411. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State1
361. Reference Deptel 302.2 I met with King and Talhouni together afternoon of tenth. I opened by stating that yesterday I had come to see His Majesty to express deep personal concern of myself and my government at Jordanian build-up of troop strength along Syrian border. Today I had come under specific instructions which, I had explained to King yesterday, I expected to receive momentarily. I then expanded on points in reftel and ended up urging in strongest terms that GOJ weigh most carefully in terms of its own future and welfare as well as in terms of international relations consequences which might occur if it should embark on an adventure in Syria.
King heard me out without interrupting and when I stopped he smiled and said he hoped I would forgive him if he went over some of same ground we had covered yesterday. [10½ lines of source text not declassified]
[1 paragraph (8 lines of source text) not declassified]
I then asked if Jordan intended to allow sufficient time to have its grievance heard by UN, why at this particular time should troops and armored strength be built up along Syrian frontier. [9½ lines of source text not declassified]
In considering these three reasons, I said I realized there must be elements in Jordan which were crying for vengeance and which perhaps could not be satisfied except through some form of action. At same time, it occurred to me that troop build-up was subject to considerable danger. Tempers could easily be inflamed and any small incident at frontier could develop into large scale conflagration. King replied he recognized dangers inherent in this but thought necessity of safety valve justified present risk.
[2 paragraphs (13½ lines of source text) not declassified] I thanked King and said I knew my government would be pleased to have his assurances. USG recognized there might be pressures on him, but we were sure that as a leader of the Arab world with considerable international stature he would be able to control those elements in his country which might desire hasty or ill-considered action. My government had come to same conclusion as he, namely that UN [Page 739] offered most satisfactory and possibly only method of seeking redress in situation. King agreed, said he would keep in touch with me, and again gave his reassurances.
Comment: I was most encouraged by this talk. Some of evasiveness of yesterday’s conversation was missing and King’s reassurances were clearer and sharper. I came away with firm feeling King in control of extremist elements and at least for moment will not allow them gain satisfactions they desire immediately. Moreover, I believe as of now he fully intends give UN adequate opportunity consider case.
Considerable danger still exists, of course, small border incident could provoke full scale attack. Also King might lose control to extremists. Greater danger than either of those perhaps is possibility of provocative reply from UAR to GOJ note requesting extradition or another incident similar to PriMin bombing. Latter case, I am convinced, would lead to instant and violent retaliation by GOJ against UAR.3
- Source: Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project “Clean Up”, Jordan. Confidential; Niact; Limit Distribution. Repeated to London, Cairo, Tel Aviv, Beirut, Damascus, Jerusalem, and USUN.↩
- Document 409.↩
On September 10, President Eisenhower approved a personal message from him to King Hussein praising Hussein’s restraint since the assassination of Prime Minister Majali, and counseling against military retaliation to avenge the death of Majali. The message, which was drafted by Mills in NEA and approved by Herter, warned that an aggressive action by Jordan against the UAR could start a chain reaction in the Middle East “the final repercussions of which could easily be disastrous not only for Jordan but for the area as a whole and indeed for the world.” The message was sent to Amman on September 10 in telegram 322, with instructions to Kocher to deliver it to Hussein if, in Kocher’s judgment, the situation was such that the message would have a constructive impact. (Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project “Clean Up”, Jordan)
Kocher replied, in telegram 367 from Amman, September 11, that he felt it advisable for the moment to hold the President’s message in reserve. He felt that the démarches which he and British Ambassador Johnston had made within the past few days had made clear to the King “extreme concern both US and HMG regarding present situation.” Kocher concluded that the President’s message would have little additional impact if delivered on the heels of those démarches. Later, however, he felt it could be of “incalculable help to us.” (Ibid.; included in the microfiche supplement) A handwritten notation on the copy of telegram 322 found in Project “Clean Up” files reads: “Never delivered.”
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