statements favorable to Israel by our political candidates, etc. Despite these developments, the Near East as of the moment remains relatively quiescent. This is in considerable contrast to the Aswan Dam-Suez crisis in 1956 or to the Lebanese in 1958. We believe it is very much in our country’s interest that the relative quiescence be maintained. With many other problems besetting us elsewhere in the world, we would not wish to enlarge our burdens by stirring up further outcry against us in the Near East. In this connection, it is worth noting that we are currently undertaking a new approach to the Arab refugee problem. The prospects for success are dim at best; we would not wish to extinguish them by violent outbursts against us in the Arab world which would certainly occur if it became known that we are providing the Israelis with missiles.

9. Israel’s Progress. Israel continues to make tremendous strides in its economic growth. During the first four months of this year, its foreign exchange reserves increased in an amount greater than all of 1959, and in 1959 they increased some $40,000,000. Israel’s industry and agriculture continue to flourish and her exports have quadrupled in the past ten years. Her markets are expanding in Europe, Asia and Africa. Meanwhile, our country, both through government and private channels, continues its large-scale financial assistance. We believe Israel’s real hope for survival lies in positive constructive growth rather than in introducing a spectacular weapon which will stir up troubles in the Near East and thus produce conditions unfavorable to Israel’s continued progress.

10. Israeli Reactions. There is little doubt the Israelis will be keenly disappointed if we flatly reject their request. Conceivably there might even emerge some Israeli sentiment in support of an adventure of the 1956 Sinai type under the assumptions: a) that Israel had better have a show-down with the United Arab Republic while it still has qualitative superiority; b) that after the example of 1956, in return for its withdrawing from Arab areas over-run in the initial phases of such an adventure, Israel could extract concessions concerning transit of Israeli shipments through the Suez and perhaps a relaxation of the Arab boycott; c) that by stirring up trouble in the Near East, Israel could underscore its need for military equipment and arouse widespread American sympathies for greater security support for Israel, particularly during an election year in our country. In this connection, it is worth noting Ambassador Harman’s concluding observation in his discussion with Assistant Secretary of Defense Irwin (Tab C).

Recommendations;

Having on the basis of the considerations set forth above reached the conclusion that it is not in our national interest to introduce missiles into the Near East at this time, and yet mindful of our country’s continuing desire to assure Israel’s welfare, NEA believes that our response to Israel’s request for Hawk missiles should be along the following lines:

a. While offering no hope for the immediate future, we should avoid rejecting Israel’s missile request categorically and permanently. We can, as the Secretary did with Mrs. Meir, continue to note that we shall in the future keep Israel’s missile request “under review”.

b. We should be responsive to Israel’s economic problems. The Secretary and Mr. Dillon have already indicated that we shall consider sympathetically Israeli applications for assistance which meet DLF criteria. Meanwhile, we can remind the Israelis how forthcoming we have been to date—our aid in FY60 has exceeded the level of our aid to Israel over the years since Israel’s birth. We can in this connection note our $15,000,000 DLF loan to assist with the construction of the Central Israel Water Conduit, a key element in Israel’s total water development program.

c. We should continue to take a sympathetic attitude toward Israeli requests for modest amounts of defensive and unspectacular military equipment. We can remind them of the forthcoming attitude reflected in our offer under credit terms of $6 to $10 million worth of early warning electronics equipment. We should also continue consultation with the British, and perhaps the French, to facilitate Israel’s procurement of important military needs from such non-American sources.

d. Reflecting as it does, the observations set forth above, we should proceed with the despatch of the proposed letter from the Secretary to Prime Minister Ben-Gurion and be prepared to continue friendly high-level exchanges of this type as occasion requires. The theme of these exchanges should be that Israel should rely for its survival not on sabre (or missile) rattling and arms races but on the pursuit of peace through healthy internal economic growth and a determination to achieve a modus vivendi with her neighbors. We should assure Israeli leaders that by following this course, Israel can be confident of the support of the United States and other friends, whatever the crisis which may arise.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 784A.5612/7–760. Secret; Eyes Only. Initialed by Jones.
2. Not further identified.
3. No tabs were attached to the source text. Tab A, telegram 9 from Tel Aviv, July 2, is in Department of State, Central Files, 611.84A/7–260; Tab B, telegram 1299 from Tel Aviv, June 30, is ibid., 651.84A/6–3060; regarding Tab C, see footnote 2, supra.