101. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State1
1560. Beirut’s 1650 to Department.2 Presented Senators Gore and McGee to Nasser yesterday and ensuing hour and quarter of conversation devoted entirely to discussion Palestine question which Gore said he, as chairman NE subcommittee, had been commissioned study on behalf Foreign Relations Committee with assistance McGee from Appropriations Committee.
Line which he took was that he and McGee are young Senators who had played no part in earlier phases of Palestine problem but who nevertheless now faced with making serious effort do something about it since they being criticized by their constituents for continuing vote funds for refugees without being able show any progress toward settlement. Furthermore, their visits to refugee camps had filled them not only with revulsion but with strong feeling that in name justice and humanity something should be done restore refugees to normal life. Suggestion then made that, although there is growing opposition in Congress to continuing annual appropriations, it might be possible obtain really large sum—something say in billion dollar range—if it could be made part of definitive liquidation of refugee problem. Gore said formula which he had in mind would consist of undertakings by Israel repatriate refugees but, in anticipation he would probably wish return, massive resettlement program would be required. Gore said realized many predecessors had given their best in attempt find settlement this problem without success and would be presumptuous think he could succeed where others had failed. However, he had been commissioned by Committee to dissipate Arab fears and thereby make it possible for Arabs and Jews to live side by side in peace. He didn’t think there was anything visionary in this because Egypt itself had been country where up till few years ago Arabs and Jews had lived in harmony; it was only after Israel had been set up that problems had developed.
Nasser then went on say there was one thing he wished make absolutely clear and that was that UAR has no intention whatsoever of initiating war with Israel if for no other reason than that it is obvious [Page 225] that no such conflict could be localized. Result would be that in matter of days great powers would intervene and freedom of action would be lost. Even British and French had made mistake of thinking they could localize a war in Middle East and had been taught lesson the hard way. But aside from sheer expediency, Nasser said he doesn’t believe in resort to force as matter principle. However, this does not mean that UAR will not defend itself. It will do so even though it means, as it does, that much money has to be spent on defense that should desirably be applied to building up economy of country. What use would there be to building tall chimneys of factories and leaving the country prey to Israeli invasion? If some solution can be found, so much the better, because no question but that UAR and its revolution would be much further ahead than is now case if it were not for Palestine problem.
In ensuing conversation, Senators endeavored draw Nasser out on various points but with only limited success. Asked what proportion of refugees he thought would want to return, Nasser said difficult say, and recalled resettlement project in Sinai which had been thwarted by refugee objection. Even if given option for settlement elsewhere, he thought at least half would want to go back.
Pressed to acknowledge (especially by Senator McGee) that break-through on refugee problem would be important step in solving Palestine problem, Nasser seemed acquiesce but it appeared that in so indicating he was thinking in terms of solution where substantial number would return whereas Senators envisaged only token return.
When Gore indicated interest in revival of PCC suggested by Nasser in Ellis–Wynn interview,3 Nasser merely responded by saying that Israelis had been interested in PCC until they admitted into UN and then had dropped it.
Following interview Senators said they had been favorably impressed by thoughtful and quiet way in which Nasser had received their comments and questions and said this quite contrary to what they had expected on basis his public utterances as reported in American press. They also seemed feel that Nasser’s strong disclaimer of intention initiate war with Israel afforded base on which pursue study settlement.
Comment: I believe conversation was casual [useful?] exercise despite fact it brought out nothing new as far Nasser concerned except perhaps for his observation that any settlement of refugee problem that did not result in return of considerable number and reestablishment significant Arab component in population would mean that basic [Page 226] problem of Israeli-Arab relationship would remain unchanged. However, as Senator McGee observed, difficult as this might be, it would at least be problem of more conventional type.
Since foregoing is in nature material being assembled for report to Foreign Relations Committee, suggest circulation be confined to American officials.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 884.411/11–1759. Confidential. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Baghdad, Damascus, Jidda, Tel Aviv, London, Paris, and USUN.↩
- Telegram 1650, November 14, reported on Gore’s and McGee’s discussion of the refugee question with the Lebanese Foreign Minister who was confident that no more than 10 percent of the refugees would accept repatriation to Israel. (Ibid., 884.411/11–1459)↩
- For Harry B. Ellis’ account of the interview with Nasser on October 8, see Christian Science Monitor, October 8, 1959, p. 1.↩