115. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State1
2209. Foreign Minister Oueini asked me to call this morning. He said during his recent vacation in Cairo he had seen Nasser and had also attended meeting of tripartite Arab committee on diversion of Jordan waters made up of UAR, Jordan and Lebanon. Minister said purpose of his convoking me this morning was to stress, as an old friend, utmost gravity with which he views possibility of Arab Governments undertaking hostilities against Israel if safeguards are not provided against fulfillment of Israeli project to divert Jordan waters to Negev.
Foreign Minister said he could make no secret of fact that if matters continued as they now seemed to then Arab Government would, in self-defense, undertake military action against Israel.
Oueini said, as I knew, he had always stood for course of moderation in Arab League councils, and he believed firmly that peace must be maintained in Near East until long outstanding issues between Arabs and Israel were ultimately and peacefully resolved. It was because of his firm conviction in favor of a moderate course that he felt he had a right to appeal to United States to exercise utmost influence on Israel to stay its contemplated plans for diverting Jordan water to Negev. Minister said that, if he could attend forthcoming meeting of Arab League council in Cairo after first week of February with some indication that Washington had been able to exert a restraining hand in Tel Aviv, he thought he would be able to persuade other Arab delegations to refrain from impetuous and perhaps overtly hostile acts.
Recalling paradox traced Embtel 2088,2 I asked Oueini what difference it would make if Arab fears of irrigation of Negev, predicated on assumption this would facilitate immigration of 2,000,000 additional Jews to Israel, were realized if Israelis irrigated Negev by desalination rather than by diversion of Jordan waters. To this Oueini replied that, in first place, he did not believe Israelis would be successful in securing enough sweet water by desalination process; but even if [Page 254] they did, this would not pose same emotional challenge to Arabs as diversion of Jordan waters. He said, “The Jordan is our river. We can not tolerate that it be taken away by Israelis.”
Comment: I have rarely seen Oueini so deeply stirred although at same time restrained in his expression. It was clear that he viewed possibility of an outbreak of hostilities as of utmost gravity. End comment. He spoke of possible military operations against Israel by UAR and Jordan, and said that despite Qasim’s quarrel with Nasser, Iraq would have to go along. He was sure that Saudi Arabia would not forebear in supporting other Arab Governments and that Lebanon, although it had no hankering for war, would of necessity not only facilitate passage of Syrian troops across its territory but would of itself take part in military operations.
Minister said he had yesterday summoned French Ambassador to say that a report had reached him that about a month ago when Mrs. Meir was in Paris she had stated that Israel could count on French support for its project for diversion of Jordan waters. Oueini said he told French Ambassador that he would be unwise to count unduly on continuing Lebanese friendship for France. He pointed out Lebanon was sole Arab country (other than Magreb states) which had maintained relations with France. However, he could assure Ambassador that if quoted report were true Lebanese friendship, official and otherwise, for France would be at an end.
Minister asked my advice as to whether he should make a similar démarche to British Ambassador. I said that if in fact situation was as grave as he portrayed it I thought most certainly he should discuss issue with my British colleague since UK was one of signatories with US and France of tripartite agreement on Palestine. Oueini said he thought this was good advice and he would ask Crosthwaite to call.
Foreign Minister said he was going from this interview with me to consult with Foreign Affairs Commission of Parliament and asked if he could inform members that he had discussed threat of Jordan waters diversion with American Ambassador. I said I had no objection, provided he made it clear that he had talked with me because US and Lebanon shared a mutual desire to see that every step was taken to maintain peace in Near East and to settle differences only by peaceful means.
Interview concluded with Minister asking if Washington could give him some hopeful sign along lines of having exerted a moderating influence on Israeli Government before he goes to Cairo next month for Arab League meeting. I recalled that in past years US, as friend of both parties, had in fact been willing to lend itself to various moves [Page 255] designed to lessen tension and to preserve the peace. I would certainly recommend to my government that it give immediate study to ways and means of once more exerting a moderating influence.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85322/1–1260. Secret; Limited Distribution. Repeated to Amman, Cairo, Baghdad, Damascus, Tel Aviv, London, Paris, and USUN.↩
- Telegram 2088, December 31, 1959, noted that Lebanese censors were deleting references to Israeli desalinization successes in foreign periodicals, perhaps because if these became known, the drive to frustrate Israeli use of the Jordan waters would collapse. The paradox to this was that ability to provide water to the Negev would allow increased Jewish immigration. (Ibid., 684A.85322/12–3159)↩