60. Special National Intelligence Estimate1
CONSEQUENCES OF POSSIBLE US COURSES OF ACTION RESPECTING LEBANON
The Problem
To assess the situation in Lebanon, its implications in the area, and the likely consequences, in Lebanon and elsewhere, of possible US courses of action.2
[Page 94]The Estimate
I. The Situation in Lebanon
1. The situation in Lebanon, as in the rest of the Arab world, has been profoundly influenced by the rise of radical Arab nationalism and the expansionist objectives and subversive activities of the UAR. Underlying the present conflict in Lebanon is a condition of increasing tension between forces favoring open alignment with the West and those favoring the “positive neutralism” of the radical pan-Arab movement led by Nasser and reflected in the UAR. There is a rough correspondence between these contradictory tendencies and the Lebanese Christian and Moslem communities; the sharpening of the issue tends to break down the modus vivendi whereby those communities have hitherto combined to form the Lebanese state.
2. The present conflict was touched off by indications that Christian President Chamoun intended to amend the constitution in order to succeed himself. This has antagonized some pro-Western elements as well as the neutralist elements, and provided Nasser with an opportunity which he has exploited. The situation is complicated by personal and political rivalries within the Christian and Moslem communities as well as between them. The opposition, which includes Christians as well as Moslems, has no common objective other than forcing Chamoun from office and as yet has no common leader. Many of its most militant elements have been stimulated by the rise of radical pan-Arab nationalism to challenge the status quo in Lebanon. They have also received from UAR policy guidance, propaganda support, and weapons, supplies, and “volunteers,” which have greatly increased the difficulties facing the Lebanese government security forces in their efforts to cope with the uprising.
[Here follow paragraphs 3–6 containing general information on the situation in Lebanon.]
II. Consequences of a Collapse of a Pro-Western Government Without US Intervention
7. Most politically conscious elements in the Middle East identify Chamoun with the US. They probably believe that the US is committed to the preservation of a Western-oriented regime in Lebanon if not to the continuation of Chamoun himself in office. In these circumstances, if Chamoun’s government or a pro-Western successor government collapsed under the onslaught of anti-Western opposition elements, friends and enemies of the West alike would believe—irrespective of whether any formal request for help had in fact been made—that the US had proved itself unwilling to come to the aid of its declared ally and friend, and that it had capitulated to Nasser. The governments of Middle East countries disposed toward cooperation with the West would be strongly influenced to revise their policies.
[Page 95]8. The reaction to a US failure to intervene would be strongest and most harmful to the US if there had been a publicized request for US assistance prior to the collapse of a pro-Western government in Lebanon.
9. We believe that the disorders in Lebanon have already cost the US some prestige in the area, since they are widely interpreted as evidence of deep-seated and powerful opposition to a chosen instrument and client of the US. Any political compromise in Lebanon will cause some further loss of prestige, and the overthrow of Chamoun by clearly anti-Western forces would be construed as a drastic weakening of US resolve to maintain its interests in the area.
10. Moreover, collapse of a pro-Western government, with no US action, would almost certainly accelerate the activities of the UAR and its supporters in seeking to undermine anti-Nasser regimes. Popular sentiment would be more inclined to view the UAR as the wave of the future, and there would be some increase in the danger of collapse of anti-Nasser regimes.
III. Probable Consequences of US Intervention
11. Lebanese generally are probably fearful of the consequences of intervention by Western troops. Reactions would be conditioned, however, by the circumstances in which intervention took place. In a situation in which the Lebanese believe that domestic conflict was primarily the result of internal differences, most would tend to oppose intervention; many would accept intervention if they believed that the UAR sought to dominate and absorb Lebanon; but most Moslems would probably prefer domination by the UAR to Western occupation.
12. If the US were to intervene at the request of President Chamoun under present circumstances, the reaction of the Christian community would be divided and a majority of Moslems would be strongly opposed. If Chamoun were to gain a larger measure of control of the internal political situation and if the integrity of Lebanon appeared to be threatened by Lebanese extremists and the UAR, most of the Christians would probably rally behind him and accept intervention, but only a small part of the Moslems would do so. If Chamoun were to yield to a successor government committed to maintaining Lebanon’s integrity and tacitly friendly to the West and if the integrity of Lebanon under that government were in turn jeopardized by Lebanese extremists aided by the UAR, such a government could probably get most Christians and some Moslems to support it if it asked for US intervention.
13. In the complex Lebanese situation, one immediate problem confronting the intervening forces would be that US forces would probably find themselves in hostile contact not only with UAR-controlled subversive elements, but with a wide variety of local elements [Page 96] not presently hostile to the West but acting either in opposition to Chamoun or to foreign intervention in principle. Even if General Chehab were willing to cooperate fully, some of the Moslem elements in the army might desert. In any event, clashes with opposition forces and expanded opposition activities probably would force the US to commit large forces to deal with large areas of Lebanon. For instance, it probably would prove necessary to conduct operations in areas other than the principal coastal cities in order to cope with guerrilla or terrorist activities and to block logistical support being sent to opposition forces from Syria. This would increase the risk of clashes with UAR forces and of inadvertent violations of UAR territory.
