Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Arab-Israeli Dispute; United Arab Republic; North Africa, Volume XIII

106. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, November 25, 1959, 5 p.m.¹

Washington, November 25, 1959, 5 p.m.

SUBJECT

• UNRWA

PARTICIPANTS

• Ambassador Avraham Harman, Israel
• Counsellor of Embassy, Moshe Erell
• Mr. Francis O. Wilcox, IO—Assistant Secretary
• Mr. Joseph J. Sisco, UNP
• Mr. Ludlow, NEA
• Stephen E. Palmer Jr.,UNP

After an exchange of pleasantries the Ambassador said that he had called on Mr. Wilcox to seek clarification of Dr. Hancher’s statement of November 20 on the Special Political Committee.² The Ambassador was particularly interested in what we had in mind specifically with respect to the Palestine Conciliation Commission. Mr. Wilcox first observed that nothing in our statement should have been surprising to the Israelis. He said that this year we had not taken the lead on this item but rather had sought constructive suggestions from other parties. A number of suggestions had been made, although unfortunately few from the parties directly concerned. Among the proposals were some relating to the reactivation of the PCC, but the US at present has no specific ideas in this regard.

Ambassador Harman pointed out that almost every time that suggestions relating to the PCC were put forward in debate mention was made of such factors as “suitable composition” or “equitable geographic distribution”. Were changes to be made in the composition of the Commission there would be danger that the Soviets might be included. Largely because of this possibility the GOI has grave doubts about any reactivation of the PCC, believing that it probably would be a retrogressive step. Mr. Wilcox said that he assumed, therefore, that the GOI would prefer not to have the PCC enlarged. The Ambassador replied that enlargement could not help but create difficulties with regard to the question of parity, etc. Mr. Wilcox reiterated that we have no specific plan to offer at this time on the PCC. He admitted that reconstitution of the Commission would run the risk of creating new problems, but added that we shall seriously consider any reasonable proposal which might allow some progress to be made in this issue.

Mr. Sisco pointed out that the United States has always been in favor of the Commission’s doing what it was set up to do, namely, to provide for a fundamental settlement. The Ambassador said that the GOI believes that only through direct contacts between the Arabs and the Israelis could any progress be made, and that fundamental progress is not likely to be made through the PCC.

Following an exchange about the timing of the remainder of the UNRWA debate, Mr. Wilcox noted that Senators Gore and McGee apparently had an interesting talk with Prime Minister Ben Gurion.³ Ambassador Harman stated that Ben Gurion had been informed by the Senators that they were quite hopeful about the possibility that Nasser might be willing to compromise on outstanding issues. The Ambassador continued by saying that Ben Gurion was skeptical about Nasser’s intentions but that, however, Israel was prepared to meet the Arabs, directly or through intermediaries, to discuss any issue. The Ambassador said that Ben Gurion told the Senators that he would prefer the United States to take the initiative with respect of any such negotiations; that they should be undertaken most privately, and that if talks were conducted in a forum like the PCC the result would be only a hardening of the respective positions. Mr. Wilcox said that the Senators seemed to be encouraged both by the reactions of key Arab leaders and Ben Gurion’s reactions. Ambassador Harman stressed Ben Gurion’s skepticism about the possibility of any real advancement at this time.

Mr. Wilcox inquired if there were in the Ambassador’s opinion anything the United States Government could appropriately do at this time to help the situation move along. The Ambassador replied that any public steps, in this area where quiet diplomacy could conceivably be rewarded, might boomerang.

Mr. Wilcox speculated that the Senator’s criticism of the refugee registration situation could conceivably have a couple of results; 1. Congress may be even more reluctant than before to support the UNRWA program financially, and 2. the governments directly concerned with the refugee problem may be impressed by this evidence of Congressional concern. The Ambassador said that it is important for the United States Government to realize that the UNRWA program affords the Near East a certain stability. The situation in the Near East is not moving forward in a positive way but at least it is not deteriorating to an explosive point. The Ambassador said that it is well to keep this “balance of stability”, for one reason because a number of the Arab refugees have in fact integrated themselves in the host countries, and there is among the refugees a significant degree of concealed self-support.

Mr. Wilcox reverted again to the Senator’s impression of Ben Gurion’s reaction to their observations, specifically to the matter of repatriation and compensation. Mr. Wilcox said that in a sense Israel really holds the key to any significant step forward in the refugee deadlock. He stated that very likely he would consult with Senators Gore and McGee upon their return. He would therefore appreciate the Ambassador’s view as to what degree the GOI would be willing to move in an explicit way with regard to the repatriation and compensation issue.

The Ambassador said that Ben Gurion will be in a stronger position with his new government but added, “It is not realistic to assume that we can go beyond what Eban said last year.” Eban’s statement (to the Special Political Committee, November 17, 1958)⁴ represented “the most that can be expected from any government of Israel on the repatriation and compensation question.” The Ambassador then explained in some detail the “severe domestic situation created by Israel’s Oriental problem.” He referred to the recent riots in Haifa and Beersheba, said that there are about 450,000 Oriental Jews who consider themselves refugees from the Arab countries, that the old and new Oriental Jews in Israel now constitute about 50 percent of the total population, and that this large segment has grave grievances against the Arab states, particularly Iraq, from which they were allowed to bring nothing out, and the UAR. This, said the Ambassador, is entirely apart from the continuing concern about the general security situation of Israel. The Government of Israel has no reason to feel less concerned about its security situation now than it has in the past. Thus, Eban’s “careful formulation” will continue to guide the Israelis in this question.

Mr. Wilcox expressed the hope that Mr. Eban’s statement of last year would be somewhat amplified at some future time. The Ambassador replied that this would occur only when genuine negotiations between Israel and the Arab states are underway. This, he stressed, was what Ben Gurion had in mind when he responded to the Senators. Mr. Wilcox observed that for 12 years the refugee camps have been focal points of animosity directed against Israel. Were the refugee problem to begin to be solved there would be a good chance for a real improvement in Israel’s position in the area. Were, for instance, the Government of Israel to make a public statement indicating willingness to consider again the repatriation-compensation issue, this might well bring about a considerable improvement with respect of Israel’s security and its political posture in the area. The Ambassador said that he doubted whether people like Shukairy would allow the refugee question to be solved, for it is important to such people to be able to direct animosity against Israel.

The Ambassador stated that he would very much appreciate being informed about our thinking with regard to the UNRWA item in the days ahead. This could be handled either here or in New York. The thinking of the United States Government, he added, will influence Israel’s approach to the issue.

Mr. Ludlow said that in recent talks he had with several Arab delegates he had been impressed by their relative reasonableness, particularly by evidence that they seem to be more willing to face the fact that in the end the host countries probably will have to assimilate most of the Palestine refugees. However, Mr. Ludlow continued, the Arab spokesman do not feel it is politically possible for them to compromise in the absence of an initiative from Israel.⁵

F.O.W.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320.511/11–2559. Confidential. Drafted by Palmer on November 27. A briefing paper for this conversation is ibid.,NEA Files: Lot 79 D 215, Palestine Refugees.
2. For text of this statement, see Department of State Bulletin, January 4, 1960, pp. 31–33.
3. See Document 104.
4. For text of this statement, see U.N. Doc. A/SPC/SR.84, pp. 82–85.
5. On November 30, Harman again expressed Israeli concern about injecting the PCC into the refugee question. (Memorandum of conversation; Department of State, Central Files, 320.511/11–3059)