112. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State1
1036. Paris for NATO. Naples for Lister. Depcirtel 8212 re dispute over Jordan waters arrived over weekend. After study I requested see Prime Minister and spent hour and half fifteenth with him and Wasfi At-Tal (Broadcasting Head and Prime Minister’s favorite translator). I summarized Depcirtel omitting FYI portion.
Prime Minister then said perhaps in hundred years there might be Jordanian Prime Minister who could accept Johnston plan or something like it as agreement between Jordan and Israel but certainly now no Prime Minister of Jordan could do so contrary to opinion Arab League.
Majali then said not correct that Arab rejection Johnston plan involved only political considerations and only difference was over 30 MCM water. (Re this 30 MCM he stated it consisted of saline waters Israel wished Jordan to accept.) Majali said many other differences on technical side of Johnston allocation although he did not specify.
Majali asked whether my visit was to bring pressure for acceptance Johnston plan because if this USG policy, all Arab world would be up in arms. I said I came merely to express as clearly as could views USG. Majali said Arabs could not go back to Johnston plan.
Majali continued by stating he studying whole question right now but he would give me his first informal opinion. He said Jordan did not take all of Yarmuk but left 25 percent to meet needs Israel. He indicated Jordan not at all worried about Beit Shean project. What worried Jordan was Israel planning pump out of valley for use in Negev almost all sweet water in Jordan River before it enters Lake Tiberias, leaving saline Tiberias water (nourished also by salt streams and springs) for lower Jordan. He said it unfair for Israel to deprive lands which have depended on Jordan River since time immemorial from usable water they have always used.
[Page 248]When I pointed out that if allocations agreed upon it should make no difference to Jordan how Israelis used their allocation, Majali disagreed strongly, saying perhaps Israelis would only take out of valley their allocation under Johnston plan but they would take sweet water before it entered Tiberias, leaving saline water which would ruin agriculture in lower Jordan valley.
At another point I stressed that USG adherence to concept of Johnston plan meant USG did not favor developments which would mean any riparian would get water in excess such allocations. Majali asked if this applied to Israel as well and I said I was sure it did.
In passing I had mentioned I could see difficulty of Majali position since Nasser was presenting himself as greater champion Jordanian interests than Jordan Prime Minister. Majali replied he had made statement which published New York Times November 17 to effect Jordan had no capacity to prevent Israelis from taking Jordan River water before it enters Lake Tiberias since that would occur in territory adjacent to UAR and could be prevented only by latter. For some reason Nasser had taken this up; he does not know why but may be because of internal unrest Syria. Nevertheless Majali declared if UAR takes some action to prevent Israelis from taking this sweet water and shooting occurs on Syrian-Israeli border, Jordan could not stand aside but would have to come to UAR support. Implication was such support would be Military.
Majali deprecated emotionalism surrounding this problem but stated if Israelis are permitted siphon off sweet water of Jordan and trouble occurs, it would be case where tripartite declaration should apply and this means USG particularly would have role in preventing war over this issue. He reiterated that Israelis if not stopped by USG will be taking this sweet water by 1963 if not before. I asked Majali if Jordan had technically dependable information regarding damaging salinity in Lake Tiberias should Israelis take off water now entering it from Jordan River; he replied this known both from Johnston studies and from 15 volumes of Baker–Harza studies, all of which in Washington. I replied he could not take it for granted that Baker–Harza studies in hands of Department as might be filed away in ICA/W. If these studies in fact proved this point, Jordanian Ambassador in Washington might well bring this technical study to attention Department.
Majali said that yesterday (14th) UAR started attack USG this issue.
I told Majali I would be glad communicate to Department any information on this question he wished provide me and he said I would be hearing from him.
Comment: I have no doubt Majali finds himself in situation where his whole reputation as defender Jordan Valley is at stake. He is convinced Johnston Plan technically was unfair and that if Israelis take [Page 249] sweet water from Jordan before it flows into Lake Tiberias, lower Jordan Valley crops will be ruined. Although he obviously does not wish war, he gave me distinct impression that if force only means preventing this from happening, its use would be fully justified. It obvious he expected USG, in interests of maintaining peace in Middle East, should step in to prevent Israelis from taking such water even though within their Johnston allocations as to quantity.
Assumptions in Depcirtel as to degree of technical agreement reached in Johnston negotiations certainly do not agree with Majali views and, I have no doubt, of all other Jordanians who were involved, as he was, as Cabinet member at time.
If Jordanian information incorrect, I believe technically competent USG experts should come here (and probably Cairo and Beirut as well) to correct what may be basic difference opinion.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85322/12–1559. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Ankara, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jerusalem, London, Paris Topol, Tel Aviv, Tehran, Rome, and Naples.↩
- Circular telegram 821, December 12, transmitted a summary history of the Jordan water development program since the inception of the Johnston mission in 1953 and instructed U.S. officials to make the following three points if the subject was raised: 1) the problem was the responsibility of the people in the area, 2) the Johnston plan was the most effective way to distribute and utilize Jordan river resources, and 3) nothing would be gained by an emotional approach to the question. (Ibid., 684A.85322/12–1259)↩