14. US military intervention would keep any pro-Western government in office. If it took place in behalf of a pro-Western government which had succeeded Chamoun, most of the Christian population would unite behind it. In any event, US intervention would be widely regarded as a move to perpetuate Christian dominance. The government’s capability to govern the Moslem portion of the population would be drastically reduced. The local Moslem-Christian conflict would not only be intensified but would also be more closely identified with the broader issues between pan-Arab nationalism and the West.
15. Thus, it would be extremely difficult to create a stable situation not clearly dependent on US forces. In the longer run, any regime so dependent would probably be held in widespread contempt, not only by anti-Western but also by most moderate elements. It probably would not long survive the withdrawal of Western forces. Thus, the US might find itself faced with the onerous choices of a prolonged stay in Lebanon or a withdrawal while the situation was still unstabilized.
16. UAR Reaction:Nasser and the UAR leaders have assiduously exploited the Lebanese crisis to promote the cause of radical pan-Arab unity. They would treat US military intervention as a direct challenge to their long-range objectives, but would also regard it as presenting substantial opportunities for exploitation in the area. Their reaction would be sharp:
- a.
- They would be certain to step up their propaganda campaign against the US, the Baghdad Pact, and the anti-UAR governments, notably those of Jordan and Iraq. They would take vigorous action in the UN, almost certainly with Soviet support.
- b.
- They would probably continue and possibly increase covert assistance to opposition forces in Lebanon, including support for terrorist actions against US troops and civilians. However, Nasser would try to avoid direct clashes between regular UAR forces and those of the US.
- c.
- They would probably take sabotage action, directly or by proxy, against Western oil interests in Lebanon and possibly by closing down or sabotaging the Syrian pipelines. They might also attempt sabotage against oil operations in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrein, and Aden.
17. Elsewhere in the Area: The governments of Jordan and Iraq would probably welcome US intervention as a blow against Nasser and as an encouraging demonstration of US determination to support its friends in the area. However, there would be strong adverse popular reaction in these countries against the US move. This popular reaction would limit the freedom of action of the governments. In these circumstances, effective Iraqi and Jordanian cooperation in the intervention cannot be assumed. Other Arab governments, such as those of Libya and the Sudan, which are vulnerable to Nasser’s moves, would also welcome US intervention, but would be even more restrained than Iraq and Jordan from openly supporting it. The governments of Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan would almost certainly support the US move. The Saudi Arabian Government would probably seek to avoid involvement in the situation.
18. To the extent that the intervention succeeded in restoring a stable pro-Western government in Lebanon, Arab popular reaction would become colored by respect for US firmness. There might be some decline in belief in the UAR as the wave of the future and the pace and scope of UAR expansion might be reduced for a time. This would not, however, seriously weaken the long-term trends in the area toward radical pan-Arab unity. If the US were forced to maintain its forces in Lebanon for a protracted period, the popular reaction would become increasingly adverse, since the occupation would be played up and probably accepted as evidence that the US intended to re-establish Western imperialist control in the area.
19. Israel would view intervention by the US as a favorable precedent. However, realizing that its open cooperation would be unwelcome to the West and would probably serve mainly to unite the Arabs, Israel would probably avoid direct involvement in the situation as long as the conflict remained confined within Lebanon.
20. Soviet Reaction: The nature of the Soviet reaction to US intervention with military force would vary according to circumstances and the Soviet assessment of opportunities to damage the US position. If the US were to intervene in Lebanon in order to assist the government to cope with a UAR-supported uprising, the Soviet reaction would probably be confined to vigorous diplomatic and propaganda action. If, in the course of this intervention, the US became involved in military action on UAR territory, the Soviets would react more strongly, possibly increasing military assistance and providing “volunteers.” Although the latter course of action would increase the chance of a [Page 98] Soviet-US conflict through miscalculation, we believe it unlikely that the USSR would take action which it estimated would involve serious risk of general war.
21. Effect of UK Participation: We believe that adverse reaction to intervention would be intensified if the UK participated, but the considerations set down above would not be significantly altered.
Outlook
[2 paragraphs (21½ lines of source text) not declassified]
24. Whatever the outcome of the present crisis, we do not believe that the present political-religious balance, with its slight edge in favor of the Christians, can long be maintained in Lebanon as presently constituted. The UAR will almost certainly continue to exert formidable pressures upon Lebanon, encouraging the Moslem element to reach for greater power, to contest the Christians’ Western orientation, and to move in the direction of neutralism and pan-Arabism. Thus, the long range tendency appears likely to be in the direction of increased instability, with the possibility of fragmentation or some accommodation with the UAR.
- Source: Department of State, INR–NIE Files. Top Secret. According to a note on the cover sheet: “The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff.” All members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in the estimate on June 5, except for the Atomic Energy Commission representative and the Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained because the subject was outside of their jurisdiction.↩
- We assume that if US forces were to intervene in Lebanon, they would be accompanied by UK forces. [Footnote in the source text.]↩