61. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State1
4472.1 had a general talk with President Chamoun last night and found him sorely perplexed at military and political situation. It was obvious President had increasing doubts as to fidelity of General Chehab. We know Chamoun has been given forced feeding of suspicion and rumor by his advisors including one story of an elaborate Chehab family plot against Chamoun which would result in an almost compete sell-out to Nasser. In this atmosphere, and given General’s own refusal vigorously to prosecute military campaigns against insurgents, it is not surprising that President is of uncertain mind on what to do about the General. For example, Chamoun complained to me Chehab had actually requested permission to take a week’s leave at his home in Junieh on ground he was “fatigued”. President likewise was [Page 99] much vexed at reports from Air Force General had ordered pilots not to fire on given objectives, apparently for fear they would hit partisan bands or rebel villages.
When I asked Chamoun if he intended to get a new Commander-in-Chief, President said I must keep in mind this was a very small country and firing of General was not as easy as it might be in a larger country. Chamoun therefore seems saddled with Chehab whether he wants him or not.
President said General had been charged with writing up one more of his seemingly endless series of “plans de campagne” and that he the President would make up his mind “within 48 hours” on what final decision to take re General. We have been through a month of “48 hours” and I do not expect that any determinative action will be taken at end of this next two-day period. More ominous was Chamoun’s statement that if in next few days situation did not improve, “I might have to ask the three Ambassadors to consider new means of finding help.”
Immediate military interest centers on what our ARMA considers to be an effective battle plan prepared by G–3 for reduction of the Basta. This operation should commence this morning and is militarily feasible in opinion of Colonel Stinnes. It can therefore be taken as a test, first of Chehab’s readiness to move in effectively against the main focus of insurgent infection; and second, of degree to which either by his own desire or by possible sabotage in the General Staff, a feasible operations plan may possibly miscarry.
Chamoun last night read me translation of an intercept from a voice radio outside Lebanon which he said was in obvious Egytian Arabic. It called upon rebel forces under Sabri Hamadi in the Bekaa to effect junction with Jumblatt’s Druzes with apparent intent to cut line of communications between Beirut and the Bekaa with ultimate objective of moving against Beirut. At the same time rebels in the Akkar were ordered to move apparently as a diversionary measure. Three times during this voice message, date of June 7 was indicated as zero hour. This again may furnish some evidence of outside direction of rebel forces; or it may be, if authentic, a rebel counter-measure against operation being mounted in the Basta. At all events next few days should militarily provide a crisis and enable us to draw certain conclusions both as to rebel capabilities and—of possibly greater importance—degree of loyalty of General Chehab and his staff.
On political front I asked Chamoun where he thought opposition leaders now stood. He said that while individually many of them were prepared to be reasonable and to consider a peaceful end of insurrection, when they gathered together they became more bellicose, each vying to exceed the other in shouting defiance.
[Page 100]I said that if this were the case, it seemed to me obvious antidote was to separate opposition leaders and keep them from meeting. I likewise indicated Nasser’s continued interest in amnesty for leaders of opposition. Chamoun said he was prepared to see that all had easy routes of escape if that would satisfy Nasser.
Foregoing account is supplemented by [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] interview2 with Chamoun following my visit.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/6–658. Top Secret; Priority. Repeated to Cairo, London, Paris, and USUN.↩
- Dated June 6. (Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Beirut Embassy Files: FRC 68 A 5159, June 1, 1958–June 15, 1958; included in the microfiche supplement)↩